

NIKOLAI YAKOVLEV

CIA TARGET-

the **USSR**



PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

Although the CIA is active throughout the world (including the United States), this book deals only with its subversion against the Soviet Union. Following the techniques of the wartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the CIA attempts to undermine the Soviet social and state system. Professor Yakovlev gives a detailed analysis of 'psychological warfare', describing 'Operation Solzhenitsyn', Carter's 'human rights' campaign and the true image of those who took part in it in the U.S.S.R.—Andrei Sakharov, Yuri Orlov, et al. Of particular interest is the author's examination of the collaboration between U.S. scholars and the CIA. The book has sold 300,000 copies in the Soviet Union.

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CIA TARGET- THE USSR



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AN UNAVOIDABLE EXPLANATION

Any analysis of Western secret services is bound to be difficult. It is like hewing one's way through a dark jungle of confusing, sometimes totally confounding, facts. The difficulty is both conceptual and functional, relating to search and selection of information. Though the subject is unquestionably autonomous, and, at times, has its own motive forces, the work of secret services is ultimately no more than a continuation by other means of the policy of the governments concerned. In many cases, however, it is work that the governments will officially and vigorously disavow. That reason alone, to say nothing of the secrecy that shrouds the subject, makes the researcher literally gasp for air—for aren't facts the air the researcher breathes. What he often gets instead is poison vapour, because no other sphere of Western governmental activity resorts so freely to misinformation.

Yet, knowing the subject is vitally important. For to understand the modern world we must also understand the work of the secret services, specifically the Central Intelligence Agency of the U.S.A., whose far-flung and varied activity draws in all of mankind.

Allen Dulles, that classic figure of U.S. espionage (yes, the field has grown so much that it also has its classics), ended his book, *The Craft of Intelligence*, on the following note:

'The military threat in the nuclear missile age is well understood, and we are rightly spending billions to counter it. We must similarly deal with all aspects of the invisible war... The last thing we can afford to do today is to put our intelligence in chains. Its protective and informative role is indispensable in an era of unique and continuing danger.'¹

There is a lot here that attracts the eye—like the reference to the cost of the invisible war (as high as the

cost of ICBMs and nuclear bombs), and like the semantics of Dulles's pronouncement.

F. Prouty—a man who ought to know for he was once the Pentagon's liaison officer with the CIA—commented in a rare moment of truth, in the mid-1970s (at the close of the Vietnam war and shortly before Watergate) that the above final and summary paragraph of the old master is the best sample of the intelligence team's view of how to live in the modern nuclear age. They would have us establish the most extensive and expensive intelligence network possible and then develop a feedback capability that would automatically counter every threat they saw.

'Although Allen Dulles does not say it in his book, his concept of Intelligence is about 10 percent real Intelligence and 90 percent clandestine operations. In other words he would have us busy all around the world all of the time countering "all aspects of the invisible war". By this he means intervening in the internal affairs of other nations with or without their knowledge and permission... It is what the United States has been doing in an increasing crescendo of events, beginning with such actions as the involvements in Berlin and Iran in the 1940s and culminating in the terrible disaster of Vietnam that began as a major intelligence operation, went on into the clandestine operations stage, then got out of hand and had to become an overt activity during the Johnson era.'²

Why these revelations came when they did is understandable. Prouty's piece was written in 1973 when people in the United States were totalling up the damages of the Vietnam war. There were all sorts of estimates in those days, of which R. Sigford said in an unpublished paper, 'The Rhetoric of the Vietnam War: Presidents Johnson and Nixon', for the University of Minnesota: 'Estimates vary, but the direct and indirect cost of the Vietnam War in terms of dollars and cents to the United States comes to about 350 billion dollars.'³ That's high. What's more, as usual in the ultra-pragmatic United States, it left out the cost in human lives, especially those of the Vietnamese.

In 1978, when the dust had settled, former CIA Director William Colby let it be known that in the seventies the

spending on covert actions was 'rapidly diminishing'. He amplified: 'The Agency had cut back on political action and paramilitary operations to the extent that funding for Covert Action had plummeted from more than 50 percent of the over-all CIA budget in the 1950s and 1960s to something well under 5 percent.' Did this mean the funding had really plummeted? No, covert action was being financed out of other budgets. Colby admitted it. 'The Agency,' he said, 'had turned over virtually all its political-action and paramilitary operations ... to Pentagon.' As for Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and the Asia Foundation, Colby added, their financing was left 'for the State Department and Congress to work out.'⁴ This from Colby's long and inarticulate memoirs, *Honorable Men. My Life in the CIA*.

For his title he borrowed the pronouncement of an equal—his predecessor in the office of CIA director, Helms, who in the early seventies publicly reassured those who had lost faith in the virtues of the Agency: 'Take it on faith that we too are honorable men'. It so happened that some time later Helms was caught in an act of perjury before Congress, which would ordinarily—for any plain American—mean certain imprisonment. But when 'honorable man' Helms was summoned into court, he and his lawyer begged for leniency on the grounds that he would carry 'the scar of a conviction for the rest of his days'. The court responded by imposing a fine of 2,000 dollars in November 1977, but not for perjury. It concocted a misdemeanor that isn't in any law book: failing to testify 'fully, completely and accurately' before Congress.

The Nation observed in its November 19, 1977 issue that 'the *quid* the government got for the *quo* of Helms's agreement to enter a *nolo* plea to a misdemeanor was the avoidance of a trial to which the former CIA chief could have brought a heavy load of dirty linen for judicial laundering. Among others, Henry Kissinger's splattered shirts would have been revealed for all to see.' Outside the court, the journal went on, as Helms, sentenced to a fine incommensurable with the magnitude of his act, and his lawyer 'talked to reporters, that "scar" had been miraculously changed into "a badge of honor", even a "banner", as the wily attorney put it.'⁵ Indeed, confounding any attempts, whoever they come from, at sounding out

the essence of the U.S. system of government, is for the CIA a matter of honour, no less. That, among other things, is what it's there for.

There is no greater delusion than to picture the CIA as purely an agency of intelligence and counter-intelligence. Whatever corrections Colby may have made, Proudy's estimate, based on the authority of Allen Dulles, is much more convincing: real intelligence is 10 or slightly more per cent of the CIA concerns. If this weren't so, there'd have been no need to have the CIA. For as we will see the United States has no dearth in intelligence services, of which, by a rough estimate, there are at least ten. George Kennan, diplomat and political thinker, a part-time expert on covert operations, observes rightly that secret intelligence 'was a normal feature of the policies of national states long before either the Soviet Union or even the United States came into existence; and it would be utopian to hope for its total disappearance. But there are limits... I myself have had occasion to see instance after instance in which American intelligence authorities have mounted, or have attempted to mount, operations which have constituted, or would have constituted, a direct abuse not just of Soviet-American diplomatic relations in the formal sense but of the very possibilities for reaching a better understanding between the two governments'.⁶

The above is an understatement as concerns the policy Washington pursues through the CIA. But it is better than nothing. And it is a reflection of Kennan's recently surfacing realism at very mature age.

Certainly, the CIA is not intelligence alone. It is the conductor and orchestrator of the so-called psychological warfare. To this it devotes some 90 per cent of its resources. The definition of 'psychological warfare' given in instructions to the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) in 1942 ran as follows: 'The coordination and use of all means, including moral and physical, by which the end is to be attained—other than those of recognized military operations, but including the psychological exploitation of the result of those recognized military actions—which tend to destroy the will of the enemy to achieve victory and to damage his political or economic capacity to do so; which tend to deprive the enemy of the support, assist-

ance, or sympathy of his allies or associates or of neutrals, or to prevent his acquisition of such support, assistance, or sympathy; or which tend to create, maintain, or increase the will to victory of our own people and allies and to acquire, maintain, or increase the support, assistance and sympathy of neutrals.'⁷

These methods are equivalent to attempts at disrupting the political system of the target state, and at ultimately overthrowing it. Espionage is a subsidiary tool of that aim. The spearhead of the CIA 'psychological warfare' is directed against the Soviet Union. That, indeed, had been the purpose for the establishment and maintenance of the CIA, a type of organisation without precedent in history.

On a broader plane, the CIA is one of the most important and probably the sharpest tool of the U.S. ruling elite for retailoring the world to suit Washington's likings.

Irrespective of the tone and tenor of the official rhetoric, the ruling American political tradition is intolerance. It dates to the days when the Pilgrim Fathers, who hadn't got on with the Old World, crossed the ocean to set up a state fitting their views. That was when the *we-they* outlook took shape. And any careful observer will see that the U.S. statesmen who speak for political pluralism are really intolerant of it, for they worship the form of government in the United States as the only possible and in every way superior form. For reasons rooted in this American political tradition, the permanent conflict between the U.S.A. and the rest of the world is in fact inevitable. The functional role of the CIA is to do what it can to settle the conflict in America's favour.

Intolerance outside the country, as well as at home. A truly sectarian ethic. Whatever the White House says is to be taken as gospel. We need no examples from the remote past. Here's a recent one. The criterion for nominees to top offices in the administration, according to Lyndon Johnson, is loyalty: 'I don't want loyalty. I want *loyalty*. I want him to kiss my ass in Macy's window at high noon and tell me it smells like roses.'⁸ But what about the mass media, the press? They write from all angles, don't they? They do. But White House accreditation is something an American journalist doesn't sneeze at. And there, to take the word of a newsman who didn't

make it, one H. Thompson, 'guys like Mears (Walter Mears, *Associated Press*) and Semple (Bob Semple, *The New York Times*) go whimpering around—kissing Ron Ziegler's (President Nixon's press secretary) ass.'⁹

What else could one expect? The psychological warfare is directed inward, too, with the object of maintaining extreme conformism. Still, the CIA is being extensively discussed in the press. There had even been an investigation. Let's see what came of it.

The outcry that had set in motion various CIA and FBI investigations in the mid-seventies has been almost completely cushioned by the ramified American political system. Now that the dust has settled, the sediment it had brought to the light of day can be examined at greater ease. The first thing that strikes the eye is that the 'investigators' tackled not what they wanted or what was suspect, but only those facts, as a rule, which the leaders of the country and of its intelligence services thought fit for public consumption. These were a motley array of facts, some of an intimidating nature, but facts that had been filtered by a finicky political censorship.

Over these facts Western, notably American, mass media have broken many lances. Now, within limits, all Americans know, and are mildly outraged by the carefully selected facts about the punitive system in the U.S.A., the U.S. espionage, and the experiments that robbed people of their will power. The due censure has been pronounced. But the end purpose of the campaign is still a puzzle to many. It will be no exaggeration to say, however, that this fairly close examination (save some sinister omissions) of the attempts, say, to put people's minds under control is, in fact, an essential part of the effort to establish such control on the widest possible scale. The dissidents, at least, have been warned of what awaits them if they don't mend their ways. It will be no exaggeration to say, too, that the purpose of the whole thing was to show the world, especially outside the orbit of U.S. 'democracy', who exactly is standing guard over capitalism and how.

The Progressive, an American journal that gives vent to judgements suiting its title, remarked about the investigations on Capitol Hill as follows: 'The records were excessively censored... The Senate committee was blunt

enough about the illegalities and outrages of the FBI, but it was almost sycophantic in some of its assessments of the CIA... "The best thing about this is that it's over," Senator Howard H. Baker, Tennessee Republican, declared of the fifteen-month investigation that preceded the big moment. "We're finished (and) we've done it, I believe, without doing any damage, or injury, to the agencies".'¹⁰ No damage at all. And plenty of publicity, of a kind that will make Americans think twice before they venture to go against the established law and order.

The circumspect citizen of that overpraised civilisation seeks escape in spiritual escapism. *Catch 22* has become a fact of life. Some are trying to leave the country. A deplorable example is the thousand Americans, described as a sect, who had sought refuge in the jungles of Guyana in the seventies. The reason for their withdrawal into the tropical forest is obvious: the wretches were looking for freedom. Some may, admittedly, have had a warped idea of that priceless treasure, and fell under the influence of Jeff Jones, who is said to have been a religious fanatic and mystic. But this could not be true of all the thousand. Though they hadn't committed any crimes or misdemeanors, they felt the tentacles of the secret services reaching out to them in the jungle. In the eyes of the exponents of American 'democracy' their collective protest and departure from the U.S.A. was a 'conspiracy'. And no sooner did the prospect of being shipped home, into the maw of 'law and order', loom big for the unfortunates in November 1978 than most of them preferred to commit suicide. They were victims of the psychological warfare.

The CIA practises subversion in many different fields. At present, not minimising other areas, it applies special efforts in the field of ideology against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. The choice was made for a number of reasons, partly beyond the control of the CIA chiefs.

Let's look at that particular aspect of CIA activity. But since it is not possible to detach it completely from the general picture of Western subversion, we will therefore have to touch on other issues.

The first question: why was the CIA established in 1947, not before and not after?

For the Soviet Union 1947 was a history-making year, austere and portentous. Some of the war wounds had been healed. Industrial output was back at prewar level. The dry, precise figures of the Central Statistical Board spoke of a gigantic labour effort in the war-ravaged west of the traditionally Russian territory that had been the scene of titanic battles.

On the ruins of towns and villages, factories and mines, a life of peace was being rebuilt by men just back from the war. Army greatcoats, shirts and boots carrying the dust of Europe were standard apparel. Life was hard, the problems gigantic. The war-ravaged country had to be put back on its feet, and this by its own effort if it wanted to look to the future with assurance. The one motive was to return life to normal as quickly as possible for a nation that had borne the brunt of the most terrible war in history.

The people of the Soviet Union had earned the right to a steep rise in living standards and, much more, the right to repose and tranquillity after the crushing ordeal of war. Though much was being done, there was much more that still had to be done. And it wasn't just a question of war's aftermaths, which were in evidence at every step. Even after Victory, much of the country's resources were being claimed by what were now called defensive rather than military needs. It was clear even before the guns had fallen silent that defence would be imperative. The blinding explosions over Hiroshima and Nagasaki had been a stern warning to mankind of what imperialism, armed with the latest weapons, was liable to inflict on the world. At the turning from war to peace, therefore, the U.S.S.R. had to marshal tremendous funds for the development of new, highly expensive weapon sys-

tems, first of all atomic arms. And this at a time when every rouble counted. Naturally, this affected the life of the Soviet people.

In 1947, Colonel-General E. I. Smirnov, who had headed the wartime medical service of the Soviet Armed Forces, changed from military into civilian clothes, and assumed the post of Health Minister of the U.S.S.R. To his new office he brought his extraordinary gifts and experience: no other belligerent army had had as high a percentage of recoveries from wounds as had the Red Army, and throughout the war, at the grimmest times, there had been no epidemics of infectious diseases. Smirnov tackled his new job with the usual energy. He toured the war-ruined provinces, and was stunned. In the Donets Basin area, in the city of Makeyevka, hospital patients were given their meals in tin cans. These much used cans were before his mind's eye when he reported to the government on the priority needs of his ministry. It needed money. And money was allocated, but the sums were far less than needed.

Joseph Stalin admitted Smirnov's concern to be legitimate, but said that in his position the minister certainly knew of the development of atomic arms and where the money was going. That was why so many crying needs were being put off. But there was no other choice. A deadly peril had again arisen for the Soviet people which had saved European civilisation from the Nazis.

There was only one country in the world then that had any surpluses—the United States. It had escaped the ravages of war. It had flourished. We and the Americans had fought on the same side, but our contributions to the war had been different. Not a single shell had burst on U.S. soil, not a single American home had been gutted. The death toll of the U.S.S.R. was 20,000,000, that of the U.S.A. 400,000: one American for every 50 Soviet dead. I made this comparison time and again when writing of World War II. For that is something no historian in America, and most of them have views that differ from ours, can deny. Professor John Lewis Gaddis, for one, referred to a piece of mine, noting that 'a recent Soviet Account has

noted pointedly but accurately that for every American killed in the war against the Axis, fifty Russians died'.¹

The material losses, too, were different. The war destroyed a third of the Soviet Union's national wealth. And only some decades earlier, in World War I and the Civil War, Soviet losses in percentage terms had been as staggering. For the Soviet Union, the cost of the war of 1941-1945 at the then current rate of exchange, amounted to 485,000 million dollars (including destroyed property). The U.S. war cost was 330,000 million. U.S. lend-lease aid to countries fighting the Axis powers totalled 43,600 million dollars, out of which approximately 10,000 million went to the Soviet Union, amounting to about 3.5 per cent of total U.S. war cost. That is the figure—3.5 per cent—we should go by when evaluating the wartime cooperation of our two nations, because it represents the U.S. contribution to the mammoth battles in the chief and decisive theatre of the war against Germany and its allies.

Many influential and highly placed Americans visited the Soviet Union in the early postwar years. They were warmly received as recent allies. Some were received or granted interviews by Stalin. Asked on October 29, 1946 by a United Press correspondent if Russia was still interested in a U.S. loan, Stalin answered in the affirmative. The correspondent asked how long it would take to rehabilitate the devastated regions of Western Russia. Stalin said, six or seven years, perhaps longer.²

President Roosevelt's son, Elliott, put the question a little differently (in an interview on December 21, 1946): 'If a system of loans or credits were arranged between the United States and the Soviet Union, would such agreements have a lasting benefit to the economy of the United States?'

Stalin replied: 'The system of such credits is, of course, mutually advantageous both to the United States and to the Soviet Union.'³

The logic of the late President's son, no longer very young and consequently capable of thinking for himself, was no less than astonishing: what benefits could the United States, which had enriched itself on the war, get from the Soviet Union that had been bled, and bled white? As though the millions of Soviet lives laid down for America, among others, weren't enough?

At that time, indeed, it was expected that the United States would give a helping hand to its wartime ally, and assist it, if only a little, in recovering from the destruction incurred in the defence not only of our country, but of the cause of the United Nations. But the matter didn't go any further than words, words, words. The upper echelons in the U.S.A. had other plans. Some twenty years later, George Kennan (then counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow) wrote in the first volume of his memoirs, published in 1967:

'The American administrations of that day, both FDR's and Mr. Truman's, have often been reproached over the intervening years for the abrupt cancellation of Lend-Lease to Russia in the summer of 1945, and the failure to offer to the Soviet Union the large-scale loan which, in the view of some, the Soviet leaders had been encouraged to believe they would receive... I must confess that if the United States government deserves criticism for taking a hard line in any or all of these problems, I deserve greater criticism for taking a still harder one, for taking it earlier, and for inspiring and encouraging Washington in its stiffness. It will stand as a fair example of the views I was putting before the ambassador and the State Department at that time. I know of no justification, either economic or political, for any further granting of Lend-Lease aid to Russia, for any agreement on our part that Russia, not being a contributor to UNRRA*, should receive any substantial amount of UNRRA aid, or for any extension of U.S. government credit to Russia without equivalent political advantage to our people... I find, in retrospect, nothing to regret about this.'

Why this ill will against an ally of the United States? Didn't Kennan, a man who had devoted his life to studying the Soviet Union and who was considered a leading

* UNRRA—United Nations Relief and Reconstruction Administration, was formed in 1943. Its members, whose territory had not come under enemy occupation, were to contribute up to 2 per cent of their 1943 national income to its funds. Other members were urged to make contributions within their power. The U.S. representatives in UNRRA used aid in attempts to achieve aims sought by Washington. The Administration was dissolved in 1947. (*Here and further the footnotes are by the author.*)

expert in Soviet affairs, know enough of the country and its people? We find instructive episodes in his memoirs, lifting the veil on the mentality of those who shape American policy. 'My views on all that had to do with possible economic aid to Russia,' he wrote, 'were influenced, I suspect, by the impressions of a journey that I had opportunity to make, within the Soviet Union, not long after the ending of hostilities in Europe.' The U.S. Embassy counsellor visited Novosibirsk and Kuznetsk, and was hospitably received. But here is what he writes: 'I was required to endure all over again that well-meant but sometimes trying refrain of Russian hospitality: "You don't eat anything. You don't like it, huh?"' The kind hosts could not know that Kennan's ambition, as he notes in his memoirs, was to see Kuznetsk where 'no Westerner, so far as I could ascertain, had been... for several years. I had never seen any of the leading Soviet industrial plants.'

For Kennan it had been a most rewarding journey. He saw everything he had wanted to see. He visited the places where Soviet military power was forged during the war, and was probably impressed. Years later, he described what he remembered of those days when, as a man who spoke fluent Russian, he was not recognised as an American by the people around him. Here is what he wrote:

'The result was that I had, for once, the feeling of not being a stranger, of belonging to a company of ordinary Soviet people. My companions on the plane, in any case, did not seem to recognize me as anything out of the ordinary. At the airport in Omsk, sitting in the grass under the shade of the wing of the plane in the heat of the day, I read aloud to a group of them, at their request, from a volume of Aleksei Tolstoy's *Peter the Great* which I had with me. In the evenings I shared their company in the little airport dormitories as though I were a common citizen like the rest of them. I felt immensely at home among them.'

But the call of duty came first. Little did his companions on the plane suspect what was going on in the mind of this modestly clothed man wearing a simple worker's cap:

'Watching the great plain of the region just west of the Volga as it slowly receded beneath us, I fell to

thinking, in connection with these friendly fellow passengers, of the problem of American aid to Russia... The Russian people, as the experiences of this visit had just emphasized for me, were a great and appealing people. The sufferings they had recently undergone were enormous. These sufferings had been incurred partly in our own cause. One would have liked to help, but could one? When a people found itself under the control of a strongly authoritarian regime, and especially one hostilely inclined to the United States, there was very little that Americans could do to help them, it occurred to me, without helping the regime... People and regime, in other words, were bound together in a common dialectical relationship, so that you could not help people without helping regime, and you could not harm regime without harming people. In these circumstances it was better, surely, to try neither to help nor to harm, but rather to leave people alone. It was, after all, *their* predicament, not ours.'

Lofty thoughts those, verging on the philosophical. What stereotype anti-Soviet pragmatism! Kennan looked with the frigid eyes of an 'expert' on those whose 'sufferings had been incurred partly in our own [American] cause', and concluded that, after all, it was *their* predicament. Granted, that was a personal view. But what about the hostility to the U.S.A. that Kennan refers to? In his slowly developing narrative, he recalls how in the autumn of 1945 a group of American congressmen had (importunately, we may add) obtained Stalin's consent to receive them.

Kennan, who was in charge of the Embassy in the absence of the U.S. Ambassador, was to accompany them to the Kremlin. The Congressmen appeared before him from underground: they had just been on a tour of the Metro (the Moscow subway), where they had been offered refreshments (again that sinister Russian hospitality), and having lost their sense of proportion were in their cups, though, surely, the hosts had not intended that.

'They were on the verge of their interview with the great Soviet leader,' he writes. 'We tore away, in two limousines, in the direction of the Kremlin, I riding in the front seat of one of the cars. As we approached the Kremlin gate, protected by what was probab-

ly the most vigilant and elaborate system of guarding of any place in the world, I was horrified to hear, from the interior of the car behind me, a raucous voice saying: "Who the hell is this guy Stalin, anyway? I don't know that I want to go up and see him. I think I'll get out." Elaborate arrangements had been made, including even the submission of every passport to the Foreign Office, to assure admission of the party to the Kremlin, and I knew that if anyone were missing, things would be royally gummed up. So I said with great definiteness: "You'll do nothing of the sort. You will sit right there where you are and remain with the party." There ensued the formalities at the gate. Doors were opened, identities were established, seats were looked under. A car full of armed men was placed before us, and another one behind. Thus guarded, we drove off up the short incline to the heart of the Kremlin. At this point the same raucous voice became audible once more behind me: "What if I biff the old codger one in the nose?" My heart froze. I cannot recall what I said, but I am sure that never in my life did I speak with greater earnestness. I had, as I recollect it, the help of some of the more sober members of the party. In any case, our companion came meekly along. He sat in Stalin's office at the end of the long table, facing Stalin, and did nothing more disturbing than to leer and wink once or twice at the bewildered dictator, thus making it possible for the invisible gun muzzles, with which the room was no doubt studded, to remain sullenly silent.

Incredible nonsense. And this from a man said to be an 'expert' on the Soviet Union with a reputation for sound thinking. Speaking of 'hostility', doesn't it positively brim over in Kennan's masterpiece?

What did the elected representatives of the American people speak about with Stalin that day? 'I cannot recall the tenor of the discussion between the Congressmen and Stalin (the Washington archives, I am sure, would show it),' Kennan writes, 'but I have a vivid memory of our approach to this occasion.'⁴

Yes, we've heard about the 'approach'. As for the tenor of the discussion, there's no need to trouble the Wa-

shington archives. On returning home, the talkative Congressmen lost no time to tell all comers why they had visited the Kremlin. They were members of the House Select Committee on Postwar Economic Policy and Planning no less. Gaddis collected and studied their pronouncements at the time, and described them in his book, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* (which appeared in 1972):

'On September 14, 1945, this delegation, led by Committee chairman William M. Colmer of Mississippi, enjoyed the distinction of a personal interview with Joseph Stalin.

'Colmer told the Soviet leader that his committee knew about the Russian desire for a loan from the United States. How, he wanted to know, would the Soviets use the money, how would they pay it back, and what could Washington expect in return? ...The delegation stopped off in London on its way home to report to Secretary of State Byrnes, and later conferred personally with President Truman. Before both men Colmer's group stressed the necessity "of stiffening our collective backbone in dealing with the Soviet Republic".

'The Colmer committee was willing to approve an American loan to the Soviet Union; but only if the Russians met certain conditions. They would have to disclose what proportion of total production they devoted to armaments. They would be required to reveal vital statistics on the operation of the Soviet economy, and to provide an opportunity to check the accuracy of these figures. The Soviet Union would have to give up the administration of relief for political purposes in Eastern Europe and disclose the terms of its trade treaties with the countries of this area. Within both the USSR and the East European countries under its control, the Kremlin would have to guarantee full protection of American property, the right to distribute American books, magazines, newspapers, and motion pictures ... Finally, the United States should insist upon "the fulfillment of Russia's political obligations on the same terms as those of other Governments. This includes the withdrawal of Russian occupation forces in accordance with the

Potsdam agreements and the Yalta conference"... In short, Colmer and his colleagues demanded that, in return for an American loan, the Soviet Union reform its internal system of government and abandon the sphere of influence... in Eastern Europe.'⁵

What the sober ones have on their mind, runs a Russian saying, the drunken ones have on their tongue: the things the gentlemen of the Select Committee said in the Kremlin can be easily imagined. But, certainly, they weren't pumped full of vodka when they were developing their view on relations with the Soviet Union in their many public statements and articles, which Gaddis so faithfully summed up. What was said left little doubt as to who was 'hostilely inclined'. So, George Kennan, an experienced diplomat, naturally 'cannot recall' the tenor of the discussion, suggesting that the curious turn to the archives. Below, with a trace of annoyance, it is true, he sums up the extraordinary foray of the U.S. congressmen:

'The episode was a small one, but I must say that it was one of the impressions (and there were many of them in the course of a Foreign Service career) that gradually bred in me a deep skepticism about the absolute value of people-to-people contacts for the improvement of international relations. On the other hand, I must also say that our congressional visitors varied, in their capacity to derive profit for themselves...'⁶

This closing remark, naturally vague coming from a professional diplomat, explains the behavior of the official U.S. persons who kept arriving in Moscow in those days. In the summer of 1946, for example, a group headed by oil magnate Edwin Pauley arrived in the Soviet capital to discuss reparations. It had come in order to acquaint the Soviet administration with the First Charge Principle, namely, as U.S. historian Daniel Yergin explains in his book, *Shattered Peace* (1977), that 'reparations from current production—that is, the output of German industry—were to be kept as low as possible. Second, all exports from this production would be used first to pay for goods imported from the West, and only after that for reparations deliveries to the East. This was the so-called First Charge Principle. Germany was to be integrated into a multilateral, but American-dominated, world economic

order before reparations (in effect, aid) went to the Soviet ally... Some members of the U.S. delegation could not conceal their antagonism and their belief that their directives were too soft; some could not control their entrepreneurial drives. Several of Pauley's colleagues, recruited from the oil business, sold their suits in Moscow at a going price of \$ 250 each.'⁷

Small-time profiteers who, in addition to making a quick dollar, helped to block reparations to the Soviet Union, though it was established by that time that despite the war time destruction Germany's economic potential of 1945 was higher than in 1939.⁸ No, we could expect no good from theorists like Kennan, practitioners like Colmer, and people like Pauley & Co. For the simple reason that Washington saw the Soviet Union as an enemy, and acted accordingly.

3

That is what they still think of the U.S.S.R. The content of the bulky report of the U.S. Senate select committee that studied governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities is epitomised in its introductory passage:

'The Second World War saw the defeat of one brand of totalitarianism. A new totalitarian challenge quickly arose. The Soviet Union, a major ally in war, became America's principal adversary in peace. The power of fascism was in ruin but the power of communism was mobilized...

'American military intelligence officers were among the first to perceive the changed situation. Almost immediately after the fall of Berlin to the Red Army, U.S. military intelligence sought to determine Soviet objectives. Harry Rositzke, later to become chief of the CIA's Soviet Division, but at the time a military intelligence officer, was despatched to Berlin by jeep.'

Here is how Rositzke described his impression to the commission on October 31, 1975:

'We got on the outskirts of Berlin and yelled out "Amerikanski", and were highly welcomed. And as we went over the Autobahn the first basic impression I got, since I had known Germany well before the war, was a

long walking group of German males under 16 and over 60 who were being shepherded to the east by four-foot-ten, five-foot Mongolian soldiers with straw shoes...

'We then made our way through the rubble of Berlin—most were one-way streets—identifying every shoulder patch we could...

'When we had seen enough and were all three extremely nervous, we headed straight west from Berlin to the British Zone. When we arrived we had an enormous amount of exuberance and a real sense of relief, for the entire 36 hours had put us in another world. The words that came to my mind then were, "Russia moves west".'⁹

There had been nothing of the sort: Soviet soldiers never shepherded German males under 16 and over 60 to the east; nor could 'four-foot-ten, five-foot' soldiers, much less soldiers in 'straw shoes', ever have won the battle for Berlin, then the den of the fascist beast. The shoulder patches of Soviet soldiers are not identifiable. Nor was 'Russia moving west'. The man had lied to his superiors then, and lied again thirty years later. He portrayed his 36-hour stay in Berlin as an exploit. Yet he and his companions 'were highly welcomed', as he says himself—welcomed as allies, in the flush of victory, without a suspicion that the visitors were a little band of witless spies.*

But could one ask for more from a young, though promising, rogue, Harry Rositzke. General George Patton, a hero of that war glorified in the U.S.A., is a horse of a

* What the Senators swallowed hook, line and sinker, proved too much for the editors of Readers' Digest Press. Unlike the grey-haired legislators on Capitol Hill, who accepted Rositzke's story because it squared with their own stereotype mentality, the editors stripped the episode of some of the more 'colorful' detail in a 1977 book by Rositzke, entitled *CIA's Secret Operations. Espionage, Counterespionage and Covert Action*: 'No one knew what the Russians were doing in Berlin, and three of us, one a Russian-speaking ethnic Rumanian, volunteered to sneak into the Soviet zone and find out. Tense and somewhat apprehensive, we spent five hours getting across the zonal border and six hours in Berlin.'

'Several visual impressions remain as clear in my mind now as they were then. The straggling column of German boys and old men being herded east along Berlin's Ring Road.'

No trace of the 'straw shoes'. Presumably the editor's pencil had gone through them, as it did through 'the 36 hours' and a few other lurid details. But the spirit was the same:

'Russia moves west, went through my mind. Europe will never be the same again.' (Introduction, pp. XXV-XXVI.)

different colour. He could be expected to have been more serious. Yet he discovered that the Russians were a race of 'Mongolian savages', every one of them 'an all out son of a bitch, a barbarian, and chronic drunk'.¹⁰ How's that for witless malice?

Yes, long before World War II was over, the top American brass had designated the Soviet Union as a potential enemy of the United States. For them it was a simple matter of numbers: apart from the United States, the Soviet Union was bound to emerge from the war as the most powerful country in the world. It therefore was the enemy—a conclusion, mark you, deduced not from the Soviet Union's intentions but from its capability.

This ponderous professionalism (politically stupid) confirmed anti-communism as the dominant philosophy of official Washington.

The top American brass set about elaborating a new military doctrine. Talking about the problems of the post-war world back in 1943, the then Navy Under Secretary James Forrestal said: 'There is no such thing as security, and the word should be stricken from our dictionary. We should put in every school book the maxim that power like wealth must be either used or lost.'¹¹ Examining the balance of strength between the United States and the Soviet Union at the time, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff arrived at some rather realistic conclusions in regard to the outcome of an armed conflict between the two countries. These conclusions, formulated in a series of recommendations to the Administration, beginning from the latter half of 1943, unquestionably were influenced by the fact that they were made after the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk. Highly noteworthy, for instance, were the recommendations sent on August 3, 1944, to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, cautioning the Administration against political flights of fancy in disregard of the true potential of the United States:

'The successful termination of the war against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of relative national military strengths, a change more comparable indeed with that occasioned by the fall of Rome than with any other change occurring during the succeeding fifteen hundred years. This is a fact of fundamental importance in

its bearing upon future international political settlements and all discussions leading thereto. Aside from the elimination of Germany and Japan as military powers, and developments in the relative economic power of principal nations, there are technical and material factors which have contributed greatly to this change. Among these are the development of aviation, the general mechanization of warfare and the marked shift in the munitioning potentials of the great powers.

'After the defeat of Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude. This is due in each case to a combination of geographical position and extent, and vast munitioning potential. While the U.S. can project its military power into many areas overseas, it is nevertheless true that the relative strength and geographic positions of these two powers preclude the military defeat of one of these powers by the other, even if that power were allied with the British Empire.' ¹²

U.S. military planners realized already then that the victories of the Soviet Union had created a new military balance between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., and, in a broader sense, between socialism and capitalism. This is what underlies the postwar pattern of international relations. If the October Revolution had smashed a link in the capitalist chain, the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War resulted in an equilibrium of strength between the two systems. Washington's main concern now was to reverse the balance in its own favour.

The U.S. military, thinking in their customary terms of force, cast about for a means that could be used to strike down the Soviet Union. Soon that means appeared: the atom bomb. Even before it had been tested and used, the upper councils in Washington firmly believed that the threat of the super-weapon, code-named S₁, would compel the U.S.S.R. to 'liberalise' its system and renounce the fruits of its victory in Europe. That, at least, was the impression that War Secretary Henry L. Stimson carried away from his talks with President Roosevelt. Here is a notation he made to this effect: 'The necessity of bringing Russian orgn. into the fold of Christian civilization...

The possible use of S₁ to accomplish this.' ¹³ In view of the top secrecy of everything that concerned the atom bomb, Stimson's note is of necessity cryptic.

After the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and even before Japan had surrendered, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff began working on plans for a new war. These were outlined in directive JCS 1496/2, Basis for the Formulation of a Military Policy, and JCS 1518, Strategic Concept and Plan for the Employment of United States Armed Forces, approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 18 September and 9 October 1945, respectively. At the time they were top secret documents, to which some U.S. researchers have now been given limited access.

One of these researchers, Michael S. Sherry, writes in his *Preparing for the Next War*, published in 1977:

"We are not going to deliver the first blow", Eisenhower reassured Congress late in the fall (of 1945); but secret plans suggested otherwise, and even in public testimony some officers hinted strongly at the wisdom of preemptive attacks. The legitimacy of preemptive strikes, only implied in earlier plans, now received the Joint Chiefs' explicit endorsement...

'Successive staff discussion sharpened the emphasis on deterrent and preventive action. . . . Navy planners moved to insert into JCS 1496 an explicit reference to striking the "first blow", and insisted that "this point should be emphasized to make it clear that this is a new concept of policy different than the American attitude toward war in the past. . .

'In the event of a major war, certain objectives were clear. The United States should follow "what has been our one and only basic policy in the last thirty years. This is that we prefer to fight our wars, if they be necessary, in some one else's territory."

"Through its farflung system of bases and the mobility of its forces, the United States would shield itself, to the limited extent possible, from direct attack. . . . Drafts of JCS 1518 indicated doubt about the desirability of attempting full conquest or destruction of a major enemy like the Soviet Union. But General Lincoln argued that the objective in a war with the USSR "should not be to drive her back

within her frontiers but to destroy her war making capabilities; otherwise a long war or a stalemate would result"...

'In October (1945), a JCS committee proposed an accelerated effort at research and production of atomic weapons, the maintenance of maximum secrecy, and the "refusal to give these secrets to any other nation or the United Nations Organization". To hasten progress down the chosen path, the War Department led an effort to insure military control over future atomic research and development...

'Certain that it could choose no other course, the military now made plans to use the bomb as its primary instrument of massive deterrence and retaliation. That policy was no secret. In his November 1945 published report to the secretary of war, Arnold (Commander of the USAF) asserted that the nation must make it "apparent to a potential aggressor that an attack on the United States would be immediately followed by an immensely devastating air-atomic attack on him". Going beyond Arnold, a secret JCS staff study weighed the advisability of both retaliatory and preventive atomic strikes against the Soviet Union. The Joint Intelligence Committee suggested twenty Soviet cities suitable for atomic bombing... The committee recommended an atomic attack not only in case of an imminent Soviet attack but in the contingency that enemy industrial and scientific progress suggested a capability for an "eventual attack against the United States or defense against our attack". The committee advised "that use of strategic air power should be given highest priority" in any effort to arrest Russian progress toward an attack capability. The committee added that atomic bombing was relatively ineffective against conventional military forces and transportation systems—an admission that the bomb really would be useful only for mass destruction of urban targets.'¹⁴

Did the authors of these barbarous plans really believe in the 'Soviet threat'? The secret documents analyzed by Sherry make it clear that no one believed in the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union. Here is Sherry's verdict:

'The Soviet Union presented no immediate threat, the services acknowledged... Its economy and manpower were exhausted by the war... The U.S.S.R. would concentrate on internal reconstruction... for the next several years... Soviet capabilities alone, regardless of what was thought of Russian intentions, appeared sufficient cause to designate the U.S.S.R. as a potential enemy.'¹⁵

The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive 1496/2 was examined by a coordinating committee of the State, War and Navy departments, and as SWNCC 282 was discussed by the top men of the State Department. In a memo dated November 16, 1945, the State Department made some critical remarks but by no means challenged the following point in directive 1496/2 repeated in SWNCC 282: 'We cannot afford, through any misguided and perilous idea of avoiding an aggressive attitude, to permit the first blow to be struck against us. Our government, under such conditions, should press the issue to a prompt political decision, while making all preparations to strike the first blow if necessary.'¹⁶

With the use of atomic bombs U.S. historians attest that Truman had burned Hiroshima and Nagasaki in a demonstration of force, because the object lesson had to be delivered not in an uninhabited locality but at the price of hundreds of thousands of lives. Manchester testifies in his book, *The Glory and the Dream* (1978), that General Graves thought preliminary testing would be unnecessary. He estimated that the first bomb would be ready around August 1, 1945, the second on January 1, 1946, and the third at some later date as yet undetermined. This was some time in late 1944. By the early summer of 1945, Manchester notes, 'The Americans had no bombs to waste. Apart from the static apparatus... there were just two bearing the names "The Thin Man" and "The Fat Man".'¹⁷

Two atomic bombs for the Japanese. By the end of 1945 there was a stockpile of at least 196. These for the Russians. The directive of the Joint War Planning Board 432/D, of December 14, 1945, adopted in connection with the aforementioned Joint Chiefs of Staff document on the atomic bombing of 20 Soviet cities, said:

'The chart, Annex to Appendix "A" (to the document

of the Joint Intelligence Committee of November 3, 1945—N.Y.) ... shows 20 key industrial centers of the Soviet Union and the route of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the Soviets' most important single line of Communication. The chart also shows locations from which present VHB's can reach 17 of the 20 cities referred to and the Trans-Siberian. It is estimated that, with 196 atomic bombs (100 per cent of the reserve included), the United States, from bases shown, would be capable of visiting such destruction upon the industrial sources of military power in the U.S.S.R. that a decision could eventually be obtained.'

The 'sources of military power' could not have been interpreted more broadly than they were by the American planners of atomic aggression. The document 329D of the Joint Intelligence Committee of November 3, 1945, reveals their train of thought: 'I. Listed in Annex "A" are 20 urban areas tentatively recommended as the most suitable strategic targets for attack employing atomic-type weapons. The cities have been selected on the basis of their general importance with respect to (1) industrial facilities—particularly aircraft and general ordnance, (2) governmental administrative facilities and (3) facilities for scientific research and development... Very little specific information is available concerning the locations and functions of the leading scientific research laboratories and institutes under the control and direction of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences (which has its headquarters in Moscow). These institutes, probably operated in conjunction with the leading universities, are the primary research centers. It is believed that a substantial part of such research facilities is located within the indicated target areas.'¹⁸

So scientists were to be burned, too. All in all, the population of the 20 cities chosen as the initial target of an American atomic assault was then 13 million, and among them women, children, and old people. The scroll of the martyrs of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombing was to be extended to include the people of 20 Soviet cities, given below in the order chosen by the U.S. planners: Moscow, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Saratov, Kazan, Leningrad, Baku, Tashkent, Chelyabinsk, Nizhny Tagil, Magnitogorsk, Molotov (Perm), Tbilisi, Stalino (Donetsk), Grozny, Irkutsk, and Yaroslavl.

Thus, already in September-November 1945 the Unit-

ed States adopted the 'first blow' doctrine of preemptive nuclear aggression against the Soviet Union.

The more rapid was the Soviet Union's recovery from the most destructive of all wars, the louder the tocsin of war was sounded in Washington. While the Soviet people rejoiced that their economy had—after four years of war and two years of rehabilitation—again reached the level of 1941, and paid tribute for it to the heroes of peaceful labour, the U.S. ruling elite took note and drew its own, practical conclusions.

4

On February 22, 1946, U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in the U.S.S.R. George F. Kennan sent a cable to Washington which American politicians and historians unanimously regard as the cornerstone of the U.S. postwar appraisal of the Soviet Union. In the 8,000-word message, comment on which in the United States has run to millions of words since then, Kennan described the danger allegedly hanging over the United States and outlined a strategy of enmity towards the U.S.S.R. He wrote:

'In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with the U.S. there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*... It should be the point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed.'¹⁹

Thus force alone was to be used in dealing with the Soviet Union. And the members of the Truman Administration, carried away by illusions of omnipotence, set about drawing up projects for wiping out the Soviet people. Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to the President, conferred, on Truman's orders, with top officials and on September 24, 1946, submitted to the President a report on American relations with the Soviet Union. He wrote:

'The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language... It must be made apparent to the Soviet Government that our strength will be sufficient to repel any attack and sufficient to defeat the U.S.S.R. decisively... The Soviet Union's vulnerability is limited due to the vast area over which its key industries and na-

tural resources are widely dispersed, but it is vulnerable to atomic weapons, biological warfare, and long-range air power. Therefore, in order to maintain our strength at a level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet Union, the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capable of seizing and holding strategic areas, must be supported by powerful naval and air forces. A war with the U.S.S.R. would be "total" in a more horrible sense than any previous war and there must be constant research for both offensive and defensive weapons... Any discussion on the limitation of armaments should be pursued slowly and carefully with the knowledge constantly in mind that proposals on outlawing atomic warfare and long-range offensive weapons would greatly limit United States strength...

'The United States should realize that Soviet propaganda is dangerous (especially when American "imperialism" is emphasized) and should avoid any actions which give an appearance of truth to the Soviet charges... The United States should strive energetically to bring about a better understanding of the United States among influential Soviets and to counteract the anti-American propaganda which the Kremlin feeds to the Soviet people. To the greatest extent tolerated by the Soviet Government, we should distribute books, magazines, newspapers and movies among the Soviets, beam radio broadcasts to the U.S.S.R.... Within the United States, communist penetration should be exposed and eliminated.'²⁰

Add to this Clifford's disquisitions about the Soviet regime being to blame for the difficulties besetting relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and about Washington having no quarrel with the Russian people, and you get the contours of the strategic thinking of the U.S. ruling elite. They saw two ways of destroying the Soviet Union or reducing it to a state of complete impotence: war, or subversion as a prelude or, in certain circumstances, a substitute to war. The balance of strength between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. would decide which was to be given preference. Peaceful coexistence, let alone

cooperation, between capitalism and socialism, was out of the question.

This was the doctrine that gained the upper hand in the U.S. ruling quarters.

George Kennan in the earlier-mentioned cable noted:

'Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like a malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is a point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit—Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.' He amplified:

'In new guise of international Marxism, with its honeyed promises to a desperate and war torn outside world, it is more dangerous and insidious than ever before.'²¹

U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union was presented to the world as a policy of containing communism, a formula broad enough to encompass the Truman doctrine, the Marshall plan, the building of aggressive blocs and the encirclement of the Soviet Union with a ring of U.S. military bases.

'Containment' was the keynote of the reorganization in late 1947 of the upper echelon of U.S. governmental machinery. The National Security Council, that body with extraordinary powers headed by the President which decides issues of war and peace in deep secrecy, was set up, as were the Central Intelligence Agency (subordinated to the NSC) and the Department of Defense. It was a structure for war and had as its aim the speediest unleashing of war against the U.S.S.R. There was no doubt in Washington that the United States would take the initiative in that.

In the meantime, the Policy Planning Staff, then headed by George Kennan, submitted a Résumé of the World Situation (November 7, 1947):

'The danger of war is vastly exaggerated in many quarters. The Soviet Government neither wants nor expects war with us in the foreseeable future... The extreme anxiety felt in many quarters about the danger of war rests on an incorrect appraisal of Soviet intentions. Kremlin does not wish to have another major war and does not expect to have one... All in all, there is no reason to expect that we will be forced suddenly and violently into a major military clash with Soviet forces.' ²²

Those in Washington who were planning an attack on the Soviet Union must have been pleased: the assault they were plotting would be unexpected.

5

On July 10, 1948, the then Secretary of Defense James Forrestal asked that a comprehensive statement of national policy in regard to the Soviet Union be submitted to the government, inasmuch as until such a statement was prepared no logical decisions could be reached as to the proportion of U.S. resources which should be devoted to military purposes. The Policy Planning Staff submitted an analysis entitled, 'U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia'. It was endorsed on August 18, 1948, as top secret National Security Council report 20/1. The 33-page document was first made public in the United States in 1978 in the collection, *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*.

The preamble to NSC 20/1 said:

'This government has been forced, for purposes of the political war now in progress, to consider more definite and militant objectives towards Russia even now, in time of peace, than it ever was called upon to formulate with respect either to Germany or Japan in advance of the actual hostilities with those countries... Every effort should be made in government planning now, in advance of any outbreak of hostilities, to define our present peacetime objectives and our hypothetical wartime objectives with relation to Russia, and to reduce as far as possible the gap between them.'

And further:

'Our basic objectives with respect to Russia are really only two:

'a. To reduce the power and influence of Moscow...

'b. To bring about a basic change in the theory and practice of international relations observed by the government in power in Russia.'

In accordance with accepted practice of the higher echelon of state leadership action was mapped out for peacetime and wartime. NSC 20/1 envisaged the capitulation of the U.S.S.R. under external pressure in peacetime, and dealt with its probable consequences:

'The adoption of these concepts in Moscow would be equivalent to saying that it was our objective to overthrow Soviet power. Proceeding from that point, it could be argued that this is in turn an objective unrealizable by means short of war, and that we are therefore admitting that our objective with respect to the Soviet Union is eventual war and the violent overthrow of Soviet power.

'It would be a dangerous error to accept this line of thought.

'In the first place, there is no time limit for the achievement of our objectives under conditions of peace. We are faced here with no rigid periodicity of war and peace which would enable us to conclude that we must achieve our peacetime objectives by a given date "or else"...

'In the second place, we are entirely within our own rights, and need feel no sense of guilt, in working for the destruction of concepts inconsistent with world peace and stability and for their replacement by ones of tolerance and international collaboration. It is not our business to calculate the internal developments to which the adoption of such concepts might lead in another country, nor need we feel that we have any responsibility for those developments. If the Soviet leaders find the growing prevalence of a more enlightened concept of international relations to be inconsistent with the maintenance of their internal power in Russia, that is their responsibility, not ours... We are entitled to let the chips fall where they

may in terms of internal development... We are not taking any position, as a government, with respect to internal conditions in Russia...

NSC 20/1 coolly defines and justifies subversion as part of Washington's general political course; for this considerable amounts of hypocrisy were brought into play:

'It is not our peacetime aim to overthrow the Soviet Government. Admittedly, we are aiming at the creation of circumstances and situations which would be difficult for the present Soviet leaders to stomach, and which they would not like. It is possible that they might not be able, in the face of these circumstances and situations, to retain their power in Russia. But it must be reiterated: that is their business, not ours... Should the situations to which our peacetime aims are directed actually come into being and should they prove intolerable to the maintenance of internal Soviet power and cause the Soviet Government to leave the scene, we would view this development without regret; but we would not assume responsibility for having sought it or brought it about.'

What was to be 'brought about'? NSC 20/1 specified: 'This is of course primarily a question of keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control.' This added up to one thing—the ultimate 'peacetime' objective of NSC 20/1 was the overthrow of the socialist system in the U.S.S.R. by various methods of subversion.

The eventuality of war simplified matters. The compilers of the document did not go into details of how the Soviet Union was to be defeated militarily—that was left to the generals—and concerned themselves with what the U.S. would have to do after the U.S.S.R. was defeated:

'In the first place we must assume that it will not be profitable or practically feasible for us to occupy and take under our military administration the entire territory of the Soviet Union. This course is inhibited by the size of that territory, by the number of its inhabitants... In other words, we could not hope to achieve any total assertion of our will on Russian territory, as we have endeavored to do in

Germany and in Japan. We must recognize that whatever settlement we finally achieve must be a *political* settlement...

The Washington strategists examined several variants of such a 'settlement' depending on the outcome of the hostilities:

'Taking the worst case, which would be that of the retention of Soviet power over all, or nearly all, of present Soviet territory, we would have to demand: (a) Direct military terms (surrender of equipment, evacuation of key areas, etc.) designed to assure military helplessness for a long time in advance; (b) Terms designed to produce a considerable economic dependence on the outside world. (This envisages dismemberment of our country, unimpeded penetration of 'ideas from the outside,' etc.—N.Y.)... Such terms would have to be harsh ones and distinctly humiliating to the communist regime in question. They might well be something along the lines of the Brest-Litovsk settlement of 1918 which deserves careful study in this connection.'

Simply superb! In 1948 the U.S. National Security Council proclaimed itself successor to the German militarists of 1918! Incidentally, NSC 20/1 corrected a 'mistake' made by Kaiser Germany, namely:

'We may accept it as a foregone conclusion that we would not be prepared to conclude a full-fledged peace settlement and/or resume regular diplomatic relations with any regime in Russia dominated by any of the present Soviet leaders or persons sharing their cast of thought. We have had too bitter an experience, during the past fifteen years, with the effort to act as though normal relations were possible with such a regime.'

Yet the 15 years referred to, beginning with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933, were a period of developing cooperation between the two countries and joint struggle against the fascist Axis. The whole world, including the Americans, saw the Soviet Union defend the cause of the United Nations. In 1948, however, it turned out that America had had 'too bitter an experience'. But what is the use of talking about elementary decency and ethics. Back to NSC 20/1. Its compilers thoroughly examined what

was for them an attractive outcome of the war—the elimination of Soviet power:

'There remains the question of what our aims would be with respect to any non-communist authority which might be set up on a portion or all of Russian territory as a consequence of the events of war.

'First of all, it should be said that regardless of the ideological basis of any such non-communist authority and regardless of the extent to which it might be prepared to do lip service to the ideals of democracy and liberalism, we would do well to see that in one way or another the basic purposes were assured which flow from the demands listed above. In other words, we should set up automatic safeguards to assure that even a regime which is non-communist and nominally friendly to us:

- '(a) Does not have strong military power;
- '(b) Is economically dependent to a considerable extent on the outside world;
- '(c) Does not exercise too much authority over the major national minorities; and
- '(d) Imposes nothing resembling the iron curtain over contacts with the outside world.

'In the case of such a regime, professing hostility to the communists and friendship toward us, we should doubtless wish to take care to impose these conditions in a manner which would not be offensive or humiliating. But we would have to see to it that in one way or another they *were* imposed.'

Consequently, the aim was not only to destroy Soviet power, but also to abolish Russian statehood and to banish our country from the rank of the great powers. Who in the view of the National Security Council would govern the territory that is now the Soviet Union?

'At the present time,' said NSC 20/1, 'there are a number of interesting and powerful Russian political groupings among the Russian exiles... any of which would probably be preferable to the Soviet Government, from our standpoint, as the rulers of Russia.'

All these groupings were, of course, subsidized by U.S. special services. Evidently, they had given Washington no little trouble, for NSC 20/1 includes a plan designed to relieve the U.S. politicians of many headaches:

'We must expect that vigorous efforts will be made by various groups to induce us to take measures in Russian internal affairs which will constitute a genuine commitment on our part and make it possible for political groups in Russia to continue to demand our support. *In the light of these facts, it is plain that we must make a determined effort to avoid taking responsibility for deciding who would rule Russia in the wake of a disintegration of the Soviet regime.* Our best course would be to permit all the exiled elements to return to Russia as rapidly as possible and to see to it, in so far as this depends on us, that they are all given roughly equal opportunity to establish their bids for power... It is probable that there will be violence between these groups. Even in this instance, we should not interfere unless our military interests are affected.'

All that remained was to decide what to do with the power of the Communist Party: 'This is an extremely intricate question. There is no simple answer to it,' say the authors of NSC 20/1, and leave the question to the 'rulers' that would be shipped in from abroad and would probably set about physically wiping out the Communists, while the U.S. washed its hands of the matter:

'In any territory which is freed of Soviet rule, we will be faced with the problem of the human remnants (sic) of the Soviet apparatus of power.

'It is probable that in the event of the orderly withdrawal of Soviet forces from present Soviet territory, the local Communist Party apparatus would go underground, as it did in the areas taken by the Germans during the recent war. It would then probably reemerge in part in the form of partisan bands and guerrilla forces. To this extent, the problem of dealing with it would be a relatively simple one; for we would need only to give the necessary arms and military support to whatever non-communist Russian authority might control the area and permit that authority to deal with the communist bands, through the traditionally thorough procedures of Russian civil war.

'A more difficult problem would be presented by minor Communist Party members or officials who

might be uncovered and apprehended, or who might throw themselves on the mercy of our forces or of whatever Russian authority existed in the territory.

'Here, again, we should refrain from taking upon ourselves the responsibility of disposing of these people or of giving direct orders to the local authorities as to how to do so... But basically this must remain a problem for whatever Russian authority may take the place of the Communist regime. We may be sure that such an authority will be more capable than we ourselves would be to judge the danger which ex-Communists would present to the security of the new regime, and to dispose of them in such ways as to prevent their being harmful in the future... We must always remember that to be the subject of persecution at the hands of a foreign government inevitably makes local martyrs...

*'We may say, therefore, that we would not make it our aim to carry out with our own forces, on the territory liberated from the Communist authorities, any large-scale program of de-communization, and that in general we would leave this problem to whatever local authority might supplant Soviet rule.'*²³

The White House and top Administration officials were delighted by these ravings which came to underlie U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union. In many respects—curiously enough, even as regards the numbering—NSC 20/1 all but coincided with Hitler's Directive No. 21 issued roughly eight years earlier under the code-name Barbarossa Plan.*

* The frame of mind of the compilers of NSC 20/1 surfaced in various publications, notably a 1951 issue of the now-defunct *Collier's* magazine. The author of NSC 20/1, George Kennan, recalls in the second volume of his memoirs: 'An entire issue of *Collier's* magazine was devoted to imagined accounts of our future war with Russia. I can recall glancing with horror, at the time, at the cover of that issue; & I heard from others, with even greater horror, that it contained a suggestion of our celebrating our victory over the Soviet Union by staging *Guys & Dolls* at the Bolshoi Theater in Moscow. I had visions, of course, of a *Collier's* editor conceiving this to be the acme of America's triumph: showing the benighted Russians what such a great operatic & ballet stage ought really to be used for. Research succeeded in unearthing from the depths of a warehouse library-depository a copy of the *Collier's* issue in question, which I confess I had never previously read—I could not

The United States set its sights on an early war of aggression against the Soviet Union. To facilitate the actual planning of military operations, NSC 20/1 had to be couched in more concise terms as a guide to the armed forces command. An impressive array of National Security Council members—Alben Barkley, the Vice-President; George C. Marshall, the Secretary of State; James Forrestal, the Secretary of Defence; Kenneth Royall, the Secretary of the Army; J. L. Sullivan, the Secretary of the Navy; W. Stuart Symington, the Secretary of the Air Force; Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, the first Director of the Central Intelligence Agency... and John Steelman, the Secretary of the National Security Resources Board; Admiral Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary²⁵—worked for months on a version one-quarter the length of the original. The abridged version was approved by President Truman on November 23, 1948, and handed down as NSC 20/4 to the executors.

With bureaucratic elegance and finality, NSC 20/4 declares: 'The gravest threat to the security of the United States within the foreseeable future stems from the hostile designs and formidable power of the USSR, and from the nature of the Soviet system.'

It follows that the existence of the Soviet system posed 'the gravest threat'. Thereupon, the directive reproduced the key passages of NSC 20/1, listing the actions to be taken in 'peacetime' and in war that we are already acquainted with. But there is relatively greater emphasis on subversive activity in both cases, with the following ultimate conclusion:

'If the United States were to exploit the potentialities of psychological warfare and subversive activity

*bring myself to do so at the time. To my consternation, it became apparent that the idea of *Guys & Dolls* at the Bolshoi came not from a *Collier's* editor but from the eminent British playwright & novelist J. B. Priestley, & the entire issue turned out to have been an attempt to meet my demand that we think ahead & try to picture realistically what a war with Russia might mean. This issue of the now-defunct magazine, despite the fact that a number of worthy people contributed to it, was a fantastic gaucherie. I continue to regard it with embarrassed distaste.'*²⁴

Yes, it is one thing writing top secret directives, and another seeing the ideas they contain put up for public display in a widely read magazine. One more thing: the memoirs appeared in 1972, while the veil of secrecy on NSC 20/1 was not lifted until 1978.

within the Soviet orbit, the USSR would be faced with increased disaffection, discontent, and underground opposition within the area under Soviet control.'

There were some terminological distinctions between the two directives. NSC 20/4, for example, contained references to the 'Bolshevik regime'. Understandably so, for it was produced by men who were older than the writers of NSC 20/1. But what did that matter? There were no distinctions in outlook.

Since NSC 20/4 was for those who were to carry it out, there were assurances in it that war would catch the U.S.S.R. unawares, because 'a careful weighing of the various factors points to the probability that the Soviet Government is not now planning any deliberate armed action calculated to involve the United States'.²⁶

The provisions of NSC 20/4 were adopted by the top U.S. military staffs. They were quoted and taken into account in the operational plans—and of these there were many. The political arm had confirmed to the generals who the enemy was, and all the generals now had to do was define the military means and methods of crushing the Soviet Union. And this without delay, for directives NSC 20/1 and 20/4 gave to understand that war against the U.S.S.R. was imminent.

6

By 1948 a good many blueprints of a war against the Soviet Union had accumulated in U.S. headquarters strongrooms. Their authors were local commanders as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dwight D. Eisenhower, then commander of U.S. forces in Europe, left his successor in that post a plan he had named Totality, which dated to the end of 1945. The plans were updated from time to time, but all-out preparations for an early assault on the U.S.S.R. did not begin until the National Security Council issued the directives we have discussed above.

By the middle of 1948 a plan code-named Charioteer, drawn up on instructions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was completed. The war was to be precipitated by

'a concerted attack employing atomic bombs against governmental, political and administrative centers,

urban industrial areas, and selected petroleum targets within the U.S.S.R. from bases in the western hemisphere and the United Kingdom.'

In the first thirty days of hostilities it was proposed to drop 133 atomic weapons on 70 Soviet cities, eight of them on Moscow to destroy approximately 40 square miles of that city's center, and seven on Leningrad to atomize some 35 square miles. In the next two years of war another 200 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of high-explosive bombs were to be dropped. The U.S. strategic air command assumed that the Soviet Union would surrender some time during or after the bombing.²⁷

By September 1, 1948, a plan code-named Fleetwood had been sent down to U.S. armed forces field headquarters as a guide for their operational plans. Both Charioteer and Fleetwood conceded that the Soviet Union may occupy Europe once war broke out. Fleetwood noted, for example, that by the end of the first six months of the war 'the Soviets have the capability of occupying and consolidating the entire northern littoral of the Mediterranean from the Pyrenees to Syria, and of bringing the Mediterranean LOC under heavy air attack. In addition they have the capability of occupying Spain by approximately D+6 and bringing the line of communication under artillery fire.'²⁸

In the supplement to Fleetwood the Joint Intelligence Committee amplified:

'...Against probable opposing forces (i.e., the United States, Great Britain and the nations with which they were allied) the Soviets have the combat power to overrun key areas in Europe and Asia.'²⁹

The prospect was a disheartening one, but the Strategic Air Command insisted that it could be ignored, arguing that while the Soviet Army advanced in Europe and Asia, atomic bombing of the Soviet Union would undermine the main component of Soviet strength—the political one. The Joint Intelligence Committee saw it as consisting of '(1) The native courage, stamina, and patriotism of the Russian population. (2) The elaborate...machinery by which the Kremlin exercises centralized control in the Soviet orbit... (3) The ideological appeal of theoretical communism. (4) The apparent ability of the Soviet regime to mobilize native Russian patriotism behind a Sq-

viet war effort. (5) The ability of the people and the administration to carry on a war under circumstances of extreme disorganization, demonstrated in the early years of World War II.'³⁰

Though the U.S. Air Force generals maintained that atomic bombs could do the trick, a controversy developed in the higher echelons of the armed forces as to whether strategic air power could break the Russians' will to fight. In the meantime, preparations for launching atomic strikes were being completed. On December 21, 1948, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force put before the Joint Chiefs of Staff the operational plan SAC EWP 1-49:

'2. War will occur prior to 1 April 1949.

'3. Atomic bombs will be used to the extent determined to be practicable and desirable...

32a. After due consideration of the number of atomic bombs available, the radii of action of Allied air forces, the estimated bombing accuracy, the available weight of attack and the time required for realization of effects, the highest priority target system is that system constituted by the major Soviet urban-industrial concentrations. Destruction of this system should so cripple the Soviet industrial and control centers as to reduce drastically the offensive and defensive power of their armed forces.

'b. Target folders and navigation charts will be available by 1 February 1949 for operations against the first seventy cities. Currently available aeronautical charts (scale 1:1,000,000) are sufficiently accurate to permit aerial navigation to any desired point in the USSR...

'1. For the initial atomic attacks a possible 25 per cent attrition loss has been accepted for planning purposes, which still leaves ample capability for delivery of the entire stockpile of atomic bombs. As the effects of the atomic offensive are reflected in the Soviet air defense system, aircraft losses should be reduced...

'33. The following conclusions may be drawn from an evaluation of the foregoing: a. A powerful strategic air offensive against vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity could be delivered as planned.'³¹

The Air Force generals were brimming over with optimism. They were straining at the least to send the strategic air force into action. They did not see that the crucial thing was not whether cities could be wiped out but what the moral consequences of this would be for the population and the war aims as a whole. To the commanding generals of other services, with the exception of the strategic air forces, the claims of the USAF looked unrealistic. In early 1949 a Review Committee of top army and navy officers under air force Lieutenant-General H. R. Harmon was set up to assess the political consequences of an atomic attack on the Soviet Union. On May 11, 1949, the Committee submitted a top secret report, Evaluation of Effect on Soviet War Effort Resulting from the Strategic Air Offensive:

'The Problem

'1. To evaluate the effect on the war effort of the U.S.S.R. of the Strategic Air Offensive contemplated in current war plans, including an appraisal of the psychological effects of atomic bombing on the Soviet will to wage war...

'3. The plan for the strategic air offensive ... contemplates two distinct phases:

'a. An initial phase, consisting of a series of attacks primarily with atomic bombs on 70 target areas (presently planned by the Strategic Air Command to be accomplished in approximately 30 days).

'b. A second phase, consisting of a continuation of the initial attacks with both atomic and conventional weapons.

'Effect on Industrial Capacity

'9. Physical damage to installations, personnel casualties concentrated in industrial communities, and other direct or indirect cumulative effects would result in a 30 to 40 percent reduction of Soviet industrial capacity. This loss would not be permanent and could either be alleviated by Soviet recuperative action or augmented depending upon the weight and effectiveness of follow-up attacks...

'Personnel Casualties

'11. The initial atomic offensive could produce as many as 2,700,000 mortalities, and 4,000,000 additional casualties, depending upon the effectiveness of Soviet passive defense measures. A large number

of homes would be destroyed and the problems of living for the remainder of the 28,000,000 people in the 70 target cities would be vastly complicated.

'Psychological Effects

'12. The atomic offensive would not, per se, bring about capitulation, destroy the roots of Communism or critically weaken the power of Soviet leadership to dominate the people.

'13. For the majority of Soviet people, atomic bombing would validate Soviet propaganda against foreign powers, stimulate resentment against the United States, unify these people and increase their will to fight. Among an indeterminate minority, atomic bombing might stimulate dissidence* and the hope of relief from oppression. Unless and until vastly more favorable opportunities develop for them, the influence of these elements will not appreciably affect the Soviet war effort.

'14. A psychological crisis will be created within the U.S.S.R. which could be turned to advantage by the Allies through early and effective exploitation by armed forces and psychological warfare. Failing prompt and effective exploitation, the opportunity would be lost and subsequent Soviet psychological reactions would adversely affect the accomplishment of Allied objectives.

'Effects on the Soviet Armed Forces

'15. The capability of Soviet armed forces to advance rapidly into selected areas of Western Europe, the Middle East and Far East, would not be seriously impaired, but capabilities would progressively diminish...' Technical aspects are dwelt on further, such as fuel shortages, transport difficulties, etc.

'17. Atomic bombing would open the field and set the pattern for all adversaries to use any weapons of mass destruction and result in maximum retaliatory measures within Soviet capabilities.

'General

'18. Atomic bombing will produce certain psychological and retaliatory reactions detrimental to the

achievement of Allied war objectives and its destructive effects will complicate post-hostilities problems. However, the atomic bomb would be a major element of Allied military strength in any war with the U.S.S.R., and would constitute the only means of rapidly inflicting shock and serious damage to vital elements of the Soviet war-making capacity. In particular, an early atomic offensive will facilitate greatly the application of other Allied military power with prospect of greatly lowered casualties. Full exploitation of the advantages to be obtained is dependent upon the adequacy and promptness of associated military and psychological operations. From the standpoint of our national security, the advantages of its early use would be transcending. Every reasonable effort should be devoted to providing the means to be prepared for prompt and effective delivery of the maximum numbers of atomic bombs to appropriate target systems.' ³²

It behooves generals, on the eve of war in any case, to look forward to victories rather than anticipate defeats. Hence the optimistic tone of the Harmon report. At the same time, it plainly reveals a deep-seated disquiet over the insane plans of hitting the Soviet Union chiefly if not exclusively with atomic bombs.

If the strikes, as the USAF figures, came off according to plan and close on seven million Soviet citizens were killed in the first month of the war, the fighting spirit of the Russians would only harden. Harmon and his colleagues did not look further than the first thirty days of war, and this I think because they were afraid of what the atomic prologue would lead to. Force of arms, especially of atomic arms, cannot solve any political problems. But the Committee did not miss the opportunity for urging an extension of arms stockpiles, notably of delivery vehicles, and the like.

The estimates of the Harmon Committee (and we may be sure there were more in this vein) halted the atomaniacs at the fatal brink. But the ominous course towards war with the U.S.S.R. was not abandoned. In April 1949 the aggressive North Atlantic Pact was concluded. All along the perimeter of the socialist community more and more military bases were built. The wheels of the U.S. war

* It is for the first time that the concept "dissidence" appears in American documents in this connection.

economy turned faster and faster. Top U.S. leaders, whose thinking became increasingly militarized, counted on securing military preponderance over the U.S.S.R. and thus reducing to a minimum the political factors.

The idea was simple—total physical annihilation of the Soviet people. That is how U.S. Air Force Commander in Europe Major General Curtis LeMay conceived the whole thing. He scoffed at the idea of drafting various plans for war against the U.S.S.R.; as he saw it, there was no need for them since the United States possessed the means to 'depopulate vast areas of the earth's surface, leaving only vestigial remnants of man's material works'.³³ LeMay and his kind figured that they had time. They thought years and years would pass before the U.S.S.R. developed its own atomic arms.

But on 3 September 1949 an American B-29 on routine patrol over the North Pacific picked up some measurable radioactivity. A checkup was made in all haste, and a week later it was clear that the Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, which about a year earlier had activated a Long Range Detection System amounting to round-the-clock dosimetric sampling of the atmosphere, congratulated itself: not the military, and least of all the Air Force, but the scientists had been right in assessing the potential of Soviet science.³⁴

The epoch-making exploit of Soviet scientists and engineers ended the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons. The material sacrifices this had entailed had not been in vain. Now, the Soviet Union had a nuclear shield. On September 25, 1949, TASS released the following statement:

'The Soviet Union discovered the secret of the atomic weapon as far back as 1947. As for the alarm sounded on this score by some foreign quarters, there are no grounds for it at all. Though it possesses the atomic weapon, the Soviet Government stands as before and will continue to stand for the unconditional prohibition of the use of atomic weapons.'

Washington's reaction was to proceed at once to consider the launching of a preventive war. 'However, preventive war was not launched,' U.S. researcher Anthony Cave Brown wrote in the book *Dropshot. The United States Plan for War with the Soviet Union in 1957*, published in 1978.

'Apart from all else, the United States could not have won such a war in 1949-1950. Strategic Air Command was not capable of dealing Russia a single irreparable blow at this time.'³⁵

Brown analyzes the reasons why:

At the end of 1949 the United States had 840 operational strategic bombers, 1,350 in reserve, and over 300 atomic bombs. Moscow, Leningrad and other targets in the European part of the U.S.S.R. were within striking distance only from bases on the British Isles. The tentative date set for starting the war was January 1, 1950. In the first three months about 300 atomic bombs and 20,000 tons of conventional bombs were to be dropped on targets in 100 urban areas, for which some 6,000 bombing missions were thought necessary (Plan Trojan).

The Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated through war games the chances of crippling a number of strategic areas: Moscow—Leningrad, the Urals, Black Sea targets, the Caucasus, Archangel, Tashkent—Alma-Ata, the Baikal area, and Vladivostok. It was calculated that operations against the Black Sea targets, for instance, would follow this pattern: 233 B-29 and B-50 bombers (32 of them to carry atomic bombs and the rest to deal with anti-aircraft defences and to cause radar interference) would drop 24 atomic bombs on target (with three atomic bombs lost with downed planes, two not dropped, and three missing the target). Estimated losses: 35 planes brought down by fighter craft, two by anti-aircraft fire, five lost for other reasons, and an undetermined number of planes damaged beyond repair.

Thus, the probability of hits on target was 70 per cent, and bomber losses 55 per cent. Could the air crews continue flying missions with such loss rates? During World War II the heaviest losses were sustained by the 97-bomber force which raided Nuremberg on the night of March 30, 1944; 20 planes, or 20.6 per cent, failed to return. This had caused a near mutiny among the air crews. So what would be the effect of a 55 per cent loss rate?

There could be no lightning air attack on the U.S.S.R. for 'technical reasons'. Atomic bombing of Moscow and Leningrad was planned only for the ninth day of hostilities. On the other hand, the most optimistic estimates showed that the bases on the British Isles would be put out of commission by the Soviet Air Force (now armed with

atomic weapons) within two months or earlier. How much earlier?

It was found that the U.S. Strategic Air Command would be knocked out in the course of the offensive against Soviet cities. It would be short of planes and bases, and its logistics system would be thrown out of gear. In the meantime, as the Pentagon figured, the Soviet armies would reach the shores of the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The loss of Europe and the Middle and Far East in the first months of war was taken for granted by U.S. planners.

On April 11, 1950, Major General S. E. Anderson, Director of U.S. Air Force plans and operations, reported to Air Force Secretary Stuart Symington: 'The Air Force could not (a) complete the entire air offensive called for in Trojan or (b) provide the air defense for the United States and Alaska.'³⁶

The idea of a preventive war against the Soviet Union in 1950 was dropped, for it was found that the United States could not have won such a war. It was decided to build up a coalition of countries against the U.S.S.R. But that would take time, and hence the date for launching hostilities was put off to January 1, 1957.

In 1949, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were ordered by the government to draw up a war plan code-named Dropshot. It envisaged the involvement, together with the United States, of all the NATO countries. Ireland, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Egypt, Syria, Libya, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Israel, Iran, India and Pakistan would 'attempt to remain neutral but will join the Allies if attacked or seriously threatened'. Needless to say, many of the non-NATO countries had no inkling of having been included in the line-up.

The overall strategic concept was the following:

'In collaboration with our allies, to impose the Allied war objectives upon the U.S.S.R. by destroying the Soviet will and capacity to resist, by conducting a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

'Initially: To defend the Western Hemisphere; to launch an air offensive; to initiate a discriminate containment of the Soviet powers within the general area: North Pole—Greenland Sea—Norwegian Sea—North Sea—Rhine River—Alps—Piave River—

Adriatic Sea—Crete—southeastern Turkey—Tigris Valley—Persian Gulf—Himalayas—Southeast Asia—South China Sea—East China Sea—Japan Sea—Tsugaru Strait—Bering Sea—Bering Strait—North Pole; to secure and control essential strategic areas, bases and lines of communication; and to wage psychological, economic and underground warfare, while exerting unremitting pressure against the Soviet citadel, utilizing all means to force the maximum attrition of Soviet war resources.

'Subsequently: To launch coordinated offensive operations of all arms against the U.S.S.R. as required.'³⁷

In the initial period of the war over 300 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of conventional bombs were to be dropped on targets in the Soviet Union, destroying up to 85 per cent of its industry. A detailed plan was worked out for crippling the Soviet air defence, land, naval, and air forces. In the second period the air offensive was to continue, with the NATO ground forces—164 divisions, 69 of them American—being deployed for action and with control established over sea communications. In the third period, 114 NATO divisions were to launch an offensive from West, and 50 divisions from the South (the projected landing area here being the northwest coast of the Black Sea) to wipe out the Soviet Armed Forces in Central Europe. This and the continuing air offensive were to compel the Soviet Union and its allies to surrender. A total of 250 divisions was to be engaged, involving 6,250,000 men, and another 8,000,000 in the air force, navy, air defence, and so on. All in all 20 million men were to be put into the field to carry out Dropshot.³⁸

The fourth and last stage of Dropshot envisaged that 'in order to ensure compliance with our national objectives, the Allies would have to occupy' the Soviet Union and the other European socialist countries. Thirty-eight army divisions running to about a million men were considered necessary for occupation duty, 23 of them in the Soviet Union. Soviet territory was divided into four 'regions of responsibility', a euphemism for occupation zones: Western U.S.S.R.; the Caucasus and the Ukraine; the Urals, Western Siberia, and Turkestan; Eastern Siberia, the Trans-Baikal, and the Maritime Area. The zones were divided into 22 subregions of responsibility.

Two divisions were to be stationed in Moscow and one each in Leningrad, Minsk, Murmansk, Gorky, Kuibyshev, Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa, Sevastopol, Rostov-on-Don, Novorossiisk, Batumi, Baku, Sverdlovsk, Chelyabinsk, Tashkent, Omsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, and Vladivostok.

Out of the five reinforced tactical air forces earmarked for occupation duty in the socialist countries, four were to be stationed in the Soviet Union. Each of the air forces was to consist of five or six combat groups, one troop-carrier group and one assault group. One carrier task force each was assigned to the Baltic and Black seas.

It was specially stressed that a high ratio of air-force units would be desirable 'in order to bring visible evidence of Allied strength' before the Soviet people. And since there would also be punitive functions the planners provided for an abundance of transport facilities to ensure mobility.³⁹

Like the plans that preceded it, Dropshot was clearly a plan of a class war against the Soviet Union. The need for the war and the subsequent occupation it defined as follows:

'The gravest threat to the security of the United States... stems from... the nature of the Soviet system... Never before have the intentions and strategic objectives of an aggressor nation been so clearly defined. For a hundred years, victory in the class struggle of the proletariat versus the bourgeoisie has been identified as the means by which Communism would dominate the world.'⁴⁰

Dropshot marked a new departure in U.S. war planning: besides aggression against the U.S.S.R. with purely military means it focussed attention on the utilization of confederates on the other side of the front—i.e. 'of dissidents'. This term became accepted in military planning. The planners, of course, harboured no illusions about the strength of the dissidents:

'it will be more difficult to apply psychological warfare to the people of the USSR than to the people of the United States...

'Psychological warfare... can be an extremely important weapon in promoting dissension and defection among the Soviet people, undermining their

morale, and creating confusion and disorganization within the country...

'A major undertaking of the United States will be the conduct of an extensive psychological-warfare campaign whose basic objective will be to destroy the support accorded by the people of the USSR and her satellites to their present systems of government and to fasten a realization among the peoples of the USSR that the overthrow of the Politburo is an attainable reality... Effective resistance or uprisings could be expected to occur only when the Western Allies are able to give material support and leadership and assure the dissident elements early liberation from the Soviet yoke.'⁴¹

These constructions are, in substance, a paraphrase of the special American studies of the reasons for the failure of Hitlerite Germany's campaign against the Soviet Union. U.S. theorists arrived at the conclusion that in 1941-1945 Hitler had ignored the political aspects pinpointed by Clausewitz, namely: 'Russia is not the kind of country that can be conclusively conquered, that is, kept under effective occupation... A country such as Russia can only be defeated by its internal weakness and the effects of internal division'.⁴² The American strategists had made up their minds to remedy Hitler's mistake.

The place occupied by psychological warfare in Dropshot was defined thus:

'Analysis. The initiation or intensification of psychological, economic, and underground warfare directed at both friendly and enemy groups or countries would greatly enhance the chances of an early and successful conclusion of the war by assisting in overcoming the enemy's will to fight, sustaining the morale of friendly groups in enemy territory, and improving the morale of friendly countries and the attitude of neutral countries towards the Allies.

'This type of warfare has a peacetime application against the Soviets and towards friendly nations as well, but it should be greatly stepped up upon the outbreak of war and should exploit to the maximum the psychological effects of the strategic air offensive... It would require participation of all services to assist other agencies in its execution.

'Tasks. Collaborate in the integration of psychological, economic, and underground warfare with plans for military operations.'⁴³

The concluding part of Dropshot dealt with subsequent developments in the Far East where, according to the plan, the U.S. stance throughout the war against the Soviet Union was to be one of strategic defence:

'It is considered that Communist China and other areas of Southeast Asia controlled by indigenous Communists, unlike Korea and the European satellites, will not be under the complete domination of the Soviets and in the event of an early capitulation by the U.S.S.R. will not necessarily also capitulate. Consequently the introduction of Allied control forces into those areas may be neither feasible nor desirable upon the capitulation of the U.S.S.R. since full-scale operations against opposition may be required. Therefore appropriate action in those areas would have to be decided upon after a determination of the existing situation following the capitulation of the U.S.S.R. Cognizance should be taken of the possibility that the fulfillment of the national objectives of the United States may require major offensive operations in the Far East and Southeast Asia after the capitulation of the U.S.S.R.'⁴⁴

If we bear in mind that Dropshot envisaged involvement on the U.S. side, either willingly or under pressure, not only of the NATO countries, but also of a number of Asian and Middle East states, with Latin America and Africa acting as a reserve and a source of raw materials, the operations projected for the Far East and Southeast Asia make it plain that Washington's intention was to wipe socialism off the face of the earth by armed force, and thereby achieve the cherished goal of the American oligarchy—establishment of U.S. world supremacy. If any proof of this was ever needed, then Dropshot provides it in ample amounts.

Why then were researchers ever given access to it? In making the plan public in 1978 with the appropriate comments, Anthony Brown observed:

'Plan Dropshot was the United States' plan for world war with the Soviet Union. It was prepared by a committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1949 with

the authority and knowledge of President Harry S. Truman... After all, military geography does not change. And conventional weapons change only in the degree of their destructiveness. Therefore the battlefields of 1949-1957 could well be the battlefields of a future war.

'These obvious facts lead to a critical question: Was it not folly to make Dropshot public? I have thought extensively about this point, and I am bound to conclude that it was folly to release this document. It should have been burned, buried, or preserved in some secret vault, for it cannot endear America to Russia. As will be seen, not only was Dropshot the blueprint for the atomization of Russia, but it provided also for the occupation by American armies of that vast continent—and for the eradication by the roots of Bolshevism. Doubtless, at this critical time—the Cold War may have ended, if only temporarily, but the political and ideological war goes on with undiminished intensity—the Russians will argue that Dropshot constitutes an example of America's continuing bellicosity toward Russia and that therefore Russia must maintain and expand her armed forces. 'Why, therefore, was Dropshot made public? The Joint Chiefs were not required by law to declassify it... the document and its associated papers, when read together, shows that (1) the United States might well have lost World War III; (2) Russia would probably have succeeded in occupying all Western Europe in twenty days; (3) the U.S. Air Force thought that Russia would be able to knock Britain—then America's principal ally with bases of the first importance to the successful conduct of the atomic riposte—out of the war within sixty days; (4) Russian atomic attacks combined with Communist guerrilla warfare within the United States would have gravely impaired America's ability and will to make war; (5) America could not defend her own cities; (6) it would have taken America at least two years to bring her industry and armed forces to a pitch that would have enabled her military to return to Europe; and (7) America intended to occupy Russia and thereby risk interminable guerrilla warfare in that country...

'My personal view is that there was no motive in the Joint Chiefs' astounding action in declassifying Dropshot. The simple fact is that in all respects Dropshot was considered obsolete; that given the state of weaponry today it is no longer relevant; that we have reached the edge of doomsday; and that therefore Dropshot does not matter.'⁴⁵

There is some truth in Brown's reasoning, but not much. The motives for declassifying Dropshot and other similar documents go deeper. As for its being 'obsolete', no statute of limitations can be applied to criminal schemes such as those embodied in it. Common sense rebels at the very thought. It is quite safe to say that making it public is in a sense an act of self-justification, adducing proof that Washington had never been 'soft' on communism and thus disproving the U.S. militarists' lament that the United States had not atomized the Soviet Union when it could have been done. General LeMay, for example, who was elevated to the post of Air Force Chief of Staff during the Kennedy presidency, maintained in his 1968 book, *America in Danger*, dealing with the late 40s and early 50s, that 'we might have destroyed Russia completely and not even have skinned our elbows doing it'.⁴⁶ Dropshot declassified completely debunks the General's contention.

But those who released the document are concerned more with the future than with the past. The Americans can now see how disastrous the consequences would have been of a fullscale war against the Soviet Union even before thermonuclear weapons existed and when intercontinental ballistic missiles were still on the drawing board. The implication is—and at times the point is made directly—that with the present balance of strength between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. an armed conflict would mean disaster for the United States as well. The decades of frantic arming, with the U.S. taxpayer footing a fantastic bill, failed to give Washington the desired edge in the military field. The balance of strength between capitalism and socialism won by the Soviet people in 1941-1945 has not been upset. For this credit is due to the men and officers who battled against the fascist Axis in the Great Patriotic War, showing what a people defending people's power is capable of.

The main thing here is to show the danger of a war

against the Soviet Union and demonstrate the wisdom of trying to defeat the U.S.S.R. by other methods, without crossing the thermonuclear threshold, that is, by subversion in the broadest sense of the term, by what is called psychological warfare.

In 1950 the National Security Council drew up its directive NSC 68 to replace NSC 20/4.

7

Replace is probably inexact. The whole thing merely amounted to changing the emphasis. The new document, which was nearly twice as long as NSC 20/1, fully confirmed the old objectives. The authors of the draft (it was drawn up by the State Department's Policy Planning Staff then headed by Kennan's successor, Paul Nitze) quoted liberally from directive NSC 20/4, adding, however, a note of alarm, if not panic. The Soviet threat to the security of the United States was greatly intensified, they wrote, and amplified: 'This threat is of the same character as described in NSC 20/4 (approved by the President on November 24, 1948) but is more immediate than had previously been estimated... This Republic and its citizens in the ascendancy of their strength stand in their deepest peril... The issues that face us are momentous, involving the fulfillment of destruction not only of this Republic but of civilization itself.'

NSC 68 opened with a broad review of the radical changes in the world in the preceding 35 years. Five empires—the Ottoman, Austria-Hungarian, the German, Italian and Japanese—had passed into limbo. Within the lifetime of just one generation the world balance of forces had completely changed. Power had increasingly gravitated to two centres—the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. The existence of military equilibrium between the United States and the Soviet Union, i.e., the conclusion arrived at by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as far back as 1943-1944, was confirmed, though not too explicitly.

And equilibrium was considered intolerable. The economic potentials of the United States and the Soviet Union were examined in detail and the conclusion was drawn that the U.S. had to increase its military spending several times over. As we may recall, towards the end of the Tru-

man presidency the United States' annual military spending exceeded 50,000 million dollars, surpassing the allocations in the late forties more than three times. Was there no limit to military expenditure? NSC 68 said: 'In an emergency the United States could devote upward of 50 per cent of its gross national product to these purposes (as it did during the last war).' It may be recalled that the United States GNP in 1949 ran to 255,000 million dollars. Implicit in these calculations was one of Washington's main objectives: step up military spending and draw the Soviet Union into an arms race that would ruin it without bringing matters to the point of war for the time being.

The Soviet Union gave proof after proof of its peaceful intentions. Those who were fanning military hysteria knew perfectly well that after having developed its own atomic weapons Moscow forcefully reaffirmed its position: the atomic bomb *must* be banned. How to react to this? NSC 68 said: 'It has been suggested that we announce that we will not use atomic weapons except in retaliation against the prior use of such weapons by an aggressor... Unless we are prepared to abandon our objectives, we cannot make such a declaration in good faith until we are confident that we will be in a position to attain our objectives without war, or, in the event of war, without recourse to the use of atomic weapons for strategic or tactical purposes.'

The atomaniacs were adamant. The pros and cons of an attack on the Soviet Union were thoroughly and carefully studied, with the following result: 'The ability of the United States to launch effective offensive operations is now limited to attack with atomic weapons. A powerful blow could be delivered upon the Soviet Union, but it is estimated that these operations alone would not force or induce the Kremlin to capitulate and that the Kremlin would still be able to use the forces under its control to dominate most or all of Eurasia.'

True, there was a ray of hope: 'If the U.S. develops a thermonuclear weapon ahead of the U.S.S.R., the U.S. should for the time being be able to bring increased pressure on the U.S.S.R.'

Still, there was a problem: 'But if war comes, what is the role of force? Unless we so use it that the Russian

people can perceive that our effort is directed against the regime and its power for aggression, and not against their own interests, we will unite the regime and the people in the kind of last ditch fight.' And certainly neither atomic nor thermonuclear bombs would be able to draw this fine distinction, to say nothing of the fact that war against the U.S.S.R. did not, as we see, hold any promise of victory for the United States.

NSC 68 showed the way out of the impasse: on the one hand, sharply to increase the war preparations of the United States and its allies, and on the other:

'so foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system that the Kremlin is brought at least to the point of modifying its behavior... Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and readily mobilizable, a policy of "containment"—which is in effect a policy of calculated and gradual coercion—is no more than a policy of bluff.'

The chief premise:

'The greatest vulnerability of the Kremlin lies in the basic nature of its relations with the Soviet people.'

Consequently, the policy of 'containment' sought

'To wage overt psychological warfare calculated to encourage mass defections from Soviet allegiance and to frustrate the Kremlin design in other ways... Intensification of affirmative and timely measures and operations by covert means in the fields of economic warfare and political and psychological warfare with a view to fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries.'

The ultimate aims of these actions NSC 68 defined as follows:

'The objectives of a free society are determined by its fundamental values and by the necessity for maintaining the material environment in which they flourish...'

'1. Thus we must make ourselves strong, both in the way in which we affirm our values in the conduct of our national life, and in the development of our military and economic strength...'

'2. We must lead in building a successfully functioning political and economic system in the free world...'

'3. But beyond thus affirming our values our policy

and actions must be such as to foster a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet system, a change toward which the frustration of the design is the first and perhaps the most important step. Clearly it will not only be less costly but more effective if this change occurs to a maximum extent as a result of internal forces in Soviet society . . .

'The only sure victory lies in the frustration of the Kremlin design by the steady development of the moral and material strength of the free world and its projection into the Soviet world in such a way as to bring about an internal change in the Soviet system.' ⁴⁷

NSC 68 was submitted to Truman on April 7, 1950, and though the President did not officially endorse it until September 30, its implementation began at once. It was the basis of U.S. policy for many years, and its principal points are still operative.

Washington's political thinking revolved, in a way, within a circle of preconceived ideas. There were some amusing incidents: in 1952, for example, Senator Hubert Humphrey, then a novice in Senate and probably not yet initiated in state secrets, addressed a letter (on July 11, 1952) to President Truman, raising an issue that he described as being of the President's 'keen personal interest . . .' 'You will forgive me, I hope,' he wrote, 'if I intrude upon these interests on behalf of what I believe is a subject of paramount national significance.' Thereupon the Senator discoursed on what seemed to trouble him most—how best to organize the occupation of the Soviet Union. Saying that war against the U.S.S.R. was 'probable', Humphrey wrote:

'I am sure that I am within the reach of probable events in also suggesting that under these circumstances it would be wise if our military were actively contemplating the several alternatives available to us in coping with the ultimate responsibilities which would fall to us in the event of both war and victory. This necessarily leads one to the conclusion that we must evaluate the experiences of our efforts in both Germany and Japan following the conclusion of hostilities.

'I presume also, Mr. President, to suggest that with your keen interest in historical development

you may be particularly interested in the historical analyses which might emerge from a study of those occupation efforts. To the cultural historian I should think there could be nothing more interesting than a careful and objective analysis of the effectiveness of our last major effort to materially influence the culture of another people by direct intervention in the processes by which the culture perpetuates itself.' ⁴⁸

The letter, kept in the Harry S. Truman Library, was the then youthful Senator's best possible testimonial in the eyes of the top American leaders. Which of Humphrey's recommendations were followed and which were not is hard to say. But one thing is certain: the high-ranking officials congratulated themselves on having kept state secrets well, for the Senator was showing concern over issues that had already been thoroughly treated in secret military plans—atomic bombs first, then occupation of the Soviet Union. True, the plans made no mention of any 'culture' and were concentrated on the physical extermination of Russians. The same Truman Library contains an article by Robert Strausz-Hupé and Curtin Winsor in *Freedom and Union* (of December 1950), entitled 'Stalin will win unless . . .'. Typical of the efforts of that time to create the lie of a Soviet war threat, the authors stated: 'It is proposed to demonstrate in this article that unless we adopt a bolder foreign policy, Russia will defeat the United States in World War III.' Then, having set the tune, Strausz-Hupé and Winsor painted the hair-raising prospect: Soviet Russia will launch a mass surprise attack on the U.S. and her chief allies after she has developed a stock of atomic bombs and the means of delivering them.'

This incitement of terror had its own logic. Soon, the writers came out with a horror story of what a 'fifth column' can do on American soil. Here's what would happen, they said:

'In all probability, the Kremlin will seek first to "liquidate" the military, political and industrial brains of the U.S. and its chief allies so as to paralyze national defense during the all important first days of the war. An atomic bomb exploded in Washington and another in London would help accom-

plish that aim. But the enemy could not be sure of killing every top Government official even if several bombs were detonated in the comparatively limited area of those cities in which the chief Government buildings are concentrated. Are there occasions when the top brass of the U.S. are congregated outdoors when they would be peculiarly vulnerable to atomic attack?

'The Army-Navy football game is staged in Philadelphia's Municipal Stadium annually on a Saturday early in December. Perhaps in the year chosen that Saturday would fall on December 7. An atomic bomb exploded over or in the Stadium (smuggled to the sidelines, perhaps, in the guise of a chest containing football gear) would kill every single one of the 100,000 persons of the game. They normally include the President and most of his cabinet, the top Congressional leaders, the political leaders of both major parties, almost all the ranking officers of the Army, Air Force & Navy & many nationally prominent labour & business executives.

'The paralysing effect of the annihilation of this country's leadership timed with attack on the two capitals staggers the imagination.'

But how to save the 100,000 football fans proscribed for 'annihilation' by atomic-bomb-equipped Russian agents? The ravings of the mythmakers lead to wholly practicable, earthy conclusions: the arms race, establishment of military blocs, and the like. Plus recommendations directly related to the subject of this book:

'Take the lead in winning over as many Soviet satellites as possible—not only those like Yugoslavia that show any tendency to peep out from behind the Iron Curtain, but also the other East European peoples.

'Employ incessant counter propaganda and psychological warfare by every possible method through both governmental and private agencies such as "Crusade for Freedom", and aim this against the Red leaders (as distinguished from the people of Russia).'⁴⁹

Presumably, the President and his associates had studied the article closely, though what they thought of it was put down in a single sentence: '*Let us be the Goliath—but live to fight!!!*'

The person who made this marginal note did not leave his signature. But that is not the point. As we see, the White House took the wild tale seriously. By American standards the source—Strausz-Hupé—could not have been more trustworthy. The professor had already won considerable repute for his extreme anti-Soviet thinking and his incendiary though invariably quasi-scientific books.

The tale dates thirty years back. The chiefs of staff were working on Dropshot, blueprinting an atomic aggression against the Soviet Union, and simultaneously inventing excuses for their designs: to prevent the terrible fate that the Soviet Union had devised for the 100,000 fans, the President included, at the Municipal Stadium in Philadelphia.

The declassification of NSC 68 in 1975⁵⁰ was unquestionably intended to throw a bridge between past and future, and to demonstrate the continuity of U.S. foreign policy. Indeed, the shifting sands of time have not swallowed up the NSC 68 postulates. The ruling oligarchy in the West is still living on the proceeds from the intellectual capital the U.S. National Security Council accumulated some 30 years ago, and is still far removed from jettisoning it. This is evident from developments in the international arena, in the sphere of political thinking, and in particular from the findings of a special study group submitted to The Trilateral Commission in 1978 in the form of a report, entitled 'The Overview of East-West Relations'.

'We can then say,' the report concludes, 'that for the last 30 years, East-West relations have been characterized by long-term conflict intermingled with elements of co-operation... Despite the rise of major new problems—notably the Soviet-Chinese conflict, the "North-South" tension between the advanced industrial countries and the less developed nations and the emergence of a number of non-aligned regional powers—the East-West conflict has in our opinion retained that central importance to this day.'⁵¹

Who are these 'we' that pass such categorical judgement on no less than a global scale? What is The Trilateral Commission? Comparatively little is known about it. *Penthouse* wrote in December 1977:

In 1972, David Rockefeller decided to become the *de facto* ruler of the non-Communist world. His ve-

hicle was to be The Trilateral Commission... In 1973 David Rockefeller asked Zbigniew Brzezinski to create The Trilateral Commission—a private club of billionaires and their advisers, dedicated to running the world.’⁵²

Its members are proud of their extraordinary pragmatism implying thereby that these days the effects of ‘private’ persons can yield more than governments afflicted by bureaucratic sclerosis.

The Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973, consists of representatives of the biggest U.S., West European and Japanese monopolies. As far as we know, it meets behind closed doors and elaborates an agreed policy, in particular for the solution of the cardinal economic and currency problems of the capitalist world. Its ultimate objective, if one is to believe Zbigniew Brzezinski, is the creation of ‘a community of the developed nations’—of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. Since 1973 it has sponsored reports by special trilateral study groups. *Overview of East-West Relations* was the 15th of these reports. Though it was made public and is worded differently from the ominous recommendations contained in NSC 68, set forth candidly as behoves a secret document, the spirit of that directive is quite distinctly evident in the passages that present the outlook of The Trilateral Commission:

‘A stable world order, as frequently envisioned in the West, is not a realistic objective... Moreover, the illusion of stability has the disadvantage of tending to confine the West to defensive goals...

‘As a basic guideline for our long-term relationship with the communist powers, then, the West should not be content to defend its fundamental values and seek to implement them on its own territory: it should set itself the objective to influence the natural processes of change that occur in the Third World and even in the Communist world...

‘In speaking of peaceful change in the direction of our values, we rather aim at changes within those regimes—at influencing the kind of choices that are possible and necessary within their given basic structure... The West cannot influence them effectively by simply propagating its preferences or raising demands addressed to the Soviet leaders. But in nego-

tiating, within the framework of détente... it can shape the alternatives facing its negotiating partners in such a way as to make one internal choice more rewarding to them than the other.’

Plainly discernible behind the streamlined diplomatic language is the intention to meddle more and more in the affairs of the Soviet Union in order to undermine the socialist system and to assert the much-vaunted ‘values’ of capitalism. At the same time a search is on for allies inside the Soviet Union, for elements whom Soviet people regard as renegades. The report speaks of pressures ‘created by the “dissident” political activities of the “democratic movement”’. Unfortunately, however, the report laments ‘these groups are small and... have no mass influence’. Their advantage for the West lies in the fact that they uphold the ‘values’ of capitalism, in other words, are in the forefront of the battle against socialism. The report specially stresses:

‘The attitude towards individual human rights is one of the basic differences between the values of the Communist-controlled governments and those of the West. In its nature, it is not a difference likely to be overcome within the framework of peaceful coexistence between different systems.’

This is an admission straight from the horse’s mouth that the ‘human rights’ campaign in the West is a calculated piece of mischief-making designed to undermine the very foundations of peaceful coexistence, the basic principles of détente. But back to the report:

‘This is not to suggest that Western governments... can do nothing useful in the matters of human rights. They can and must insist that the Eastern regimes put up with the information on their right violations spread by Western news media, including the media specially beamed to the East, as part of the “ideological struggle”... The Western governments... will be wise to avoid the impression of a public governmental attempt to “force” changes in Eastern domestic policies. Much of the—positive or negative—effect in these matters depends on questions of style and method.’⁵³

And a peculiar arsenal of ‘style and method’, not even remotely resembling any ‘public governmental attempt’ at subverting the political or social systems of other countries, is the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

The early history of the CIA is obscured by pious legends about concern for 'national security'. 'The CIA,' the Hoover Commission, reorganising the U.S. state apparatus, said in 1955, 'may well attribute its existence to the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor and to the postwar investigation into the part Intelligence or lack of Intelligence played in the failure of our military forces to receive adequate and prompt warning of the impending Japanese attack.'¹ This was an authoritative opinion by a commission headed by an ex-President of the United States, Herbert Hoover.

Harry S. Truman, during whose presidency the CIA was set up, fully subscribed to this opinion. In his memoirs, completed in 1956, he wrote: 'I have often thought that if there had been something like coordination of information in the government it would have been more difficult, if not impossible, for the Japanese to succeed in the sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. In those days the military did not know everything the State Department knew, and the diplomats did not have access to all the Army and Navy knew.'

After the end of World War II the President's position was altogether lamentable. Truman complained: 'Such information as the President needed was being collected in several different places in the government. The War Department had an Intelligence Division—G-2—and the Navy had an intelligence setup of its own—the ONI. The Department of State, on the one hand, got its information through diplomatic channels, while the Treasury and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture each had channels for gathering information from different parts of the world—on monetary, economic, and agricultural matters.'

'During World War II the Federal Bureau of Investigation had some operations abroad, and in addition the Office of Strategic Services, which was set up by President Roosevelt during the war and placed under the direc-

tion of General William J. Donovan, operated abroad to gather information.

'This scattered method of getting information for the various departments of the government first struck me as being badly organized.'²

Truman rectified the situation by establishing, in 1947, the Central Intelligence Agency directly subordinated to the National Security Council. In the official history of the CIA written in 1975 for the Senate select committee headed by Frank Church, we read:

'Under the Act, the CIA's mission was only loosely defined... The five general tasks assigned to the Agency were (1) to advise the NSC on matters related to national security; (2) to make recommendations to the NSC regarding the coordination of intelligence activities of the Departments; (3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence and provide for its appropriate dissemination; (4) to carry out "service of common concern" and (5) "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC will from time to time direct..." The shadow of the Pearl Harbor disaster dominated policy-makers' thinking about the purpose of a central intelligence agency. They saw themselves rectifying the conditions that allowed Pearl Harbor to happen—a fragmented military-based intelligence apparatus, which in current terminology could not distinguish "signals" from "noise", let alone make its assessments available to senior officials.'

Well put, but only from the standpoint of superficial logic. What Washington was thinking about was a war against the Soviet Union, and it naturally strove to improve the intelligence service. The above-mentioned history of the CIA stresses:

'The concept of a peacetime central intelligence agency had its origins in World War II with the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Through the driving initiative and single-minded determination of William J. Donovan, sponsor and first director of OSS, the organization became the United States' first independent intelligence body and provided the organizational precedent for the Central Intelligence Agency. In

large part, CIA's functions, structure, and expertise were drawn from OSS.'³

Quite true. But why, then, was it necessary for President Truman to disband the OSS on September 20, 1945—two years prior to the establishment of the CIA? Why did the President himself create difficulties to rectify which, as he said, he created the CIA? To find the answer it is worthwhile to take a look at the legacy the OSS left as a guide for postwar American secret services.

2

Whatever the champions of American 'democracy' may say to the contrary, when World War II broke out the United States had more than enough espionage and counter-espionage services of diverse kinds. Washington had always preferred to 'overdo' things in this field, disregarding organizational and material costs. The special services knew their place and catered fairly well to current needs. This state of affairs would have evidently taken the country through the war, had the helm been in the hands of a man of less caliber and less inclined to secret politics than Franklin D. Roosevelt, who had an understanding partner in Winston Churchill.

Both men, though for different reasons, based their policies on a desire to achieve victory over the Axis powers at minimum cost to their countries: Churchill in view of Britain's limited resources, and Roosevelt by dint of his determination to lead the world into an 'American century' with minimum losses for the United States. The wiser for the lessons of the October Revolution in Russia, Roosevelt and Churchill knew that a new bloodbath similar to that experienced in World War I—and the technical advance of the tools of war reached in 1939 would have eclipsed it—could lead to radical social changes in their countries. Ultimately, World War II was brought on by the same, capitalist, system.

After the outbreak of the war, along with increasing the military might of their countries, Churchill in a belligerent Britain and Roosevelt in a non-belligerent United States promoted a rapid build-up of the potential for secret operations. Cryptographers of the Western allies cracked many a secret Axis code. The contents of deciphered Ger-

man documents were reported to the White House and 10 Downing Street under code-name Ultra. An effective service of misinformation at the highest level was organized to provoke the adversary to actions desirable to Britain and the United States or to thwart his plans.

The aim of the diverse secret activity conducted as part of the overall strategy of these countries was to weaken and destroy the Axis powers primarily through the agency of others. The British Secret Intelligence Service, whose wartime headquarters were in New York, shared its vast experience in political intrigue with the relevant divisions of the American secret services and helped to put them on their feet. The latter were set up and headed by Roosevelt's friend, General Donovan, a successful Wall Street lawyer before the war. Insofar as the Soviet Union was the strongest power of the Old World opposing the aggressors, it became the centre of attention for Washington and London, which were out to use its might in their own interests. In the long run, their designs were built on sand, but this in no way reduced the zeal of 'Wild Bill' Donovan.

Donovan's preparatory effort was cut short by Nazi Germany's sudden attack on the Soviet Union. There was no time to waste, for the Soviet Union's single combat against the Axis powers called for close study if Washington wished to draw prompt conclusions and to plan its policy. A competent study of the matter contains the following passage: 'The attack on Russia made it politically possible for him (Roosevelt) to declare Bill Donovan his Coordinator of Information',⁴ and this was duly announced in the President's executive order of July 11, 1941. The vague title of Coordinator (the term OSS appeared on June 13, 1942) was designed to confuse the enemy and at once disarm the large jealous intelligence community angered and dumbfounded by the appearance of a rival. Eight agencies were displeased: the FBI, the G-2, the Office of Naval Intelligence, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, the customs service of the Department of Commerce, the Treasury Department Intelligence, the immigration and naturalization service of the Department of Labor, and the Federal Communications Commission engaged in radio monitoring.

What they did not comprehend was that the OSS, formerly subordinated to the Joint Chiefs of Staff but actual-

ly to the President, was an organ of strategic intelligence, subversion, and 'black' propaganda, while they, organs of tactical intelligence, each operating in its own field, were unaffected. The most important intelligence gathered by them was to be referred to the OSS for analysis. The indignation knew no bounds. For them it was nothing short of sacrilege that civilian professors should from now on deal with military issues. But the President's power had to be reckoned with. The President's executive order charged Donovan's office 'to collect and analyze all information and data' which may bear upon 'national security'. Ray S. Cline, who started with OSS and ultimately became deputy director of the CIA, wrote 35 years later in his book *Secrets, Spies and Scholars* (1976):

"The sentence that reads: "collect and analyze all information and data" is significant and certainly reflected the spirit of "all source" intelligence that animated Donovan, Allen Welsh Dulles, OSS, and CIA...

"The order also invented the phrase "national security" that has lived on to the present, explaining the rationale for much intelligence activity, and serving also as a vague pretext for almost anything a President wanted done.'⁵

By the end of the war more than 30,000 people were working in the OSS. Its brains trust, the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A), was headed by William Langer, a Harvard professor of history. This giant division of the OSS, housed originally in the Library of Congress and still connected with it, Donovan's biographer Corey Ford writes, eventually became

'the largest collection of eminent educators and scholars ever gathered together in a single government agency. R&A skimmed the cream of the social science departments in all the universities, including specialists in every field of intelligence. Geographers furnished information on foreign terrain and climate for American policy planners; psychologists probed Axis broadcasts for hidden meanings; economists sifted German newspapers in search of figures on Nazi war production; historians provided depth and background to world events. By the war's end, R&A had enlisted over sixteen hundred social scientists from Washington alone, a national superuniversity unequalled before or since. ... In 1964, McGeorge Bun-

dy wrote in *The Dimensions of Diplomacy*: "It is a curious fact of academic history that the first great centre of area studies in the United States was not located in any university, but in Washington during the Second World War, in the Office of Strategic Services. In very large measure the area study programs developed in American universities in the years after the war were manned, directed, or stimulated by graduates of the OSS—a remarkable institution, half cops-and-robbers and half faculty meeting. It is still true today, and I hope it always will be, that there is a high measure of interpenetration between universities with area programs and information-gathering agencies of the government of the United States... Subsequently this Board of Analysts provided the model for the CIA Board of National Estimates, set up in 1950 by Dr. Langer".⁶

Though, for understandable reasons, the attention of the OSS was centred on the Axis powers, neither did it disregard an ally, the U.S.S.R. This is recorded in the U.S. specialist literature, albeit in outline only and doubtless with a good dose of misinformation. For instance, when considering the amount of lend-lease deliveries to the U.S.S.R., the U.S. leaders tried to determine the 'actual' Soviet needs lest anything should be left over for after the war. The American and British secret services pooled their efforts with regard to both the enemy and the ally, the U.S.S.R., Donovan's biographer writes:

'R&A's estimate of the strength of the Soviet Union differed from British findings; and Professor Geroid F. Robinson of Columbia, a diligent student of Russian history who later headed the first Russian Institute at Columbia, went to England and spent a week with the British counterpart of R&A, located at Oxford. "You've got better men, you've got more information, we accept your estimates," the British conceded. Dr. Langer claims that no other government had anything comparable to R&A. "And that includes the Germans," he added, "who could have had it if they wanted it—they had the competence."'⁷

A study by Thomas Powers that appeared in 1979 and is, in effect, a history of the CIA, traces OSS concerns with the U.S.S.R. in wartime. Referring to R. Harris Smith's

book, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (1972) and adding his own observations, Powers notes:

'The history of OSS, which is indistinguishable from the secret political history of the war, is marked by a preoccupation with Communism almost as intense as its commitment to victory against Germany. A woman who worked for Dulles in Bern thinks that the focus of his attention—the kind of thing man thinks about as he drifts to sleep at night & wakes up in the morning—was beginning to shift from Germany to Russia as early as Stalingrad. The OSS, including Helms, lived with the Soviet-American rivalry as a fact throughout the war.'⁸ This was a cause not only for OSS operatives, of course, but also for the scholars in OSS employ.

Years of service were given to the OSS by many American scholars of the older generation specializing in social science. Among them were the historians Arthur Schlesinger, Walt W. Rostow, Everett Gleason, and Sherman Kent, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, the economists Edward S. Mason, Charles Hitch, and Emile Despres, the sinologists John K. Fairbank and Clarence M. Wilbur. Cline wrote: 'He (Donovan) lifted intelligence out of its military rut, where it had little prestige and little dynamism, and made it a career for adventurous, broad-minded civilians. This tradition carried down to CIA, which regularly recruited some of the most able graduates from U.S. universities, to learn the intelligence business from the cadre of OSS veterans who stayed on in public service.'⁹

Many of these men of science were attracted by the chance of being on an equal footing (outwardly, of course) with such scions of America's wealthiest and most influential clans as the Du Ponts, Ryans, Vanderbilts, Mellons, Armours and Bruces. Some Russian emigres—Leo Tolstoy's grandson Ilya and Prince Serge Obolensky among them—also found their way into the OSS. OSS funds were administered by Junius Morgan, a partner of John Pierpont Morgan. A host of lawyers who worked for the largest American corporations, also worked for OSS. Drew Pearson, the columnist, observed at the time that the OSS consisted mainly of Wall Street bankers. And Donovan was flattered rather than annoyed by this press exposure of what was to have been hidden from the public eye,

James Roosevelt, the President's elder son, was OSS liaison officer with the government.

Landing amidst professional spies and the scions of America's leading families, the gentlemen and scholars were found to be far less squeamish than conventionally portrayed. They had no fear of blood and launched into various bloodthirsty plans. The CIA experiments on humans, in behavior control, and in methods of effective interrogation, and many other things of the same order, date back to those OSS times. A long-standing practice of the U.S. special services, quiet elimination of dangerous adversaries, was given a 'scientific grounding', and in wartime conditions was expected to yield great results.

An unnamed professor coined the phrase, 'fight terror with terror' in combating the Axis, adding: 'We have to become monsters to destroy monsters.' The innovator, described as a 'mumbly professor', introduced a technique that became a feature of the OSS Research and Analysis branch. Properly handled, it was a fine weapon. It pulled together all the small details about an absent person until you could make him seem to speak and move before your eyes. Heydrich was its first victim.¹⁰ His 'psychological' portrait showed that he was dangerous. The OSS and the British Secret Intelligence Service found the Czech patriots who willingly eliminated Heydrich, and laid down their lives in the attempt, with the entire population of the village of Lidice being wiped out in reprisal as the price for Heydrich's life.

Donovan's close associate, the wartime chief of British intelligence, William Stephenson, years later explained the motives for Heydrich's killing: 'Civilian morale inside Fortress Europe had to be prepared, and our guerilla forces had to be supported by most of the population. There was only one way to mobilize popular support for the secret armies, and that was to stage more dramatic acts of resistance and counterterrorism.'¹¹

This fitted perfectly into the Anglo-American strategy of having the chestnuts pulled out of the fire by someone else. But with the exception of Heydrich's assassination in 1942, no more 'dramatic acts' of the kind were heard of. Which is probably a fair indication of OSS capability. It was not the intrigues of the U.S. and British special services, but the valiant war effort of the Soviet people that

awakened and inspired the Resistance in Europe. Fascism armed to the teeth could be and was destroyed only by superior military force—the Red Army.

A war of gigantic proportions was in train, but the anonymous OSS scholars with their pathetic yen for tackling problems of global scale, produced a rich assortment of half-baked, neophyte plans.

Walter Langer, a psychoanalyst by profession, who was brought to the OSS by his brother William, undertook Donovan's assignment to pull together a 'psychological portrait' of Hitler. In the opinion of the OSS chief, it was to be of tremendous significance for the fortunes of the war. Declassified and published in the early 1970s under the title, *The Mind of Adolf Hitler*, it is rather a 'psychological portrait' of the OSS leadership, and hence the CIA, than of Hitler. The 200 pages about Hitler are enough to turn the stomach of even the psycho-historian. It is really nothing more than a collective excursion into Freud.

The sources for the research, which was completed in the autumn of 1943, were the already plentiful books on Hitler and interviews with persons who knew him personally and proved to be within reach of the OSS. What had been extracted from publications and oral reports was compared with case histories of mental patients, leading to the conclusion that 'Hitler is probably a neurotic psychopath bordering on schizophrenia. This means that he is not insane in the commonly accepted sense of the term, but a neurotic who lacks adequate inhibitions... It is a kind of "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde".'

After thus diagnosing the Fuehrer's mental state, OSS psychoanalysts ventured a summing up: 'Those who are delegated to conduct the war against Germany... will realize that the madness of the Fuehrer has become the madness of a nation, if not of a large part of the (European) continent. They will realize that these are not wholly the actions of a single individual but that a reciprocal relationship exists between the Fuehrer and the people and that the madness of the one stimulates and flows into the other and vice versa. It was not only Hitler, the madman, who created German madness, but German madness that created Hitler... From a scientific point of view, therefore, we are forced to consider Hitler, the Fuehrer, not as a personal devil, wicked as his actions and philosophy may be,

but as the expression of a state of mind existing in millions of people, not only in Germany, but to a smaller degree in all civilized countries. To remove Hitler may be a necessary first step, but it would not be the cure... We must ferret out and seek to correct the underlying factors that produced the unwelcome phenomenon. We must discover the psychological streams that nourish this destructive state of mind in order that we may divert them into channels that will permit a further evolution of our form of civilization.' From the general to the particular—to the personality of Hitler. The doors of the OSS laboratory were flung wide open, revealing the rather shoddy armarium of Freud.

Lumped together were Hitler's Messianic inclinations and his tears over a dead canary, the mechanism of influencing the crowd and the people as a whole, which the Fuehrer saw as a woman, entering into a sexually-determined contact with it from the speaker's platform. Hence, in the opinion of OSS experts, the paralyzing effectiveness of Hitler's speeches. There was also, of course, a richly documented history of his sex life, starting with early observations of the parents of three-year-old Adolf. Brushing aside the commonly-held view of the Fuehrer's homosexual inclinations, the psychoanalysts described, with relish and a wealth of detail, how Hitler satisfied his sexual desires, prostrating himself naked at a woman's feet, imploring her to beat him, and hysterically insisting that she urinate and defecate on him, and so on. This clinical case of typical masochism had such a staggering effect on his uninitiated partners that two of them committed suicide, while Eva Braun's consent to grant the Fuehrer's extravagant requests had cost her considerable effort plus two attempts at suicide.

Good heavens, why all this nastiness, and why the laudatory and loathsome afterword to the report written by Robert Waite in the early seventies confirming these conclusions on the basis of postwar investigations. Yes, Hitler 'was reputed to have taken great pleasure in having young ladies defecate on his head'. And why make the reader climb up Hitler's genealogical tree to satisfy himself that his grandfather was a Jew? What bearing did this have on the horrible war, and in what way did the elucidation of these circumstances help Washington? As Walter Lan-

ger, who had been in charge of the research project, explained in the introduction to his book in 1972, 'If such a study of Hitler had been made years earlier, under less tension, and with more opportunity to gather first-hand information, there might not have been a Munich... and one of President Diem might have avoided our deep involvement in Vietnam. Studies of this type cannot solve our international problems. They might, however, help to avoid some of the serious blunders we seemed to have made because we were ignorant of the psychological factors involved and the nature of the leaders with whom we were negotiating.'

According to Langer, it was a brilliant piece of impartial research. Quite true, at least in the case of Hitler's strange ways. But on the whole, the analysis of Hitler's personality shows the high sense of discipline that prevailed in the OSS: it supplied those at the top, in the White House, only that which flattered the recipients. It says in the study, for example, that 'there is evidence that the only person in the world at the present time who might challenge Hitler in the role of leader is Roosevelt. Informants are agreed that he fears neither Churchill nor Stalin. He feels that they are sufficiently like himself so that he can understand their psychology and defeat them at the game. Roosevelt, however, seems to be an enigma to him. How a man can lead a nation of 130,000,000 people and keep them in line without a great deal of name-calling, shouting, abusing, and threatening is a mystery to him. He is unable to understand how a man can be the leader of a large group and still act like a gentleman. The result is that he secretly admires Roosevelt to a considerable degree, regardless of what he publicly says about him. Underneath he probably fears him inasmuch as he is unable to predict his actions.'¹²

Since Langer and his learned colleagues wrote off what the Fuehrer publicly said about the U.S. President and turned instead to what the Fuehrer had thought 'secretly' about him, *Hitler's Secret Conversations*, which is a book of verbatim reports on his pronouncements among intimates, published in 1953 in London, is surely acceptable for ascertaining precisely what Hitler had thought. Well, then, let's look into it. Hitler's appraisal of Roosevelt was: 'There's no doubt about it, he's a sick brain.' Hitler said to

his retainers: 'Neither of the two Anglo-Saxons is any better than the other... Churchill and Roosevelt, what impostors!... Roosevelt, who both in his handling of political issues and in his general attitude, behaves like a tortuous pettifogging Jew... Churchill as the undisciplined swine who is drunk eight hours of every twenty-four.' About Stalin, on the other hand, Hitler said he 'must command our unconditional respect. In his own way he is a hell of a fellow'.¹³ At the height of the war, after familiarizing himself with the estimate of the U.S.S.R. prepared by the office of Walter Schellenberg, Ribbentrop told the latter that he was very familiar with his special reports on Russia, 'and he had given the full situation much thought. He had then gone to the Fuehrer and told him frankly that their biggest and most dangerous enemy was the Soviet Union and that Stalin had as much military ability and statesmanship as Churchill and Roosevelt put together... The Fuehrer shared this view and even mused out loud that Stalin was the only one he could find the necessary respect for.'¹⁴

The present-day historians of the American special services are doubtless perfectly aware of this, yet attach no importance to it, and insist that Hitler's wartime 'psychological portrait' had been impeccable. More, the Langer & Co. 'portrait' is taken as a model for similar studies, past and present, done by the CIA. R. Cline, for example, has no second thoughts about backing it with his professional weight of a former high-ranking CIA officer and, what is more, with the weight of his sideline profession of historian (he was the author of one of the important volumes of the 99-volume history of the U.S. Army during World War II—*Washington Command Post*). He does not hesitate to testify that 'Walter Langer... supervised the publication of an extraordinary insightful personality profile of Adolf Hitler, published as a book many years later, which pointed the way to similar sketches of foreign leaders by CIA's psychiatric staff.'¹⁵

Could eminent historians—like Carl L. Becker and Charles A. Beard among the American ones—have foreseen what use would be made of their relativist method by the gentlemen and scholars in the employ of the U.S. special services. Harry Rositzke was in positive raptures in 1977 that the CIA produced 'profiles on key political fi-

figures in the tradition of Professor William Langer's published OSS profile on Hitler.'¹⁶ So it's already a 'tradition'.

Evidently the range of persons whose 'profiles' are drawn is not limited to major leaders. More likely still, the CIA has adopted the practice of portraying those—Americans included—who are found to be 'dangerous' to the existing system. It appears that the kind of investigation provided for by the law is replaced with the arbitrary compilation by anonymous specialists of a secret 'psychological portrait' whereby conclusions may be drawn with regard to its 'subject', and thus, too, beyond the limits established by the law. Operational efficiency is the keynote: instead of a long investigative record, a thin file with a 'psychological portrait' as the basis for extrajudicial persecution. But, of course, that is not the kind of thing the CIA shouts about from the rooftops. Yet in 1971-1973 a certain 'psychological portrait' caused a scandal that could not be hushed up.

In June 1971 *The New York Times* began publishing excerpts from a 47-volume secret history of U.S. policy in Vietnam. It had been compiled in 1967-1968 on orders from Defence Secretary Robert McNamara who, anticipating the defeat of the U.S.A., had commissioned a panel of experts to give an exposition of the reasons for this. The 36 authors of the report, which the press came to call the Pentagon Papers, but which was officially entitled *History of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Vietnam Policy*, were aware, as was pointed out in the introduction, that what they had produced was 'not a complete ... history'.¹⁷ But even the facts disclosed in it were enough to prove that the United States had been the instigator of that aggressive war. When opinions were aired on this score in the White House, Defence Secretary Mel Laird felt that over 95 per cent of the material could be declassified. 'But,' Richard Nixon recalls, 'we were all still worried about whatever percent—even if it were only 1 percent—that should not be.'¹⁸ The Administration reacted with alacrity, but was unable to stop further publication. The then Governor of Georgia Jimmy Carter called on a Senator to urge 'the enactment of Federal legislation that would make news organizations criminally liable'.¹⁹

A public scandal erupted, in which the government's hands were tied, for the Vietnam war had by then caused

deep rifts in the ruling class. Though, to be sure, the publication of the Pentagon Papers did not, and indeed could not, alter anything in U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. This is attested, too, by R. Sigford, author of an unpublished dissertation on the Vietnam War, preserved in the Lyndon B. Johnson library. 'But after all was said and done,' he wrote, 'the Pentagon study had little if any effect on the Vietnam War.'²⁰

The culprit responsible for the leaking of the secret papers, Daniel Ellsberg, who had been in Vietnam in 1964-1966 in the capacity of a Pentagon expert, and had gone there a 'hawk' and returned a 'dove', had immaculate credentials: he had been connected with the CIA.

According to Fletcher Prouty, former chief liaison officer between the Department of Defense and the CIA, the purpose of leaking the Pentagon Papers was 'to make certain that the role of the CIA always appeared in a most laudable and commendable manner'.²¹ The Administration, it seems, had not heeded its recommendations, and this was the sad result.

Ellsberg's intervention was welcomed by Richard Nixon's powerful opponents. He was to be prosecuted, but the case collapsed. He basked in glory. His name was featured in frontpage headlines. Ellsberg was invulnerable, he was being swept along by the powerful current carrying the country towards Watergate.

In May 1973 it became known that following the publication of the Pentagon Papers, the CIA had been instructed to settle scores with Ellsberg. But by no means for turning from 'hawk' into 'dove'. As reported by V. Lasky in his book, *It Didn't Start with Watergate* (1977), Henry Kissinger, who was personally acquainted with the much-lauded truth-seeker, had reported to the President that Ellsberg had

'knowledge of very critical defence secrets of current validity, such as nuclear deterrent targeting'. In the mid-sixties Ellsberg had, in fact, worked for Defense Secretary McNamara on nuclear targeting plans. 'These closely held nuclear secrets,' Lasky says, 'were contained in a highly classified document—the Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP). Kissinger informed Nixon that a leak of SIOP would be devastating to national security. SIOP spelled out the

timing and attack patterns of American nuclear bombs in case of war; it contained specific targeting information for every military objective behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains, including the number and power of nuclear warheads programmed for each target.'

Though there was no indication that Ellsberg intended to make any revelations concerning SIOP, the President's orders were more than emphatic: 'I don't give a damn how it is done, do whatever has to be done to stop these leaks and prevent further unauthorised disclosures; I don't want to be told why it can't be done.'²²

The CIA mounted an operation code-named Odessa to put together a 'psychiatric profile' of Ellsberg. Agents with special equipment broke into the offices of the family doctors to pick up information. By November 1971 the 'profile' was ready.

The man in charge of the operation, G. Gordon Liddy, reminded presidential aides: 'The only overt program should be that involving criminal prosecution under the appropriate federal statutes. The remaining malefactors should be identified and dealt with no less severely, but by *alternative means* (italics added).'

²³ As a result of a concatenation of circumstances, and most likely because of pressures exerted by quarters that wanted to get rid of Nixon, the operation was brought to the light of day. The curtain on Watergate was rising.

Former CIA Director William Colby writes in his memoirs:

'In early May of 1973 I read in a newspaper the story that would radically shake up my life, and that of the CIA. It was the story that reported that, during Daniel Ellsberg's trial for disclosing the Pentagon Papers, it had been revealed that the office of his psychiatrist, Dr. Lewis J. Fielding, had been broken into by Howard Hunt, using CIA equipment, in search of material that would then be turned to CIA and from which CIA would prepare a "psychiatric profile" on Ellsberg for the White House. This was a shocker and I couldn't understand how I had never heard of it before, when I was supposed to have been in charge of assembling all the CIA material relevant to Watergate.'

²⁴

Colby's memoirs belong to writings that come under the head of limited credibility. But in the given case he might well have been taken aback. As were those in the White House who had ordered operation Odessa. They probably had only a dim idea of how the CIA worked, and could not imagine that so experienced an outfit would leave its tracks uncovered. On March 17, 1973, the following exchange took place between Nixon and his loyal aide, John Dean:

'Dean: ...Hunt and Liddy both. They—these fellows had to be some idiots as we've learned after the fact. They went out and went into Dr. Ellsberg's doctor's office and they had, they were geared up with all this CIA equipment—cameras and the like. Well they turned the stuff back in to the CIA at some point in time and left film in the camera. CIA has not put this together, and they don't know what it all means right now.

'President: What in the world—what in the name of God...

'Dean: They were trying to—this was a part of an operation that—in connection with the Pentagon papers. They were—the whole thing—they wanted to get Ellsberg's psychiatric records for some reason. I don't know...

'President: (Expletive deleted)...

'Dean: There are all the materials relating to Hunt. In there are these pictures which the CIA developed and they've got Gordon Liddy standing proud as punch outside the doctor's office with his name on it. And (unintelligible) this material it's not going to take very long for an investigator to go back and say, well, why would this—somebody be at the doctor's office and they'd find out that there was a break-in at the doctor's office and then you'd find Liddy on the staff and then you'd start working it back...'²⁵

The two had foreseen exactly what would happen. The break-in at the doctor's office figured prominently in what came to be known as the Watergate affair. The guilty parties went to prison. Nixon in his memoirs calls it a tragedy, for after all 'Daniel Ellsberg went free'.²⁶

But we are not concerned with Watergate. We referred to it only to show the kind of dirty tricks the CIA engaged in.

Apart from everything else, the incident went to show that the 'techniques' of the CIA, traceable to the Office of Strategic Services, are a delicate matter requiring a high degree of coordination between the top makers of policy and those who carry it out. Apparently the mechanism, in this instance at least, was out of kilter.

Certainly, this could not have been foreseen by those who had set up the OSS during World War II and planned that the same sort of activity should continue when the war was over. Under Donovan's leadership, OSS produced many novelties, among which the procedure of 'psychiatric profiling' surely wasn't the most impressive, at least in degree of importance.

There is no denying, for example, that OSS efforts had been instrumental in facilitating the practically bloodless landing of the Western allies in Northern Africa in 1942. There is no denying, too, that the OSS put in its two bits in organizing the Resistance in the Nazi-occupied European countries, though it did follow its class orientation and obstructed the mobilization of democratic forces against fascism. Arthur Goldberg, who had headed OSS units and endeavoured to infiltrate the labor movement in Europe in 1946, complained that 'the failure of the U.S. "through ignorance or fear", to give "the democratic forces of the resistance in Europe the help they deserved" limited "the scope and effectiveness of OSS activities in support of our allies in the underground"'. This statement, as Winslow Peck, a former operative of the U.S. secret services, observed in 1978, 'was in contradiction to Goldberg's own limiting of the scope and effectiveness of OSS activities by not equally funding all factions of the resistance, especially the Communists, who were the majority of that resistance'.²⁷ But that depends on what view you take. For the OSS directors it was a token of success, which propelled Goldberg's postwar career, making him today a 'connoisseur' of the problem of 'human rights' in its American interpretation.

The long hand of the OSS and Britain's Secret Intelligence Service reached into a number of German military staffs on the eve of the Anglo-American landing in France in June 1944. David Irving's book, *The Trail of the Fox*,

offers one of many examples. It does not in the least question the fact that psychological warfare methods proved highly effective in disorganising German resistance during the landing. The success of the Allied forces that landed so securely on the European mainland ought to be at least equally credited to Dwight Eisenhower and the secret services. Those who had collaborated on the German side, General Speidel and others, were amply rewarded when they assumed high posts of command in NATO in the fifties.

The part played by OSS in organising opposition to Hitler in Germany's upper echelons is still not altogether clear. This was a job handled by Allen Dulles, and though the plot against Hitler on July 20, 1944, fell through, it does not appear that Washington thought Allen Dulles a complete failure in the secret war, judging from his subsequent career. A side effect of the failure, incidentally, was the eminent success of the Western intelligence agencies in inciting the suspicions of maniac Adolf Hitler against the most popular military man in Nazi Germany, Fieldmarshal Rommel.

Lastly, it is known that apart from 'top-level' activities, OSS engaged in sending armed groups into Nazi-occupied territory, forming a dense web of agents in Western Europe. Donovan was proud chiefly of the OSS role in shaping events, and less of its activity as an intelligence agency. In late autumn 1944, when the Western allies thrust forward to the borders of Germany, he began thinking of the future of his outfit. Evidently, he picked this particular time, because the OSS contribution that had eased the way of the Allied armies to the borders of the Reich was then fresh in the memories of the top leaders of the United States.

On November 18, 1944, evidently after a preliminary verbal understanding, Donovan submitted a memo to Roosevelt with a proposal to establish, after the war, a central intelligence department directly accountable to the President with a view to centralising and co-ordinating the activity of all intelligence units which is 'required by the Executive Branch in planning and carrying out national policy and strategy'. Attached to the memo was the draft of a presidential directive charging the future department with the additional duty of conducting 'subversive opera-

tions abroad' (item 3, clause e). Moreover, upon the approval of the President, the department was to be 'assigned... such military and naval personnel as may be required in the performance of the functions and duties' (item 10).²⁸

Thus from the outset Donovan's plan, which ultimately determined the structure and functions of the CIA, assigned the 'intelligence' service the task of subverting the state system of countries to which the U.S. administration would direct it.

But before President Roosevelt had time to reach a decision on Donovan's proposal, the Germans mounted their devastating offensive in the Ardennes. It came as a complete surprise, and Washington was inclined to blame the intelligence service as well as the OSS for failing to anticipate it, though this was chiefly the business of G-2.

On February 9, 1945, the *Washington Times-Herald* and the *Chicago Tribune* let drop a sensational hint about Donovan's plan, disclosing the President's intention to set up a Gestapo, that would 'supersede all existing Federal police and intelligence units, including Army G-2, Navy ONI, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Internal Revenue Agency, and the Federal Communications Commission'.

The leak was of unparalleled magnitude. Who had dared bring the matter to public notice? Corey Ford (in 1970) said: 'The source of the leak was never revealed.' Ray S. Cline (in 1976) ventured the opinion that 'J. Edgar Hoover probably leaked the proposal to the press'. And in 1978 William Colby confirmed this.²⁹ That year it no longer required much courage to make the disclosure, for Hoover had been dead for some time.

Donovan's plans were upset by Roosevelt's death, which followed shortly after. OSS had been a personal concern of Roosevelt's, who took away with him into the grave the projects for the intended postwar reorganization of the intelligence service. His successor, Truman, came under the pressure of all the rivals of the OSS, with the pack being led by Edgar Hoover, the FBI chief. The President's attention was called to the obvious: the outcome of the war had been decided by armies that were many millions strong: where was the OSS contribution? The OSS hadn't captured any countries for the U.S.A. Its claims were exaggerated. True, it had done fairly well, but didn't Dono-

van's sphere of activity extend merely from Europe to Burma? General McArthur hadn't allowed the OSS into the Pacific Theatre, and managed perfectly well with just G-2. As for Latin America, it had been an FBI operation from start to finish. And were Axis agents there more comfortable than elsewhere? One more point: a young OSS lieutenant, John Birch, sent on a simple mercy mission to China after VJ-Day (to help US POW's out of a Japanese prison camp), let himself be killed by the Chinese.*

The main blow was directed at Donovan's principal asset—the covert actions of OSS. Evidently the attackers simply did not know by what circuitous ways the Roosevelt government had paved the way for what appeared to outsiders to be victories of just the U.S. armed forces. A weapon made to order for a political leader of Roosevelt's calibre, OSS proved too much for a man who had but half a year before been a Senator. So President Truman disbanded the OSS or, more precisely, divided it into two parts, placing the R&A under the State Department, and the secret service and counter-intelligence divisions under the War Department.

But already on January 22, 1946, Truman instituted a Central Intelligence Group, which took over some of the OSS functions. Several months later he transferred Latin America from the competence of the FBI to that newly established agency. What Donovan had failed to achieve under Roosevelt was now accomplished. Meanwhile, says the official history of the CIA, 'in March 1946, the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence services were directed to join with CIG "to produce the highest possible quality of intelligence on the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time". Intended to be broadly focussed, the study began in an atmosphere of urgency... The project was ridden with contention from the start... Each agency was interested in the project only as it served its individual purposes... CIG's intended role as an adjudicator between Departments was quickly reduced to that of an editor for independent departmental estimates. The report was actually published

* Corey Ford observed: 'Though Birch himself had no violent right-wing views, the name of this early martyr to Communism was appropriated years later by America's extremist right-wing political society.'

in March 1948, two years after it had been commissioned'.³⁰ It was published when the CIA had already been set up and had begun to function.

4

The so-called 'revisionists' among U.S. historians showed beyond a shadow of doubt in their books of the sixties and seventies that the blame for the Cold War lay exclusively with Washington. Their conclusions were in perfect harmony with the historical facts, but were viciously attacked by the official historians. Indeed, the disputes over the issue aren't really over, though under Establishment pressure many of the 'revisionists' have let the subject drop.

Certainly, even in their best hour—during the U.S. aggression in Southeast Asia—the 'revisionists' weren't all unanimous. One of the points of dispute was the date the Cold War began. Some said April 1945, meaning Truman's first days in the White House. Others said March 5, 1946, the day of Churchill's speech in Fulton. And so on. Naturally, the discussion hinged on the policy followed by the U.S.A. through the State Department. All the same, the differences over and among the 'revisionists' were confined to the intellectual, academic community.

The unseen onlookers were the U.S. special services, whose agents must have relished the sight of intellectuals scrimmaging among themselves, evaluating the causes and effects of the events, making their interpretations, and the like. CIA historian Thomas Powers observed that the long debate over the genesis of the Cold War looked a stupid occupation to OSS veterans. By virtue of their OSS background they knew that the Cold War was from the start a continuation of the real war. They had all—Allen Dulles, Bedell Smith, and Richard Helms—been at Eisenhower's headquarters in Reims on the historic May 8, 1945. All of them would one day be directors of the CIA, and all of them were convinced already then that Russia was no less a threat to the world than Hitler, whose ashes were still warm in Berlin. In the late spring of 1945, Helms, for example, quickly noted that the same was being done in relation to the Russians (strength and dislocation of troops, determining the bodies of political control) and by

the same methods (through agents) as he had been doing a few weeks before in relation to Germany. No one was yet calling Russia an enemy, but that was how the country was being treated.³¹

Espionage in the generally accepted sense of the word has, of course, been the business of the CIA since its inception. But spying was routine work. What really appealed to those who filled the vacancies in the fast expanding agency was another officially sanctioned function described as covert actions or, more precisely, subversion. Most CIA operatives saw this as its rationale and the cause of their own lives.

Fletcher Prouty, falling back on his many years as a cloak-and-dagger artist, said:

'The CIA uses its intelligence role as a cover mechanism for its operational activities. Furthermore it uses its own secret intelligence as an initiator for its own secret operations. This is what pleased General Donovan when President Roosevelt unleashed him with the OSS and it is what has been the driving force behind the hard core operational agents within the intelligence community since that time.'³²

Those were exciting times for the OSS veterans, back in their old jobs. Harry Rositzke writes:

'In the spring of 1948 the White House saw war with the Soviet Union as imminent... By now there was no longer any uncertainty in the minds of the colonel's men in the CIA's Office of Special Operations. The Soviet Union was the enemy, and the "Soviet target" our intelligence mission. We were professionally and emotionally committed to a single purpose. We felt ourselves as much a part of the American crusade against Stalin as we had against Hitler. We worked hard and long hours, at night and on weekends, in an atmosphere of impatient tension. The Cold War was a hot war for the operators: Our agents' lives were at stake.

'Even now, as the emotions of the time can be recollected in relative tranquillity, it is hard to define the precise quality of the public mood in which we began our work. Words like *hysteria* and *paranoia* come quickly to mind, and if the main element in the first is "emotional excitability", and in the sec-

ond "systematized delusions of persecution", both are relevant. They are, however, heavily loaded words, and perhaps a less analytic and more neutral term, the Cold War mentality, is safer.'³³

These sentiments were generated at the summit of the American pyramid of power whence the orders and directives came down to the executors, the CIA included. It says explicitly in the official history of the CIA that the idea of embarking on secret operations originated not with the intelligence community but with the Administration, which as far back as December 1946 ordered the conduct of 'psychological warfare'. At first, the State Department was to have taken on this function. Truman endorsed the idea, but soon there were second thoughts. Secretary of State George Marshall 'was vehement on the point and believed that such activities, if exposed as State Department actions, would embarrass the Department and discredit American foreign policy'. National Security Council directive 4/A of December 14, 1947, made 'psychological warfare' the province of the CIA. In the Agency's official history we read:

'State and the military wanted to maintain control over covert psychological operations, but they did not want to assume operational responsibility. The sensitive nature of the operations made the Departments fear exposure of their association with the activities. The CIA offered advantages as the organization to execute covert operations. Indeed, in 1947 one-third of the CIA's personnel had served with OSS. The presence of former OSS personnel, who had experience in wartime operations, provided the Agency with a group of individuals who could quickly develop and implement programs. This, coupled with its overseas logistical apparatus, gave the Agency a ready capability. In addition, the Agency also possessed a system of unvouchered funds for its clandestine collection mission, which meant that there was no need to approach Congress for separate appropriations. With the Departments unwilling to assume the risks involved in covert activities, the CIA provided a convenient mechanism.'

Psychological warfare operations were defined in directive NSC 4/A as 'primarily media-related activities, in-

cluding unattributed publications, forgeries, and subsidization of publications; political action involved exploitation of dispossessed persons and defectors, and support to political parties; paramilitary activities included support to guerrillas and sabotage; economic activities consisted of monetary operations.'³⁴ The CIA plunged into the job first of all, naturally, in the most easily accessible area—the capitalist countries, where it mounted a drive against progressives. Through the CIA, the United States sought to undermine the growing prestige and influence of the communist parties in Western Europe, notably in Italy and France.

The NSC directives, concerning Italy, for example, published in the U.S.A. since then, are studded with dots after noting the need for 'all feasible means'. Here is what Ray S. Cline says on this score: 'The omissions indicated by three or four dots in the State Department's published version of these NSC papers indicate exactly where "all feasible means" to prevent the Communists from winning the April (1948) election edged over into covert action of a kind that the Embassy diplomats could not engage in directly.'

All right, let's leave that be. But in the published part of NSC directive 1/3, which concerned Italy, it also said that 'in the event of Communist electoral victories in Italy, the United States should, among other things: Provide military equipment and supplies to Italy only if such equipment and supplies are received by anti-communist elements and are not permitted to fall into Communist hands.'³⁵

The CIA did carry out a massive act of interference in Italy's internal affairs, and this, of all things, under the flag of combating the Soviet Union.

Those were Marshall Plan times, when deafening propaganda was unleashed in the West to advertise the benefits of U.S. 'aid'. A portrait of a selfless, eager-to-help America was being drawn. But how to harmonise that high-flown rhetoric with the brazen subversive activity that Washington had launched, primarily through the CIA, practically in all corners of the world? Slip-ups followed almost at once. Now here now there anger flared over the impertinent activity of the U.S. special services.

Washington was fully aware of the danger with which

these exposures were fraught. The master-minds of the National Security Council drew up and handed down to the CIA on June 18, 1948, directive NSC 10/2, dealing with the conduct of 'special operations'.

This directive, first made public in 1978, said how the CIA would go about its subversive activity, for which a special subdivision was being set up. And to impress the CIA chiefs with what exactly was expected of them, the directive contained a clause defining 'covert operations':

'As used in this directive, "covert operations" are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and conducted that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them. Specifically, such operations shall include any covert activities related to: propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations shall not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.'

The provisions of NSC 10/2 dotted the i's and crossed the t's: the CIA was an instrument for subverting the political systems of other countries, notably the Soviet Union. The directive, says the official history of the CIA, authorized 'a dramatic increase in the range of covert operations directed against the Soviet Union, including political warfare, economic warfare, and paramilitary activities'. One of the initiators of the directive, George Kennan, admitted before the Frank Church Committee in 1975 that 'it ended up with the establishment within CIA of a branch, an office for activities of this nature, and one which employed a great many people. It did not work out at all the way I had conceived it or others of my associates in the

Department of State. We had thought that this would be a facility which could be used when and if an occasion arose when it might be needed'.

Kennan's pronouncements of 1975 were strange, to say the least. The 'need' for subverting the Soviet political system was, in fact, determined by those who defined CIA activity as a permanent function. Wasn't that why CIA got its subdivisions put together in the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) whose personnel was, indeed, very large, and which had branches in as many as 47 countries by 1952.

The official history of CIA says: 'Policy direction took the form of condoning and fostering activity without providing scrutiny and control. Officials throughout the government regarded the Soviet Union as an aggressive force, and OPC's activities were initiated and justified on the basis of this shared perception. The series of NSC directives which authorized covert operations laid out broad objectives and stated in bold terms the necessity for meeting the Soviet challenge head on. After the first 1948 directive authorizing covert action, subsequent directives in 1950 and 1951 called for an intensification of these activities without establishing firm guidelines for approval... Two generations of Agency personnel have been conditioned by this system.'³⁷ And William Colby had this to say: 'The creation of the OPC completed the formation of the CIA... Together these three "cultures"... formed an agency almost precisely the one Donovan had proposed that his OSS become.'³⁸

Apart from defining the purely operational tasks, directive NSC 10/2 introduced in U.S. official practice the doctrine of 'plausible denial'. With this directive deception became an instrument of governmental policy, and the basic guideline in the activity of the U.S. special services. The 'plausible denial' doctrine, originally conceived for CIA purposes, would thereupon be carried to very great lengths. Harry Rositzke writes: 'President Truman's covert action operations rarely came to public notice in his day, and plausible denial required little more than "no comment"'. Under President Eisenhower covert action entered its heyday, and the fifties were the decade of a broad-ranging covert action program... Eisenhower sanctioned action operations in Iran, Guatemala, and Cuba, extended

the covert propaganda mechanisms started under President Truman, and intervened in countless domestic political situations.' ³⁹

The number of 'plausible denials' continued to rise.

If so, then that is the source of the credibility crisis that gripped the U.S.A. in the late sixties and early seventies. Closer scrutiny shows that it was not the result of a combination of circumstances or the fault of statesmen, but of the extension of the CIA style of work to all official Washington. All this has been an object of public censure, especially in connection with Watergate.

The already cited unpublished dissertation by Rolf Sigford, who studied the Johnson and Nixon rhetoric during the Vietnam war, pulled no punches:

'The most terrifying ramification of the Administration's dishonesty has been the total lack of remorse. A statement that is proved false is declared "inoperative" by the White House, and demonstrably premeditated lying before the Senate is termed "a blunder". An Administration that found itself above the law in foreign affairs soon turned to using Nazi tactics in domestic affairs. As a result, the "Big Lie" has become an integral part of American government, and the private citizen is no longer secure against felonies committed by executive agents commissioned by the Administration... The rhetoric that plunged the nation into the Vietnam War is the same type of rhetoric being used to pull the nation from the Watergate mire of criminality. There is piquant irony in President Nixon's resurrection of a rhetoric that had ultimately broken the historic consensus enjoyed by President Johnson. And especially odd is the irony that allows elementary and undistinguished rhetoric to be endlessly recycled in successful attempts to fool most of the people all of the time.' ⁴⁰

The fact that the doctrine of 'plausible denial' was extended to the extreme did not make it any the less elementary and undistinguished. And for a good reason: it is in complete harmony with the purpose for which it has been invented and is applied.

William Colby reminisced as follows about his CIA work in the early half of the fifties:

'A clandestine apparatus is necessary, and it was my chore to build it in some of the Scandinavian countries. Headquarters supported the effort by sending over American agents to reside in Scandinavia under private cover, which is to say as ordinary businessmen or persons of some other nonofficial status. In the theory of the time, the American Government, through its President or its Ambassador, would then be able to issue a "plausible denial" of its involvement in the activities of these nonofficial Americans, as long as no link could be shown to exist between these nonofficial agents and the official officer, such as myself, in the Embassy. That meant that my contacts with these agents had to be in the same clandestine manner as with a fullfledged foreign spy.'

Why these precautions? Colby was engaged in an undertaking of enormous dimensions. The American plans for war against the U.S.S.R. envisaged a retreat from Western Europe at the initial stage of hostilities. Inasmuch as war was considered imminent, the stratagem (according to Colby) was this:

'In the event the Russians succeeded in taking over any or all of the countries of the Continent, the OPC wanted to be in a position to activate well-armed and well-organized partisan uprisings against the occupiers. But this time, unlike the Jedburgh and similar OSS paramilitary teams that went in to help the French *maquis* and other resistance movements during World War II, the OPC didn't want to have to arm and organize those partisans after the occupation, using such dangerous and fallible operations as night flights, supply drops, and parachute infiltrations behind enemy lines. No, this time... we intended to have that resistance capability in place before the occupation, indeed even before an invasion; we were determined to organize and supply it now, while we still had the time in which to do it right and at the minimum of risk. Thus, the OPC had un-

dertaken a major program of building, throughout those West European countries that seemed likely targets for Soviet attack, what in the parlance of the intelligence trade were known as "stay-behind net", clandestine infrastructures of leaders and equipment trained and ready to be called into action as sabotage and espionage forces when the time came.'

U.S. agents were hard at work in West European countries setting up secret arms dumps, installing radio transmitters, and plotting sabotage operations at the sites of important installations. Agents recruited by the CIA from among the local population were being given special training. Here is how Colby describes his job in Scandinavia:

'Recruitment of local nationals willing to join such a network directly, without their government knowing anything about it. I cannot specify which nation is which, as it would violate not only my secrecy agreement with CIA but the understanding upon which our cooperation took place then, and on which any future cooperation must rest... In all the countries, despite their greatly different political relations with the United States and the USSR, public knowledge that the CIA was building stay-behind nets there in anticipation of a Soviet occupation would oblige the governments to put an end to the project forthwith.'⁴¹

All this activity was distinctly subversive and incendiary in relation to the Soviet Union and flagrant interference in the internal affairs of West European countries. Needless to say, this 'infrastructure', set up for a big war, also exerts devastating pressure on the progressive forces in the country concerned.

The CIA was in a hurry to create an armed underground also in the Soviet Union. Smuggling of agents into the U.S.S.R. became widespread from 1949 on. Attempts were made to send in agents trained at CIA schools across land frontiers, by sea, and by air from the Scandinavian countries, West Germany, Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Japan, with assignments to form secret armed bands and to gather information of a military nature. This activity was at its peak in the period from 1949 to 1954. The planes violating Soviet air space belonged partly to CIA and partly to the U.S. 9th Air Army stationed in West Germany.

The decisions to send in some of the more important

agents were sometimes taken at the highest level. Here is one instance, during Eisenhower's presidency.

CIA Director Allen Dulles called on his brother, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, at the latter's home, and set forth a plan for a secret operation that in his opinion would produce excellent results. The Secretary of State picked up the telephone and called up President Eisenhower. The Secretary's side of the conversation follows: "Boss, how did you do at Burning Tree (a reference to a golf course—*N.Y.*) today? ... Well, six holes is better than nothing... Yes, I've been talking here with Allen. He has a proposal he wants to clear with you. He feels it is very important, and it will lift the morale of Frank's (OPC chief Wisner—*N.Y.*) boys. You know, since Korea and Guatemala you haven't had them doing much. Will you see him tomorrow morning? Fine. How's Mamie (Mrs Eisenhower—*N.Y.*)? O.K. boss. I'll speak to Allen... 9.30... Thank you; good night.'⁴²

The operation was cleared, and a few fools recruited by CIA, going to their doom, reported for final briefings.

At first, especially in anticipation of an imminent war against the U.S.S.R., the CIA pinned radiant hopes on infiltration of the U.S.S.R., all the more so since it had seized the files of the Nazi special services that had conducted operations against the Soviet Union, and, among other things, inherited their techniques for forging identification papers. But the optimism soon vanished. The expectations—based on analogies with past OSS experience—that U.S. agents would find a warm welcome in the 'underground' in the socialist countries collapsed. There was no underground. With the exception of a few isolated instances, CIA failed to find any accomplices.

Ray S. Cline's comment: 'The OSS legacy turned out to be, at best, a mixed blessing, and in some cases a disaster.'⁴³ Quite true. The 100 per cent liquidation of infiltrated U.S. agents was nothing short of a disaster for CIA.

By the mid-fifties the Agency's chiefs had more than enough food for thought. Harry Rositzke, who was one of the men in charge of smuggling agents into the U.S.S.R. by air, summed it up thus: 'It is easy in retrospect to sum up this crash program: The results were not worth the effort... I had a talk with the CIA director [Allen Dulles—*N.Y.*]. During a review of the results since that first drop

in 1949, he sat back and made a reflective comment: "At least we're getting the kind of experience we need for the next war." And that war, for him and for many others in Washington, was not very far away.

'Air dispatch of radio-equipped agents virtually ceased in 1954. Not only were the losses too high and the expenditure of effort too great for the results achieved... Illegal overflights violating Soviet terrain were being assessed for what they had always been: a direct provocation.'

Why this sudden concern for international law? There were many reasons for it. However enticing the prospects were that the CIA chiefs based on the 'totalitarian model' of socialism (a theory prevalent then in Washington), the empirical experience—the failure of each and every American agent—pointed to something entirely different: to the moral and political unity of Soviet society. The fate of these agents was far more revealing than the prattle of the Sovietologists who were then multiplying in the academic community of the United States. Not theoretical disputes, but much more likely the practice of the CIA at the time showed that the Sovietologist school which had elaborated the 'totalitarian model' of socialism was out on a limb. Its exponents were compelled to turn over a new leaf, and to invent new theories.

But the main reason was the development of the thermonuclear weapon in the U.S.S.R. in August 1953. Moreover, the Soviet Union had a transportable model of the weapon before the United States. This startled the Washington politicians and strategists.

In 1954, C. L. Sulzberger, of *The New York Times*, had a talk with OSS veteran David Bruce, then U.S. Ambassador in London, who had complete trust in him. Here is how Bruce described the mood of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff: 'Radford's theory (Chairman—N.Y.) was that the relative advantage now held by the United States was slipping & the Russians were gaining every year, holding their own advantage in conservative forces & weapons & catching up on new weapons. Therefore, according to some theorists, a preventive war was necessary.'

Talking and planning war was one thing, a thermonuclear holocaust was another. Richard Nixon, who was then Vice-President, made the following notes at a National Security Council meeting on March 25, 1954:

'There was a discussion of what the strategy of the United States should be in the event of a major war with the Soviet Union. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had a division on this point. The President took over in as emphatic a manner as I have ever seen him use. He stated that he felt this was a problem for the Commander in Chief primarily. He said that the only policy we could follow once war started ... was to win victory. That under no circumstances could we hold back punches because of some feeling that total victory might bring greater problems than if victory were obtained through limited war. He said, in effect, that there was no possibility of a limited-war concept in view of the type of enemy we had and the type of weapons with which we have to reckon. He said we were talking about sizes of bombs and potential destructive power in fantastic amounts and that the casualties would reach 7 million one day, 8 million another day possibly.'

Getting to hear of the President's gloomy predictions, Congress leaders went to him to discuss matters. Eisenhower felt something had to be done to develop civil defense. Senator Eugene Millikin observed:

'Well if things are so bad maybe what we ought to do is paint our asses white and run with the antelope.'

Everyone laughed, but Eisenhower's laughter was not very enthusiastic. When the discussion was resumed, he said, rather shortly: 'Well, maybe we won't even have time to paint our asses white if they began to drop the bombs and we are not prepared for it.'

In view of the new balance of strength, direct subversion—the CIA's prime concern—was fraught with disastrous consequences for the United States. Being a soldier, President Eisenhower clearly visualized what the war planned by Washington would spell for his country.

It was necessary to beat a retreat. But any change of course did not signify that the United States was renouncing its policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. It was rather a matter of revising priorities.

The Soviet Union was, in CIA parlance, a 'hard target'. The CIA chiefs would not sense the fact that the OPC methods of the five years of its 'crash' programme, which might have been effective against regimes hated by their

people, were not good enough against a popular state where government and people were indissolubly linked. The failure of CIA subversion was due not to any shortage of resources or funds (which were amply provided), but to the fallacy of its political conception. The old methods, once the pride of the OSS, had to be laid aside. But needless to say, not for ever. Relapses still occur and no doubt will occur in the future. The task, the CIA decided, was to soften up the 'hard target' from within. That, in fact, is clear from the NSC directives we have dealt with above. But the turn-around proved hard and long. A good idea of it may be obtained from looking at the CIA's relationship with the NTS (Popular Labour Union). But first we must examine the genesis and general outlines of that Russian emigre organisation.

6

Tell me who your friends are, and I'll tell you about yourself. Like litmus paper, the NTS shows up the ugliest sides of CIA activity, though when the latter came into being the former was already nearly twenty years old.

When new, powerful forces win, time seems to stop for the priests of the lost cause. They exist physically, but in a phantom world. Nothing is of value for them, but their memories. Living in the past, they cannot understand how they had lost. They refight the battles again and again in their perturbed minds.

This applied whole to the Russian 'white' emigres after the October Revolution and the Red Army's victory in the Civil War. For reasons of understandable human frailty, the emigres pictured their past in a proud and noble light. A legend was born of the 'white cause', pure, snow-white, next to luminous. The emigres lived in a world of illusions and impracticable plans. The victory of the people in Russia they declared a hollow delusion. One just had to wait, to pray for the fallen, to hope, and the nightmare would end. Meanwhile, a new generation was rising beside them—the children of emigres whom the knights of the lost cause saw as their successors.

In some of them, indeed, their fathers had succeeded in planting their own bitter hatreds. But most of their sons, poisoned with the venom of anti-Sovietism, found the 'white cause' was suffering from a shortage of guts and gumption.

Not only had their fathers lost the country, but also their fortunes. So, into battle for what was lost. A prosaic aim, for the emigres' pockets were empty. Besides, the cause was definitely sacred. None other than Metropolitan Antony had said in the twenties: 'By the power granted me by God, I bless all arms raised against the satanic red regime and forgive all sins to those battling in rebel detachments or as lone avengers of the Christ's cause. And particularly I bless the arms and deeds of the People's Brotherhood of the Russian Truth, which has been fighting by word and deed for some years against the red satan in the name of God and Russia. May God's mercy fall on everyone joining the Brotherhood or rendering it any aid.'

In the early years, the antagonists of the Soviet Republic formed the League of Russian Arms. They continued the armed struggle against the worker-peasant state, crossing the border, and smuggling in terrorists and saboteurs. But in vain. They failed in their enterprise for just about the same reasons as those that brought about the OPC-CIA defeats of 1949-1954. Speaking at the annual NTS conference in October 1977 at Frankfurt-on-Main, one Chikarleyev recalled that 'the League of Russian Arms had fought by its own methods, but at a point in time these methods were probably unsuited to the conditions. And when the League began losing strength under the onslaught of the enemy, there appeared on the scene those who were called "national boys" (for being young and nationalistic)—our elder comrades of the NTS.' The latter, some of whom were present, must have dropped a tear: the reference was to the early thirties.

A mass of emigres had converged on Yugoslavia at that time. Its police regime, drowsing in the hot Balkan sun, was unconcernedly benign towards rightists. The foes of communism had no trouble setting up their organisation. On the Belgrade beaches and at secret meetings in their more than humble homes, young men who had been too young to fight in the Civil War, concluded with alacrity that they were grown to the job of overthrowing the Soviet worker-peasant government.

At the tawdry conventions of 1932 and 1934, they set up the National Labour Union of the New Generation (NTSNP), subsequently renamed the NTS or Popular La-

bour Union of Russian Solidarists. The founders decreed that those born before 1895 would not be admitted.

Little or nothing was done to specify any programme aims. There was just one, vehement resolution: the chief method of struggle is terrorism. The headquarters in Belgrade's Rankova St. was nicknamed Ranka-Pusta (analogous to Janka-Pusta, the terrorist ring responsible for the assassination of Yugoslavia's King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Barthou in Marseilles in 1934). Things began to hum. Wild projects were incubated. On paper they brought the young anti-Sovieteers to the desired end—the overthrow of Soviet power. And deeds, too, followed the words.

At the end of 1974, the sole surviving member of the original executive bureau of the NTS, one V. D. Porem-sky, wrote nostalgically about the times before World War II: 'What we were annoyed with most were the endless political disputes, looking for the culprits of the disaster, with everyone blaming the other fellow: the monarchists shifting the blame on the Constitutional Democrats, the CDs on the Socialists, and so on. We dissociated ourselves from this emigre scrimmaging... By the end of the thirties we were sending scouts into Russia. They had no tourist visas, and went across tightly guarded borders, crawling under barbed wire fences and racing at night across the ploughed up strip of frontier land, sprinkling pepper in their wake to throw off the pursuing wolfhounds. They went in armed. Some were mowed down by the border guards, others were captured and shot. Only a few managed to come back across the same border.'

Quite true. The NTS people didn't make good conspirators or terrorists. When the chips were down, their nerve failed them. But that did not reduce their hatred of the Soviet system. The methods they devised were conceived in impotence. This we have from the horse's mouth: that of Y. I. Divnich, who was head of the NTSNP in the thirties and forties.

Having dedicated thirty years, practically all his active life to the organisation, he saw light shortly before his death, and wrote a remarkable book, a confession. Looking back on his years of exile, his wartime ties with the Nazis, and his postwar work for the Western spy services, Divnich wrote: 'For years I had been consumed with hatred for everything Soviet... I was deaf to anything positive

that I may have heard about the Soviet system. My brain was adapted to conceiving nothing but shady sides in Soviet life. I was ludicrously obsessed with hatred. I made it a rule, and impressed it on my followers, that each morning I would plan what harm I could inflict that day on the Soviet system, and that every night I'd see that I hadn't lived the day for nothing. And if the day yielded no results, I suggested that we should at least spit on the picture of some Soviet leader in the papers... I shook my puny fist, and dispensed mosquito-bites... at the conflagration that had set alight the blaze of liberation in billions of hearts. I stumbled about in the dark like a blind man, not suspecting that it was I myself who had put out the light.'⁴⁷

Back in the thirties, the NTS made contact with various spy services—Polish, Japanese, and so on. The pathological anti-Sovietism of its members opened the doors for them. But the cloak-and-dagger professionals saw quickly enough the abyss between the claims of the NTS and what it could really do. The NTS claimed it had countless followers in the U.S.S.R. which was unmitigated bosh. It wasn't until the Nazi sneak attack on the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, that the 'national boys' struck gold.

Though they are inveterate blabbers, the NTS people are more than reticent about their wartime activities. But the truth will out. A scandal, one of many, erupted at a statutory meeting of the NTS in 1974. On October 20 that year, NTS activists gathered in Frankfurt at a plenum of Posev Publishers. They spoke of their anti-communist sentiments and their affection for the West. Then a certain V. I. Fainberg, of Israel, took the floor and thanked the NTS for its good intentions. He wished them luck in putting these intentions into effect, for it was high time they made amends for their conduct in the war.

In precisely what terms the said Fainberg couched his utterances we do not know, but even the *Posev* (the official NTS magazine) version is condemnatory: 'I have no idea where the NTS came from... But it's a fact that during World War II some of the NTS members served in Vlasov's army, which was in the employ of the Wehrmacht. The Russian knows that twenty million were lost during the war, and that the Germans were exterminating not only Jews, but also Slavs and other nations. How are you going to tell him that members of the NTS and the Vlaso-

vites had far-reaching aims? ... The Russian will not understand. Frankly, neither can I ... It seems to me, therefore, that if you want people to follow you, you must disavow your old ideas.' ⁴⁸

The heaviest NTS artillery was summoned to fire back. NTS chairman A. N. Artemov thundered: 'We can counter this sowing of strife and hatred only with a granite wall of trust and brotherly love. In our relationships we must proceed from the presumption of decency.' Still, what did NTS really do during the war? Absolutely nothing criminal, said Artemov. He pulled out what he thought was a conclusive argument: 'The NTS had no programme until 1946. Hence its hands were clean.' Poremsky lost no time to amplify: 'We had no programme, and nothing but the so-called ideological guidelines, the text of which fitted into a mere two or three typewritten pages.' ⁴⁹ The journal's contributors were invited to write in. A spate of articles followed. A certain Korzhavin made this pronouncement: 'Not everyone, after all, is able to come to Frankfurt and see for himself who he is dealing with. But those who can must learn to trust their eyes and hearts—and the deeds, too, say, of the *Posev*. People who inspire confidence ought to be trusted.' ⁵⁰

Why not trust them, indeed, if that's what they want. But what to do with the 'innocent lambs' who had had no programme? I have a brochure in my possession, not of two or three pages, but of ninety-six, entitled, Programme Propositions and Statutes of the National Labour Union of the New Generation (Printed by Merkur Printing Office, 10 Toplican Venac, Belgrade, 1938).

It says explicitly that the aim of the NTSNP is '1. To overthrow the communist regime ... 8. To establish the right of private property ... 10. To suppress any signs of class struggle.' These points are printed in bold type in the beginning of the brochure, evidently to emphasise the resolve of its authors. The 'national boys' promised a 'national revolution' that would 'culminate the revolutionary era that began in 1917'. They anticipated victory, and wrote: 'The fullness of state power must belong to the Ruler of Russia, who will have dictatorial powers, and to the government he appoints.'

The Programme Propositions contained provisions that sounded particularly sinister on the eve of World War II,

when the Nazis were poised to unleash war on all mankind: 'The only means of redeeming Russia ... is the full and unconditional destruction of Bolshevism. The struggle against Bolshevism shall not be halted under any circumstances, even in the event of war. On the contrary, with a war going on it will be easier and quicker to organise the popular masses for struggle against Bolshevism, for participation in the National Revolution.' ⁵¹ This meant the NTS was the ally of any enemy of the Soviet Union.

While the inner circle of the NTS congregated in Frankfurt, the New York Russian-language *Russky golos* ran a cursory survey of its wartime record:

'The organisation came into full bloom during Hitler Germany's war against the U.S.S.R. The NTS was a subsidiary of various German intelligence and counter-intelligence services, and operated hand in hand with them in occupied Soviet territory.

'The old emigres, such as Okolovich, Olgsky, Poremsky, Stolypin, Redlikh, Rar, and the like, and the "new emigres" (the wartime traitors to their country) such as Artemov, Krushel, Garanin, Svetlanin, and the like, had the most cordial of relations with the Gestapo, and many are stained with the blood of Soviet people.

'During the war, one NTS leader, Okolovich, had headed Gestapo groups under various aliases in Smolensk, Vitebsk, Orsha, Minsk, Borisov, and Bobruisk. He had taken part in many punitive actions against the partisans. Old emigres in the NTS, Olgsky was the Minsk and Slutsk resident of Hitler's Sonderstab R counter-intelligence agency; Rar collaborated with the Nazi occupation forces in Latvia, and was employed in the Vlasov Committee; Artemov taught in a school of Nazi propagandists and was a spare-time Gestapo informer keeping an eye on the NTS leadership. Probably for the same purpose, the Gestapo had him put on the Vlasov Committee ...

'To this day, they are nostalgic about the 1941-1945 period when the Nazis were fighting against the Soviet people. The NTS journal *Posev* reminds its readers time and again that this is the most precious legacy that the enemies of the Soviet Union have. An article by Rar, "Who Hasn't Heard of the Vlasovites?", refers most admiringly, from the present-day NTS standpoint, to these wretched traitors. It builds its "bridge" from those days to the pres-

ent by pronouncing Bukovsky, condemned by a Soviet court for his anti-Soviet activity and now serving his sentence, a true "hero". "The name of Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov," Rar gaggles, "is a confirmation of V. K. Bukovsky's words that 'struggle is possible—struggle is essential'. And this in the most unfavourable of circumstances." Well, the connection is apparent. Bukovsky tried using the ammunition the Vlasovites had left behind after shooting up Soviet people.'

The *Rusky golos* standpoint is understandable. It reflects the views of that section of Russian emigres who had never associated themselves with the enemies of the Soviet Union since 1917. They censured accomplices of the Wehrmacht's eastern campaign. For them there is no difference between the present-day Bukovskys and the successors of the Vlasovite traitors. The story circulated by the NTS these days is that, like the Vlasovites, it was endeavouring to be a kind of 'third force' during the war, and had never really served the Nazi Reich. Much ink and paper was wasted to create this impression. But witnesses, including those who are anything but friends of communism, have never taken these claims seriously. Some Vlasovites and NTS men escaped across the demarcation line into the U.S. zone after Germany's defeat. There they spoke fast and loud about their hatred of communism and, claiming that they were a 'third force', sounded out the chances of working for new masters. At that time, their contacts with the Americans proved discouraging.

A colonel of the Vlasov 'army', one A. G. Aldan (Nerianin) who found himself with a group of other traitors in the American zone, had a taste of the contempt average Americans felt for those who had betrayed their country: 'When they met our men and officers, and learned that we were Russians, the American servicemen broke into smiles and slapped us on the back, "Ah, Russians, Russians." They'd give us cigarettes, chocolates, biscuits, and generally lavished tokens of friendship on us. But as soon as it dawned on them that these Russians weren't the Russians they thought they were, their attitude changed abruptly. They turned their backs on us, lit their cigarettes, and spat on the ground at our feet.'

At first, the bewildered traitors attributed this to GI ignorance. Then, their camp was visited by a few U.S. of-

icers. The Vlasovites poured out their story to them. And here's what they heard in reply: 'We'll never understand why you, Russians, went against your country when she was locked in unequal combat with an outside enemy... You're wearing German uniforms, carrying German arms, and are in German pay. Your so-called special agreement with the Germans is pure fiction, and you know it... We don't understand your line of behavior and disapprove it strongly. And average Americans, who saw the Russians fighting shoulder to shoulder with them against the Nazis through the war, will never understand you.'⁵²

This treatment was prompted by the recent cooperation of Soviet and American arms, but it was also due a great deal to the knowledge that the Vlasovites and NTS men were fascist scum: they subscribed to the ideology whose bearers had placed the whole civilised world, the U.S.A. included, in mortal danger. And no matter what flag the NTS happens to wave today, it'll never wash off the stigma.

More, the NTS was the one that had planted fascist ideas in the heads of the brainless bandits who had followed Vlasov. It had given them their 'ideology'. The writers of the manifesto that announced the formation of the Vlasov 'army' in October 1944, opened it in the best Goebbels tradition with this blurb: 'The current world war is a life-and-death struggle of opposite political systems. Locked in struggle are the forces of imperialism headed by the plutocrats of England and the U.S.A., whose greatness is built on the oppression and exploitation of other countries and peoples... Locked in struggle are the freedom-seeking peoples (that, presumably, refers to Nazi Germany and its satellites—N.Y.) who thirst for a life of their own, based on their own historical and national development.' All these resounding declarations weren't worth the paper they were written on. But they are worth remembering in view of the present NTS attempts to prove that it had had nothing in common with Hitler Germany, the deadly enemy of the World War II anti-Hitler coalition.

Why these persistent attempts? A guilty conscience? Pangs of remorse? No, the answer is simple: when the Nazi Reich collapsed the NTS went into the employ of the very 'plutocrats' it had cursed during the war to win the favour of its former masters. It is in their employ still,

and, certainly, the turncoats are embarrassed when the past is raked up. They would much prefer to let sleeping dogs lie.

The story of how the NTS people tricked the British intelligence into taking them into its service awaits the pen of a humorist. In the confusion that followed the collapse of the Nazi Reich, still puffing after their dash from the advancing Red Army, they managed to assure the chiefs of the Secret Intelligence Service that they had left a network of agents behind, in the Soviet Union. The British nibbled at the bait. They figured that they were dealing with the vanguard of a mighty NTS army that, still in the U.S.S.R., was eager to start performing the bidding of its British masters. The Secret Intelligence Service was evidently unacquainted with the history of the NTS, and did not realise that the fugitive fighters against communism were wont to turn tail at the slightest sign of danger. In other words, this was not the vanguard but practically the whole of the NTS, and it was small in numbers.

The scoundrels hit it rich. In exchange for their wild stories about countless followers in the Soviet Union, the Secret Intelligence Service kept greasing their palms with pounds sterling, especially in the early years, before the pound was devaluated in 1949. And the CIA, learning of the British breakthrough, also made eager contact with the NTS. It recruited agents who were smuggled into the Soviet Union with CIA, and partly Secret Intelligence Service, aid. In 1951-1954, the Soviet security rendered harmless the following American and British agents smuggled into the Soviet Union: Yakut, Kudryavtsev, Pishchikov, Remouga, Makov, Lakhno, Novikov, and others. All of them were from the NTS.⁵³ It is hard to tell how the CIA reacted to these failures, but the Secret Intelligence Service people were assailed with doubt. The intelligence supplied by NTS with references to 'sources' in the Soviet Union was less than reliable. And the high life led by the NTS masterminds caused the British to arrive at the conclusion that every shilling advanced to these men to fight communism was spent in bars and night clubs.

On February 28-29, 1956, the Secret Intelligence Service and the CIA met in London to discuss the future of the NTS. The British were in a depressed state, and avoided the eyes of their overseas partners. It wasn't easy for them to admit that a bunch of rogues had been fooling

them for so many years. They defined their new attitude in a Proposed Statement to the NTS Leadership, which scored up the sad waste of taxpayers' money. The Proposed Statement said:

'1. The British Service has always made it clear to the NTS Leadership that its object in pursuing operations jointly with the NTS was to obtain secret intelligence on the USSR. In return for secret intelligence or for the prospect thereof the British Service was ready to supply the NTS with extensive facilities in the field of training, supply, dispatch and operational advice and support of all kinds...

'2. Secret Intelligence can be accurately assessed both quantitatively and qualitatively. Consequently from the British viewpoint, set out above, it has always been clear that the NTS, in the support of which much money, time and experience has been expended, must sooner or later be judged by tangible results...

'4. The British find that this period of seven years is sufficient to enable them to draw up a balance sheet in which every factor in British-NTS partnership can be given its due weight. Their conclusion is that the partnership has been largely unproductive from their point of view, i.e., that the results obtained have been in no way commensurate with the time and money invested.

'5. The British Service has therefore decided to terminate this partnership in all sectors of activity.'

In the sensitive world of spying words must never be taken at face value. It is not likely that the Secret Intelligence Service really cut all ties with the NTS. But that isn't the point. The thing to note is that the CIA put the NTS on its own payroll. With typically American thoroughness, the CIA sized up the activity of the NTS in the light of its British colleagues' experience. And surely it arrived at the same conclusions as those in the British Statement. Certainly, no ban was imposed on NTS espionage and subversion. But the chiefs of the NTS were told they would have to earn their dollars not with tall tales of their 'successes' in the U.S.S.R., but with subversive activity in the ideological field. That could be controlled and checked on the spot, for the NTS ideologists would reside in Frankfurt, West Germany.

The dollar injections put the *Posev* publishers and journal, and the NTS radio broadcasts, on a solid financial

foundation. But a printing press and radio microphone aren't worth a rap if they've nothing to say. What to print? What to broadcast? One suspects, judging by the wooly Russian of some of the NTS material, that Western Sovietologists were called in to help. Any literate Russian easily spots telltale faults of language and give away discrepancies in the way of thinking, identifying the material as a translation from the English, as a pitiful piece produced by a Sovietologist who'd never set foot on Soviet soil.

Evidently, the CIA people became aware of this, too. Soon, they took their NTS collaborators to task: be good enough to have ideology or else—. The old propositions, dating to the 1938 programme, the Prague manifesto, and the guidelines for the Vlasovites weren't suitable stuff for champions of the 'free world'. It wasn't right to vilify American 'plutocrats' for a dollar wage.

Those were hard times for the NTS chiefs. They brooded, muttering under their breath: 'A programme, a programme, we want a programme.' How to explain to the American taskmasters that all the NTS wanted was dollars, more dollars, in exchange for denunciations of communism. The CIA pragmatists required ideological concepts, original ones, not borrowed from Western Sovietologists.

In those days K. K. Cherezov, who later returned to the U.S.S.R., was an NTS activist. He produced picturesque vignettes of the infernal torment of the NTS chiefs condemned by the CIA to create an ideology. 'Artemov,' Cherezov recalls, 'resumed his NTS activity and, strange as it may seem, became its "ideologist"'. Frankly, he is a complete stranger to matters of theory and ideology. His "theoretical" juggling has lifted NTS "ideology" to the peak of absurdity. Even the initiated can't always tell the beginning from the end, the question from the answer, and the entrance from the exit. At a closed session of the NTS leadership he was blamed, primarily by Poremsky, for his partiality for a deep-cushioned armchair, where not all logical conclusions come from the head.'⁵⁴

In 1958, following agonising toil, the NTS finally came up with a programme. The wild mumbo jumbo, which no sane man could properly assess, is valid still. But assess it we must, at least in general terms, if we want to estimate the CIA exertions in the ideological field. The makers of the programme say from the outset that their orga-

nisation is called the Popular Labour Union (of Russian Solidarists). The two words in parentheses are the key to the NTS ideology; the NTS people regard them as the key to their aim of toppling the Soviet system. That, in fact, is how Poremsky spelled out the ideological tasks of the NTS: 'Find the right keyhole, then pick the right key. What keyhole? What key? That is what makes up the social invention.'

In 1941-1945, when still a faithful servant of the Hitlerites, the NTS demonstrated the true essence of this in practice. Divnich admonished: look at deeds, not words.

'I recall a casual conversation with solidarist V. D. Poremsky in the winter of 1941,' Divnich writes. 'It occurred in Berlin at the Italian Restaurant... Poremsky was then, like me, an announcer of the German radio. I was badly troubled about my part in the game. Wasn't it time to make tracks: our bosses wanted us to persuade Soviet soldiers to surrender to the Germans. Apart from the fact that this meant Russia's defeat, we knew the inhuman conditions awaiting any pow's. Poremsky kept chewing his food calmly, much too calmly for a Russian patriot. Only someone whose conscience was in complete harmony with his deeds could chew on like that. "I'm not in the least disturbed," he said. "I'm perfectly aware of what I'm doing. The main thing is to get rid of the Bolsheviks."

"But that means the Germans will capture Russia."

"No matter. The solidarity idea will dissolve them. With life reposing on solidarism, the Russian soul will engulf the German dream of conquest. Russian vodka, Russian songs, Russian women, and Russian hospitality—no one can stand up to that."

'What other illustration do we want—whatever the definition of solidarism is in the programme.'⁵⁵

Well put. It gives a good idea of solidarism in action. Time has passed, but the NTS chiefs, when they're among their own kind, make no secret of the fact that solidarism is no more than a right-sounding word. 'It's less a system of ideas, and rather a method of securing the goal.' That was how Redlikh put it to his confederates at the close of 1975. In this context, a dagger and a typewriter are equivalent in expressing solidarism.

The NTS programme is an illiterate concoction employing cheap demagoguery as bait for the gullible. So are the NTS statutes. To make the document look respectable, it

was supplied with a preamble. Its first lines are apocalyptic: 'The population of the globe is exposed to the danger of a thermonuclear, chemical and bacteriological war, the danger of overpopulation, hunger, air and water pollution, destruction of verdure, and disastrous changes of climate. These dangers are of planetary scale and confront all countries irrespective of their social or political system.'

Then, climbing down from the philosophical podium, the NTS gang follow the well-beaten anti-communist path.

For them salvation lies in wiping out communism. That's precisely what the NTS says: 'The Union considers the liberation of Russia to be the indispensable condition for the peaceful resolution of the conflicts that are rending humanity today.' Hence, say the statutes, 'the purpose of the Union is to eliminate communist dictatorship'. By the logic of the statute writers, this will improve the climate, make verdure thrive, and so on.

Poremsky designed a 'molecular' theory of revolution. Mainly to please the CIA. But it was hastily updated second-hand goods—the 'molecular doctrine' that Poremsky had sold the Secret Intelligence Service in the late forties. Under the wing of the CIA, Poremsky inflated it to absurd proportions. Now the NTS can counter CIA questions about its followers in the U.S.S.R. with bland lies: there are plenty, but you can't see them with the naked eye. For that you want Poremsky's private microscope.

Redlikh praised the 'molecular doctrine' to the skies in a 'theoretical' report he delivered at a sitting of the NTS leadership in 1972 (evidently with an eye to any CIA eavesdroppers):

'It's perfectly obvious,' he said, 'that if the propaganda stream is strong enough it gives form and direction to people's aspirations, until they begin to act like a well-rehearsed orchestra without a conductor. Thus, without any great organizational overhead, there occurs a condensation of the political potential resembling, as was aptly noted by Poremsky, the action of molecules in super-cooled liquid, known as the pre-crystallization process (hence the term "molecular"). It is this "organization without organization", this elementary solidarity of people who think alike, and a readiness to search for what unites rather than dis-unites, that provides us with the key to the success of our common cause.'⁵⁸

The insiders in the NTS aren't fooled. They know this inanity is designed for Western ears. For them, as they quip among themselves, it's 'a molecule, a revolutionary molecule, just one—and a drunk at that'. The reference is to Poremsky. And they ought to know what makes his creative imagination tick, as they know the purpose of his exertions: more dollar handouts at the expense of the American taxpayer.

Let's be realistic and to the point: the power of attraction of the NTS 'ideology' is close to nought.

The CIA chiefs are naturally aware of this. That is why they keep goading the NTS boys. This has given rise to some tragicomic incidents.

In November 1979, *Posev* carried Redlikh's article, 'A Talk With Friends in Russia', illustrated with photographs. Who he talked to is unidentifiable, but the talker is shown clearly: the worse-for-wear Redlikh before a microphone. 'As regards the financing of our cause,' he complains, 'we're like a fish beating its tail against the ice, we're like a squirrel in a wheel cage, we're as poor as church mice.' That may be true. The CIA may have become tight-fisted. It may be keeping the NTS boys on starvation wages. But the financial difficulties thus created probably concern the personal consumption of the NTS chiefs, not the 'cause'.

For Redlikh's complaints run counter to the announcements in *Posev*, enjoining prospective tourists going to the U.S.S.R. to take along anti-Soviet literature, dispensed free of charge with detailed advice on how to evade the customs. *Posev* (No. 6, 1980), says, for example: 'Up to 30 books and journals, or up to 150 pamphlets may be smuggled in with the things in your suitcase. They ought to be put in one package about ten centimetres thick. Do not place the packet on the bottom of the suitcase, and not on the top, not along the sides, but in the middle, covering it with your things. If you take one or two books, half a dozen pamphlets, and a couple of newspapers and journals, it is best to put them in your pockets. That way they will pass the customs with the greatest degree of probability (of the order of 98 per cent) ... Naturally, do not declare the literature (with the customs) either orally or in writing.'

The literature, printed in the West on NTS money or, more precisely, on that of the CIA, is to be mailed to various addresses, or 'left in the Metro, in telephone booths, on the shelves of bookshops, in theatre lobbies, at stadi-

ums—in any other public place.' All that costs money, much money, including the wages of the scurvy people who undertake the unclean chore.

The 50th anniversary of NTS was in 1980. Predictably, its chiefs released a goodly dose of cock-and-bull to mark the occasion, chiefly for the ears of Western spy services. To round out the 'molecular' theory, they spoke of 'constructive forces' that they allegedly had 'in the upper echelons of Soviet society'—various 'directors of enterprises', various 'regimental commanders', various 'true scientists'. Those are the people, Redlikh declared, 'who we expect to do the job... They are the ones who will carry out the coup d'état'. A more unlikely whopper one could hardly invent.

And all from despair, to obtain new dollar handouts from the CIA.

7

However ludicrous the NTS claims are, they are evidence of the hard life it leads under the vigilant eye of CIA bureaucrats. The latter, too, aren't any too free, being under the control of superior powers who, in effect, represent the White House. Ray Cline says on this score:

'The enthusiasm in Washington for covert action of all kinds was reflected in a series of new directives, each broader than the last. In 1955 the NSC revised the control procedures in a new covert action directive labeled NSC 5412, and thenceforth covert action projects were reviewed formally by the "5412" or "Special Group", which varied in name and composition over the years, becoming the "303 Committee" under President Kennedy and the "40 Committee" under President Richard M. Nixon. Always, however, the NSC directives provided that a senior State official, a senior Defense official, the Chairman of the JCS, and a White House representative of the NSC proper approve projects on behalf of the President.

'Through the years primary influence in these matters gradually came to lodge with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs—the job held in the 1960s and 1970s successively by McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, and Henry Kissinger.'⁵⁷

That's how things stand. The direct line of responsibility, traced to the governmental hierarchy, strips the apo-

cryphal stories of CIA independence—leaving it to do things the top leaders of the United States know nothing about—of their last vestige of credibility. It is hard to believe, of course, that the rogues of the NTS are within the field of vision of the upper political echelon. But it is true nonetheless. The lie about the enterprising CIA performing obvious nonsense behind the backs of the top authorities, is highly useful, and above all for those in authority. That is precisely what the appointed historians of the CIA had in mind when they wrote the following in the official history for the Church Committee:

'Ultimately, much of the responsibility for the scale of covert action and for whatever abuses occurred must fall to senior policymakers. The decisionmaking arrangements at the NSC level created an environment of blurred accountability which allowed consideration of actions without the constraints of individual responsibility... As the scale of covert action expanded, policymakers found it useful to maintain the ambiguity of the decisionmaking process to insure secrecy and to allow "plausible deniability" of covert operations. No one in the Executive—least of all the President—was required to formally sign off on a decision to implement a covert action program. The DCI was responsible for the execution of a project but not for taking the decision to implement it. Within the NSC a group of individuals held joint responsibility for defining policy objectives, but they did not attempt to establish criteria placing moral and constitutional limits on activities undertaken to achieve the objectives. Congress has functioned under similar conditions. Within the Congress a handful of committee members passed on the Agency's budget. Some members were informed of most of the CIA's major activities; others preferred not to be informed.'⁵⁸

Though the writers of the above seem to plead for commiseration with the sad plight of the CIA in the jungle of the U.S. political system, their writing commands attention in an entirely different context. The aims of any and all CIA actions unfailingly reflect the designs of the top policymakers. It is a different story that in carrying them out there are failures and setbacks that cause the U.S.A. much embarrassment.

THE GENTLEMEN'S CLUB
AND THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY

1

In the U.S. at the juncture of the 1940s and 1950s the cry went round for scholars to join the CIA. Veterans of R & A OSS responded with enthusiasm: membership in the Gentlemen's Club, as the CIA was sometimes called, was good for one's standing. Professors were promised fabulous salaries and personal participation in shaping the most delicate US policy aspects. They were offered jobs in the newly established Office of National Estimates (ONE), the brain of the CIA. People put in charge of the Office in 1950 had worked under OSS cover, and in due course pondered U.S. foreign policy on the eve of and during World War II.

They had put to good use the few years of academic freedom between their OSS and CIA jobs, and had written several books that were now part of official US historiography. William Langer, together with S. Gleason, had planned writing a four-volume analysis of US foreign policy from 1937 to 1945. But apparently the return to their old occupation in the CIA in 1950 got in the way, and they produced only two volumes in 1952-1954: *The Challenge to Isolationism: 1937-1940* and *The Undeclared War: 1940-1941*. Those books, the authors believed, reflected the central issues at the time of writing.

These two volumes by Langer and Gleason have no doubt become an indispensable source—and not only in the United States—for students of the period immediately preceding World War II and of its initial stages. These books are indispensable not because they offer a unique interpretation of those years—essentially, they echo the official version of Washington's foreign policy aims—but because the over 1,500 page-long volumes are based on facts and documents accessible only to the authors. In the words of A. G. Guerin of France, 'all those closely studying the his-

tory of World War II are familiar with the name of William Langer, but few of them realize that he is a CIA man'.¹

As early as 1946, Generals Marshall and Eisenhower demanded that a 99-volume history of the U.S. army in World War II be written. Eisenhower wanted to assign the task mostly to civilian historians, because the 'gang of retired colonels' would drag their feet for at least 25 years. The U.S. top brass wanted to have the 99-volume edition without delay, to study the past war for the coming conflict. The armed forces' archives were opened to the selected historians. Ray Cline, the man who wrote the first volume, was given a chance to study the way US top-level authorities functioned in emergencies. He was not alone. Scholars with theoretical and practical experience flocked to the CIA.

The government was champing at the bit to dig into the CIA's intellectual capital and gave money for this purpose freely. Langer and his team were puzzled by the suggestion to recruit 1,000 people for ONE. They replied that in science, quantity did not necessarily mean quality and suggested about 30 staff members. After prolonged argument, the administrators agreed, and throughout its almost two decades of existence the Office never exceeded 100 employees.² In the initial stages, when Washington virtually worshipped ONE, Langer's prestige was unassailable. Apparently, top-level bureaucrats were sure that the Office had a crystal ball that would help scientists find ways of defeating the Soviet Union.

The crystal ball grew to be the size of an iceberg. Its tip—ONE—rested on 1,000 employees of the intelligence agency and 2,000 more people working in the central reference service—the CIA's classified data library—and various research units.³ While Langer had the CIA Director and the National Security Council behind him, he treated all bureaucrats equally, no matter what posts they held, say, in the State Department or in the armed forces. There were reports that he was impatient with them and could well say something like, 'Enough words, General. Now get down to brass tacks.'

ONE leaders obviously considered themselves an intellectual elite. There were seven of them besides Langer: four historians, Professors Sherman Kent, Ludwell Monta-

gue, De Forrest Van Slyck and Ray Sontag; Calvin Hoover, a professor of economics; General Clarence Huebner, former commander of all US forces in Europe; and Maxwell Foster, a lawyer. ONE also used the services of so-called Princeton consultants—George Kennan, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of *Foreign Affairs*, and Vannevar Bush, an atomic scientist.⁴ Those names are known, but thousands upon thousands of U.S. scientists who worked or are still working for the CIA are in no hurry to disclose their Langley connection. While the OSS had been a club of the high-born, the CIA was even more exclusive in its early years, an elite club whose members took pride in their background and university degrees. As Allen Dulles wrote in 1963, 'it is quite true that we have a considerable number of graduates from Eastern colleges. It is also true that in numbers of degrees (many of the CIA personnel have more than one degree) Harvard, Yale, Columbia and Princeton lead the list.'⁵ The establishment and operation of ONE puts in its proper perspective the old problem and wild rumours of the CIA infiltrating the academic community. The CIA did not infiltrate science. It was science that helped establish and even shape the CIA. At any rate, the brain of the CIA was built along lines suggested by scholars with a record of covert OSS operations.

ONE aimed its research at a very wide range of issues, trying to predict future Soviet action, locate weak spots of the U.S.S.R. and submit appropriate recommendations. To this day we know very little about specific ONE—and consequently CIA—recommendations. We can only judge them by their results—U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, to which CIA analysts had inevitably contributed. In the early or golden years of ONE, Langer and his colleagues had direct access to the National Security Council. There is no doubt that CIA analysts wrote either part or all of *Psychological Offensive Vis-A-Vis the U.S.S.R. Objectives, Tasks and Themes*, a document that is now in President Truman's library. Dated April 10, 1951, it was declassified in 1976. Its authors stressed the following:

'Necessarily implicit throughout these objectives, tasks and themes is the suggestion to the Soviet peoples that an alternative to the present regime can exist. It is not the policy of the U.S. to advocate specific alternatives. Consequently no such suggestion

should be made on any specific issue (collectivization, democratic elections, etc.) without special policy guidance. In all our output, however, it should be implicit that the eventual solution lies in a reassertion of the human values which are the heritage of the Russian people, and which Stalinism has repudiated...'

The point here was to help restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R. Of course, the central objective of U.S. psychological warfare was based on a distorted image of the Soviet Union in the United States: the document called for efforts aimed at 'widening the schism which exists between the Soviet Peoples and their rulers...'

This was followed by recommendations prepared by the unholy alliance of spies and scholars. The means suggested was brazen slander of the Soviet social and state system. The only restriction to be observed was the following:

'*Caution:* This is the task most easily implemented. Do not overdo it. The purpose is to stimulate a consciousness of tyranny among those who might become inured to it or not know what goes on beyond their own personal horizon.'

Slander was indeed easy for professional slanderers, but the interesting thing here was the logic of the recommendations. People lived and worked under a people's government, but CIA scholars wanted them to think they lived under a tyranny, to believe what they were told by the sworn enemies of the Soviet system instead of what they themselves saw and knew. If American propaganda is based on such assumptions, as it was in this case, then it explains why Washington's enormous appropriations for this purpose go down the drain. Only deranged minds can believe the nonsense of the 'molecular revolution' type peddled by NTS. But the CIA's 'scholarly' approach to psychological warfare was no better.

The recommendations insisted on the following ways to fight socialist ideas:

'*Task 1.*

'1. To uncover and develop the spiritual values and the moral and ethical concepts of the Soviet peoples, especially of Russia, and to establish the identity of these values with those of the free world.

'Suggested Themes':

'(a) Truth, mercy, pity, charity, love of family, hospitality, are some of the basic values which have always been dear to the Soviet peoples and which are derived from their spiritual life. They are held in common with the people of the free world, but in contempt by the Soviet rulers.

'(b) Historically the contribution of the Russian people to the free world in the various fields of creative thought—i.e., ethics, arts and the sciences—has always been recognized and respected.

'(c) A review of classical Russian literature and political and ethical philosophy shows that Russia shared and was influenced by the creative social and cultural forces that have shaped the West. The political and ethical ideals of the Russian peoples are at bottom similar to those of the West, since they spring from common spiritual roots; they are thwarted in the communist state, but they are not dead.*

* Treatment note: We should avoid talking of Western *influence* overmuch, and avoid any suggestion of being patronizing.

'(d) The Russian family is founded on love, trust, mutual assistance, and respect for the rights of others. These values are held in common with the free world.

'(e) The things for which the Soviet peoples believed the revolution was fought: peace, freedom, and a decent life for all, are basic concepts held in common with the free world. These concepts motivate and are being advanced in the progressive daily and political life of the free world.

'(f) To assure the Russian people that the free world has no designs against them nor their country and that it seeks only their freedom and prosperity in a friendly, cooperative world.'

The 'free world', and U.S. leaders in particular, was actually getting ready to shower the Soviet Union with atomic bombs, launch bacteriological warfare, and generally exterminate Russians by any means available. Meanwhile, U.S. propaganda used flattery to lull them into a false sense of security. This approach, with minor variations to suit new circumstances, is used against the U.S.S.R. to this day.

'Suggested themes' for talks about the United States were equally revealing. They were to disguise the actual U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. I must apologize for the long quotations, but the following one is a good indicator of the moral and intellectual standards of the psychological warfare strategists:

'(a) The U.S. is peace-loving and honors the sovereignty and integrity of peoples and nations.

'(b) Americans distinguish between the Soviet peoples and their government.

'(c) The United States never has been at war with Russia.

'(d) The U.S. helped the Soviet peoples in World War II even before the U.S. was at war with Germany.

'(e) The U.S. continued to help the peoples of the U.S.S.R. even after the end of hostilities of World War II. (Helped also after the Revolution: Hoover Commission)

'(f) Americans have contributed their knowledge and experience to the building of industry there.

'(g) The love of technology and gadgetry, science and mechanics applied to daily life, is shared by the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

'(h) Our countries are big and we share a tendency to plan big.

'(i) We share the spirit of pioneers.

'(j) There are many thousands of persons of Russian or Ukrainian descent in the United States who have had an important influence on the development of American life.

'(k) Russian and Ukrainian folk music and the music of their composers (including the Soviet) are very frequently performed in the U.S. Many of our outstanding performing artists are of Russian extraction.

'(l) The novels and stories of Russian authors are very popular in the United States (the free world). Courses in Russian literature figure in the curricula of all our major universities.*

* New biographies of Russian writers and studies of Russian literature should be reviewed, even if they appear to have political content.

'(m) The people of the U.S. and the free world are

well aware of the courage, energy and aspirations of the Soviet peoples; many Americans have publicly praised these qualities.

'(n) The U.S. helps all peoples when it can, whether or not they agree with American policy...

'(o) Theatrical aspirants in America still study the Stanislavsky method and no attempt is made to disguise its Russian origin.

'(p) The U.S. government and many private institutions and individuals have sought to establish cultural, scientific, and technical exchange with the Soviet Union...

'(q) Evidence of nature of America (the free world) and of the basic drives and ideals we hold in common with the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is provided in the American and other Western literature still available in the Soviet Union: Steinbeck, Upton Sinclair, Mark Twain, Jack London, Dickens, etc. Although some of the works are "social protest" literature, they demonstrate the operation of the democratic faith in social process...' ⁶

Such are the tools used for deception and subversion. That working paper was submitted to the President of the United States as part of the psychological warfare arsenal. The recommendations it contained were used by the mercenaries the CIA hired to staff subversive radio stations beamed to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. Two of them—Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe—are foremost among the CIA subsidiaries.

2

From its very first days, Radio Liberty, under CIA guidance, began planned spying operations. Soviet citizen Y. Marin who for several years had worked with Radio Liberty as Konstantin Neastrov, had investigated this aspect of RL activities in detail and submitted to competent Soviet authorities documentary proof that duplicated similar evidence about Radio Free Europe supplied by its former employees—intelligence officers Andrzej Czechowicz of Poland, P. Minařík of Czechoslovakia, and Kh. Khristov of Bulgaria. ⁷

Radio Liberty performs a wide range of intelligence-gathering functions. By using open Soviet sources, above all the press, Radio Liberty employees compile, specially for the CIA, surveys and forecasts of the state and development of the Soviet armed forces, the defense industry, the overall economic potential, and various sociological and domestic political development trends in Soviet society. Banking on their status of self-appointed 'natural experts on the Russian soul and Russian thinking', incomprehensible to Western intelligence agencies (including their CIA masters), the traitors employed by Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe often draw self-righteous conclusions and recommendations. Of course, one should not overestimate their influence on the shaping of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Still, those U.S. politicians who oppose detente gladly use the results of such Radio Liberty 'research' as additional arguments to further their cause.

A special RL department is in charge of another intelligence operation: monitoring both radio communications within the Soviet Union and radio communications between Soviet centers and civilian and naval vessels on the high seas and aircraft in flight. Radio and telephone communications of Soviet and foreign embassies and missions in third countries are also monitored. When in the 1970s Radio Liberty was officially recognized as a CIA subsidiary, its radio monitoring service was simply moved to the quarters of U.S. troops stationed in the FRG.

Radio Liberty is equally active (although less successful) in spying on the U.S.S.R. by contacting Soviet citizens abroad, a task made easier by the fact that RL has offices and agents virtually in all Western countries.

The symbiosis of Radio Liberty's propaganda-cum-subversion-cum-spying is clear: its mission was defined by the CIA's OPC ⁸ and has since remained unchanged. That is typical of psychological warfare. According to Ray Cline, subversive radio stations used subtle psychological pressure in their broadcasts. The CIA set up this operation upon request of government officials: the broadcasts were supposed to be more effective if they could not be traced to the U.S. government. ⁹ That was the concept of propaganda as part of subversion in action, and it fitted the formula once suggested by Donovan:

'Foreign propaganda must be employed as an instrument of war—a judicious mixture of rumor and deception, with truth as a bait, to foster disunity and confusion... In point of fact, propaganda is the arrow of initial penetration in preparing the people of a territory where invasion may be contemplated. It is the first step; then fifth column work; then militarized raiders or "commandos"; then finally the invading divisions.' ¹⁰

From the CIA viewpoint, that World War II formula has never lost its relevance. Its implementation beyond the initial stage is impossible not because the CIA is reluctant to go whole hog but because of circumstances it cannot control. The 1956 counterrevolutionary putsch in Hungary was a good example. The origins of the bloody clashes in that country can be traced to the subversion of Western intelligence services. Firebrand radio broadcasts to Hungary were merely one of its external aspects. At any rate, these broadcasts fostered the insurgents' confidence: they need only begin, and the West will launch a massive invasion to support them. Without such assurances, the counterrevolutionaries would never have dared take up arms.

As soon as the putsch started, Richard Nixon, then Vice-President of the United States, hurried to the Austrian areas bordering on Hungary where he met a group of rebels. 'Do you feel that the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe played a part in encouraging the revolution?' he asked. 'Looks of surprise came over their faces as my deliberately undiplomatic question was translated. One of them blurted out the answer—"Yes".' ¹¹ Even those who were with the rebels and later tried to picture the putsch as a 'spontaneous' uprising recalled that wherever a gang assembled, there was always a radio set tuned in to Radio Free Europe. Inflammatory broadcasts, addressed above all to that audience, assured the bandits that they were on the right track.

Exactly 20 years after the counterrevolutionary putsch, *The New York Times* featured an article entitled '56 East Europe Plan of CIA Is Described'. It was an interview with J. Angleton, the man in charge of CIA counterintelligence and subversion in 1956. Apparently, this former CIA executive wanted to mark the inglorious anniversary and gripe about some details in the book Ray Cline had just pub-

lished. Here is the newspaper account of the interview with Angleton:

'"Having the document gave us enormous advantage to organize and update those operational groups which were authorized in 1950," he (Mr. Angleton) continued, referring to a directive that established the agency's covert political-action arm, the Office of Policy Coordination, with an authorization for paramilitary operational groups to be used "with a view of never accepting the status quo of Soviet hegemony." Mr. Wisner, who had been recommended by Gen. George C. Marshall (then Secretary of Defense—N.Y.) to head the covert action program, and Mr. Angleton promoted "vast preparations for refurbishing operational groups"... The Eastern Europeans, in part former members of prewar peasant parties and largely from Hungary, Poland and Rumania, with some from Czechoslovakia, were trained at a secret installation in West Germany by CIA paramilitary specialists, he said. He added that the units were headed by a man he described as "a born leader, a Yugoslav, whose schooling was in the Hapsburg military academy"... 'Nationalist risings in Poland, Hungary and Rumania' were provoked 'too soon for the covert operational groups to respond.' ¹²

That was hardly the reason. William Colby's book is probably closer to the truth in its description of CIA subversion experts converging like vultures on the Hungarian border at the very first reports of the putsch:

'Ever since the creation of the OPC under Frank Wisner's direction, the Agency had had—or at least believed that it had—a mission to assist military, in the OSS tradition, resistance groups—call them freedom fighters in the Hungarian case—seeking to overthrow Communist totalitarian regimes... But once the uprising was underway, there can be no doubt that Wisner and other top officials of his Directorate of Plans (since 1952 the new name of the OPC which merged with other CIA departments—N.Y.), especially those on the covert action side, were fully prepared with arms, communications stocks and air resupply, to come to the aid of the freedom fighters. This was exactly the end for which the Agency's paramilitary capa-

bility was designed. And a case can be made that they could have done so without involving the United States in a world war with the Soviet Union.

'But President Eisenhower overruled them. Whatever doubts may have existed in the Agency about Washington's policy in matters like this vanished. It was established, once and for all, that the United States, while firmly committed to the containment of the Soviets within their existing sphere of influence, was not going to attempt to liberate any of the areas within that sphere... the price might have been World War III.

'Wisner went to Vienna at the end of the uprising and traveled to the Hungarian border to watch... Shortly after, he resigned from the Agency for health reasons, and Richard Bissell succeeded him... Wisner never fully recovered, and his eventual suicide was as much a casualty of the realities of the Cold War as was that of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal.' ¹³

While Wisner's terrorists were straining at the leash in late 1956, the White House was much more realistic about a possible war between the United States and the Soviet Union. About that time Washington was coming to realize that the United States was vulnerable to a return strike. The lessons of the counterrevolutionary putsch in Hungary were not lost on the administration: while the armed outbreak stemmed from the subversion by US intelligence services, President Eisenhower could not allow the events in Hungary to trigger a world nuclear war. But they were not learned properly enough: psychological warfare has its own inertia and logic. According to Colby, what happened in Hungary 'provided a wonderful propaganda opportunity... The CIA and its allies did everything they could to reinforce the impact in Italy.' ¹⁴

In 1959 Congress approved the so-called Captive Nations Resolution urging Americans to mourn the destiny of those nations annually and call for their 'liberation'. The resolution stunned even George Kennan, an old hand. Apparently, he was genuinely shocked when he wrote, in the second volume of his memoirs published in 1972, about the maze into which psychological warfare had led the United States:

'It was the existence in our country of one vocal and not uninfluential element that not only wanted a war with Russia but had a very clear idea of the purposes for which, in its own view, such a war should be fought. I have in mind the escapees and immigrants, mostly recent ones, from the non-Russian portions of the postwar Soviet Union, as well as from some of the Eastern European satellite states. Their idea, to which they were passionately and sometimes ruthlessly attached, was simply that the United States should, for their benefit, fight a war against the Russian people to achieve the final break-up of the traditional Russian state and the establishment of themselves as the regimes of various "liberated" territories... They appealed successfully at times to religious feeling (in the U.S.A.—*N.Y.*), and even more importantly, to the prevailing anti-Communist hysteria. An idea of the political power they possessed can be had from the fact that some years later (1959) they were able to recommend to Congress, through their friends there, the text of a resolution—the so-called Captive Nations Resolution—every word of which was written (on his own published admission) by their spokesman, Dr. Lev E. Dobriansky, then associate professor at Georgetown University, and to get this document solemnly adopted by Congress as a statement of American policy. This resolution committed the United States, insofar as Congress had the power to do so, to the "liberation" of twenty-two "nations", two of which had never had any real existence, and the name of one of which appears to have been invented in the Nazi propaganda ministry during the recent war... I could think of nothing worse than what these people wanted us to do. To commit ourselves politically and militarily not only against the Soviet regime but also against the strongest and most numerous ethnic element in the traditional Russian land... This would have been a folly of such stupendous dimensions that even the later venture in Vietnam now pales to insignificance beside the thought of it.

'I also had some awareness of the limits of our own power, and I knew that what was being asked and expected of us here far exceeded these limits.' ¹⁵

That is all very well, but could it be that Kennan did not know who fed and supported those people? He must have known that the CIA stood behind them.

Washington increasingly recognized the power of the Soviet Union, which explains why declarations of intent were not followed by acts that could precipitate a big war.

3

The CIA is obviously a failure at planting agents inside the Soviet Union, but it does and will keep up its efforts in this direction. It is increasingly trying to make spies out of people who, it would appear, bear absolutely no relation to intelligence operations. Inevitably, this adversely affects U.S.-Soviet relations. The CIA solicits the services of practically all Americans who visit the U.S.S.R. or are in any way in contact with Soviet citizens in any field, especially that of science.

Today the CIA routinely expects any American who comes into contact with any Soviet citizen to report to U.S. intelligence services. No doubt there are cases when Americans resist CIA attempts to turn them into spies. Such cases do not usually come to public notice: it takes a great deal of courage, confidence in one's position and even an acute sense of what is and what is not allowed to turn one's back on CIA recruiting agents.

Dr. Constantine D. J. Generales, a respectable 63-year-old specialist in space medicine, was genuinely puzzled when a woman approached him on May 1, 1972. As he later recalled, 'she was a little bit of a thing, very petite, with more or less auburn-colored or dirty-blond hair. She was about twenty, twenty-five years old.' She introduced herself as Sharyn Beers of the CIA and produced relevant identification. What she said prompted Dr. Generales to record the conversation (the move was unnoticed). The woman knew that Dr. Generales was planning to attend an international conference on space medicine in Miami. As he recalled, 'She said, "There's going to be a lot of Russians down there." She wanted me to take them out for cocktails and find out as much as possible about what they do and what they think.' She wanted that from a scientist of world repute, a member of many scientific societies, recent-

ly President of the New York cardiology society, etc., etc. Dr. Generales refused the offer and, in protest, did not attend the conference.

On September 2, 1972, he heard from the woman again. His secretary received a telephone call. Sharyn Beers wanted to know if Dr. Generales would attend an international congress on space medicine in Nice on September 19-21. The scientist refused to go to France for the same reason he had not attended the Miami conference. Besides, he wrote an angry letter and sent it to the address Beers had left with him. Among other things, Dr. Generales wrote: 'I take this opportunity to inform you and your superiors at the Central Intelligence Agency that such queries as this as well as your request of me to observe and report to you about the private conversations of Russian aerospace scientists ... you made last May are really counterproductive and if I may be so bold as to say, highly distasteful. The mere fact that an intelligence agency approaches any individual of known integrity as myself leaves a stigma of suspicion which is no way rewarding. It is after some thought that I decided to put these remarks on paper and firmly ask you as well as your superior officials to refrain from contacting me.' On the night of February 5, 1973, Dr. Generales' office was burglarized and searched. Items stolen included a taperecorder and the recording of the conversation with Beers.

Naturally, Dr. Generales complained to the police. No result. Then the Watergate scandal erupted, and he wrote to General Alexander Haig, President Nixon's chief of staff, describing the attempted recruiting and other things and asking the general to do something about it. On May 17 Haig wrote back, thanking Dr. Generales for his letter and saying that he had turned it over to the Justice Department with a request for an immediate investigation. Nothing came of that either. Apparently, Dr. Generales believed that General Haig had his hands full as it was—he was soon made Supreme Allied Commander in Europe. Therefore this time the scientist addressed himself to President Ford. In his letter of September 10, 1974, he wrote: 'Mindful of your opening remarks upon assuming the presidency ... encouraging citizens to communicate with you, I wish to report to you personally the efforts of the CIA to engage me in despicable espionage activities.' He set

forth the facts with scholarly precision. No answer. Dr. Generales then cabled a reminder to the White House. On January 15, 1975, he received a reply: Dr. Generales' letter had been lost in the huge amount of mail addressed to the President, and he would be contacted as soon as it was found. That was where the matter ended as far as official channels were concerned.¹⁶

The journalist David Wise heard about the story, interviewed Dr. Generales and asked him for Beers' telephone number which, naturally, was not listed in the telephone directory as a CIA number. Wise called this number several times but failed to reach Beers. Then, somebody phoned Wise, inquired whether he was still writing a book about the CIA, and promised to come and offer information about the Agency. The man never showed up. Wise recounted the story in his book and added resignedly that burglaries were routine in the United States and that the burglars were seldom found. After all, Dr. Generales, who wanted to get to the truth riding on the crest of the Watergate wave, was small fry compared to Senators Howard Baker and Charles Mathias. In the latter half of 1975, precisely when they were 'investigating' the CIA, the FBI, and other intelligence agencies, these two members of the Senator Frank Church Committee complained to competent U.S. authorities that some unknown persons had entered their homes when they were away, and not touching any valuables or money, had made a mess of their files. The agencies under 'investigation' hotly denied suggestions that they were responsible for those after-dark forays into the Senators' homes. The burglars, of course, were never caught.¹⁷ Perhaps this explains the great satisfaction, say, Senator Baker expressed when the Church Committee finally completed its mission.

One can positively say that the CIA monitors each and every contact between American and Soviet citizens, be it a personal contact or by correspondence. All Americans without exception are questioned, whether directly or indirectly, by CIA agents. It is quite another thing that this comes to light in exceptional cases only. It took the revolting publicity of Lee Harvey Oswald, the man considered to be President Kennedy's assassin, to bring this CIA practice into the open. A clearly disturbed personality, Oswald did live and work at a radio factory in Minsk, U.S.S.R.,

in 1959-1962. As soon as he returned to the United States, the CIA found ways to debrief him. Official CIA instructions about this case said: 'We (are) particularly interested in the information Oswald might provide on the Minsk factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself and...biographical information that might help develop foreign personality dossiers... Don't push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd...' Conduct 'the laying on of interview(s) through suitable channels.'¹⁸ After President Kennedy's death, those investigating the assassination learned about the CIA's interest in Oswald. The Agency denied it and claimed that it had never debriefed Oswald.

However, Edward Jay Epstein's book about Oswald published in 1978 reported an interview with 'one Washington-based psychologist', a specialist in indirect examination for the CIA and other governmental agencies. In the summer of 1962 he was asked by a CIA case officer to examine an American who had recently returned from the Soviet Union: 'He met the American at the roof garden of the Roger Smith Hotel and heard a story of defecting to the Soviet Union several years before, marrying a Russian woman and then deciding to return to the United States. He noted that this defector was extremely self-centered, almost to the point of being a megalomaniac, and was unpleasant in the way he asserted himself. In November 1963, when he saw Oswald's photos in the newspapers, the psychologist recognized him as the individual whom he had indirectly examined at the behest of the CIA. However, when I discussed this debriefing with him... he became uncertain whether the person he examined was Oswald.' After all, the roof garden examination had taken place 15 years earlier.¹⁹

For the benefit of the Church Committee and, consequently of the general public, former CIA Director Richard Helms said the Agency found nothing unusual about such practice and added: 'Back even as far as World War II when Americans returned from overseas, from trips they had taken for one purpose or another, they were interviewed by Army intelligence, Navy intelligence, by State Department officers, and others. After the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency... this business of interviewing American travelers was vested in one place, that was

domestic contact service... It is simply a device whereby if the President of some steel company in New York travels to the Soviet Union and returns and has seen certain metallurgical plants in the Soviet Union it is of interest to this Government to know how big those plants are, what they do, and all the rest of it. And individuals from this office go to see that gentleman and interview him about it. There is no pressure involved. There is no payment of money. There is no effort to twist anybody's arm. We simply are giving them an opportunity as patriotic Americans to say what they know about this.' ²⁰

The picture is clear and no additional comment is needed. As Mr. Helms sees it, being a patriot means being a spy. Let those Americans whose conscience does not permit them to share this CIA doctrine beware. Miles Copeland, who has for decades served with the CIA, is equally unperturbed in his book about contemporary U.S. espionage: 'The number of ordinary citizens who go to Soviet consulates for touring visas is considerable. Nonetheless, anyone with a sinister purpose (sinister in the opinion of Messrs. Helms, Copeland, and others—N.Y.) who thinks that he can disguise his visit to a Bloc diplomatic installation by crashing a party or asking for a visa is mistaken. In almost all Western cities where there are Bloc (i.e. socialist countries—N.Y.) diplomatic and consular installations, a "light check" is made of all persons entering, and rarely will it fail to single out those visitors who have access to government secrets and whose disloyalty might have dangerous consequences. When they have been spotted, these visitors become the subject of intensive investigation.' ²¹

Facts prove that the CIA conducts this investigation without any regard for legal formalities.

And finally, the matter of Americans' correspondence with people living in the socialist countries. Since 1952 the CIA, which had been joined by the FBI, has inspected all such letters and telegrams without exception. All letters were opened, and copies were made of the more 'interesting' items. The CIA did that in the hope of finding proof of its fantasies about Russian 'infiltration' and other far-fetched mysteries. The Agency was sure it would succeed: according to a study of government political surveillance in the United States, 'In 1976, James Angleton, the

CIA chief of Counter-Intelligence, explained why he thought the mail-opening program would produce useful information. The Russians, he reported, thought we abided by the Constitution and therefore would never open first-class mail.' ²² Having inspected scores of millions of letters, the CIA brass did not find what they were looking for and even ran into some rather unpleasant consequences.

Investigations conducted in the mid-seventies of the CIA and its ilk revealed that the victims of mail-opening included Senators Frank Church and Edward Kennedy, Richard Nixon, the Rockefellers, and other prominent people. A mild scandal ensued. That was when James Angleton was forced to make the above explanation of the motives behind the CIA's mail-opening program. Since the investigation was supposed to restore 'legal norms', the CIA's chiefs promised that the Agency would no longer open private mail—except in cases when 'the law' itself expressly required.

The investigation of the CIA is over, and so is the outburst of harsh words addressed to the Agency. Has anything changed with regard to, say, the outrageous practice of using American journalists for spying and subversion? In April 1980 Admiral Stanfield Turner, CIA Director, appeared at a convention of American newspaper editors. There were blunt questions about the CIA's past record of using journalists and about future prospects in this regard. Without batting an eyelid, the Admiral said he could not rule out the CIA using journalists in the future. A few days later Carter, then President, reiterated Admiral Turner's view at a briefing for provincial newspaper editors.

The ladies and gentlemen of the 'free' press were in all probability taken aback by the Administration's display of frankness. So they decided to clear up the matter among themselves in a series of articles that graced the pages of the July/August 1980 issue of the Bulletin of the American Society of Newspaper Editors. The series was entitled 'The CIA and Journalists' and left no doubt that members of the second oldest profession were ready to do any bidding of the CIA. Bol Shulman of *The Louisville Times* interviewed Admiral Turner, who quietly reaffirmed his opinion: 'Journalists should be willing to forgo their avowed independence and serve government if the

President and the Chairman of the congressional committee overseeing the CIA join the agency director in saying patriotism demands a secret mission.'

Senator Walter Huddlestone, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, added: 'The original draft of pending legislative for a CIA charter prohibited the agency from hiring journalists, clergymen or teachers for secret missions. A personal appeal from the President erased that ban.'

C. H. Hauser, editor of the *Providence Journal and Bulletin*, recounted a 24-year-old episode in his relations with the CIA. In 1956 he and a colleague had visited Moscow, and Hauser published a series of articles after the trip: 'The call from the CIA man came a week or two later. He was interested in my stories, he said, and would like to talk with me about my experiences in Russia. And, by the way, did I happen to have any more pictures—other than the ones that had run in the paper?

'Hundreds, I said, with the feeling of pride any reporter gets when his extracurricular talents are noted. He'd love to see those pictures, he said and by the way would I mind if he borrowed the negatives for a week or two.

'We met in the lobby of the Hotel Barringer. (I don't recall wondering at the time why he didn't meet me in the newsroom). We talked for an hour or so mostly about the set of photos I brought with me. He left with my shoebox full of 35-millimeter negatives (which were returned, as promised, two weeks later). He never asked to see or borrow my notebooks. If he had, I probably would have turned those over, too.

'With the background of three years in the Army (including a brief assignment as a field artillery Battalion intelligence officer), I was very much aware during my dealings with the CIA man of how intelligence people piece together a myriad of details to create a jigsaw puzzle of useful information. The question never entered my mind as to whether I would cooperate with the CIA. I was an American citizen, and my government had asked for my help.'

A plainly told story, supposed to be heartwarming patriotic. As to the few journalists who consider cooperation with the CIA unethical, *The Houston Post* editor E. Hunter said: 'It's uncomfortable to find myself cast in a

role some of my colleagues will immediately brand as that of an "apologist for the CIA".' He also added: 'Pick the circumstances and the timing of your confrontation very carefully. If these factors aren't favourable, don't. Neither the issue nor the timing is right on this one.'²³

That is the way it was. That is the way it will be. It pays to remember the straightforward admissions we have quoted when professionally meeting American journalists.

4

The CIA made wholesale use of Americans' contacts for a good reason. The scope of the program alone proves it is no use planting agents in the socialist countries, particularly in the Soviet Union.

The inevitable failure of this course was borne out by the collapse of the CIA's similar undertakings during the US aggression against Vietnam. William Colby, in charge of the CIA's Vietnam operations in the 1960s, cited reasons for their failure. The same reasons could explain the Agency's vain attempts aimed against the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries in Europe. Speaking of CIA operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the first half of the 1960s, Colby stressed:

'The teams we had infiltrated in North Vietnam, either from the air or from the sea, had been notoriously unsuccessful, having been captured or disappearing from radio contact in a short time after their arrival (except for one or two which quite clearly came under enemy control). And my close friend and deputy, Robert J. Myers, a long-time Far Eastern hand (later to leave CIA and become publisher of *The New Republic*) had vigorously urged me to stop sending them as both unconscionable and ineffective. And he buttressed his argument by pointing out the failure of similar operations in... Eastern Europe in earlier years, saying that it was clear from that record and our own, that Communist control of a population was of a different order from the German or Japanese occupations of World War II (sic!—N.Y.) and thus OSS-type operations successful then were of no use to us now. I agreed with Myers' points... I told

McNamara that putting teams into the North did not and would not work. He listened to me with a cold look and then rejected my advice. The desire to put pressure onto North Vietnam prevailed, and there and then the United States military started the planning and activity that would escalate finally to full-scale air attacks. The CIA's lack of success was dismissed as the result of the small scale of effort.²⁴

We know only too well what that led to. At any rate, the ignominious failure of the aggression in Vietnam, among many other things, greatly enhanced the CIA's original decision to wage psychological warfare within the socialist countries—to look for and organize local opponents of the existing system and use them as pawns in the efforts aimed at overthrowing that system. The Soviet Union has always been and remains the principal target in this regard. And CIA 'science' plays an active part in these efforts.

The Carter Administration reorganized US intelligence services, and some aspects of that reorganization were made public in Presidential Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978. Although accompanied with deafening rhetoric about the need to observe the 'rule of law' and other fine things, the reorganization simply heightened the efficiency of the CIA and other agencies of the intelligence and counterintelligence community. The executive order confirmed the decision President Carter had taken shortly after his inauguration: the number of White House aides entitled to access to information on CIA covert operations was reduced from scores to only five people.

The Special Coordination Committee chaired by Zbigniew Brzezinski was set up within the National Security Council framework to replace the 40 Committee, its forerunner. The committee was to direct CIA subversive operations and monitor the counterintelligence operations of both the CIA and the FBI. The CIA was made directly answerable to that political body.²⁵ As CIA Director, Admiral Turner controlled the budgets of many intelligence agencies—those of the Army, Air Force, Navy, the Treasury Department, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense, the Energy Department and FBI counterintelligence. The reorganization did make reductions in the staff,

but that in no way diminished the significance of subversion as the main thrust of CIA activities.

The book edited by Philip Agee and L. Wolf says rightly that, it is too soon to interpret Turner's purges as the 'end of the era' of secret agents. Turner himself stated that the CIA had no intention of abandoning covert operations and that he was strongly in favor of retaining the ability to undertake political action when necessary and duly sanctioned. He maintained that intelligence operations by undercover agents was a necessary part of CIA activities.²⁶

Naturally, there was no reliable information after security was tightened under Turner. Reviewing the recent changes in the CIA, Thomas Powers stressed: 'There has been a lot of talk, expressions of shock about CIA "excesses", highfalutin proposals for reform, various changes of name—the Directorate for Plans has become the Directorate for Operations.' But, according to Powers, that body continued in exactly the same way. Despite all the clamor, the old mechanism remained virtually unchanged, and the CIA continued to serve the President.²⁷

In their attempts at building a new image of the CIA, its leaders stepped up the publicity of its 'scientific' accomplishments that were immediately leaked to the press. But the fact is that the CIA used the academic disguise to launch instigatory campaigns. Admiral Turner was literally at a loss for words to extol his agency's efforts in that field. At the juncture of 1977 and 1978 he smugly said he took great pride in the impetus the CIA had provided to the discussion of major problems over the nine previous months. He cited numerous newspaper articles on the Soviet oil industry and said the CIA had stimulated that discussion in April 1977 by publishing a study on Soviet oil.²⁸

True, the CIA has recently become especially active in publishing various 'research papers' in an attempt to manipulate public opinion at home and abroad so it would react the way Washington wanted it to.

The CIA brass insist that the research is based on the findings of scholars who are impatient to join the agency. For example, they stress that in 1976 there were 37,000 applications for 1,100 CIA vacancies. According to a CIA public relations officer, 'the CIA has enough Ph. Ds. to staff

a university with professors in all fields of knowledge, and only a holder of an academic degree can qualify for certain posts.' ²⁹

That is quite possible. The CIA of today not only scrupulously follows but also develops the traditions laid down in the R & A OSS. It is, of course, regrettable that in the 'great American democracy' many scholars, while advocating academic freedom at various conferences, including international ones, prostitute science by selling it to the CIA. It is hardly necessary to clarify that protection of that 'freedom' is not part of the CIA mission. And the most tangible of Admiral Turner's innovations were the cynical paeans to the alliance of scholars and spies serving the interests of monopoly capital.

True, a moral paradox is clearly present here. The authors of the anonymous 'research papers' the CIA is so proud of are in no hurry to reveal their identities. For perfectly obvious reasons, those scholars are reluctant to publicly claim their laurels, although they do hold up their papers, written in the spirit of psychological warfare, for all to see. It would be quite logical to conclude that there are a great many full- or part-time CIA employees among those who parade as champions of 'academic freedom' and flirt with 'human rights', and the like. Those same people ostentatiously sign anti-Soviet fabrications but are modestly silent about their signatures on the CIA secret payroll. For example, in recent years those knights of 'academic freedom' have built a 'scientific basis' for the Soviet military threat myth, used by Washington's extremists to try and justify the runaway arms race.

Today, the papers published in the United States to malign our country use the same simple line of reasoning. A slanderer proceeds from the CIA's 'scientific' conclusion of the day to build a chain of appropriate arguments. There are many examples. Take, for instance, Robert Kaiser of *The Washington Post*. He spent about three years in the Soviet Union, more than enough to see what life was really like in the USSR. The journalist displayed exceptional curiosity about practically everything. We are not referring here to his picking up the wad of tickets a man threw 'to the ground in disgust when the result of a race was announced' and painstakingly estimated the gambler's losses.

We mean that you really have to watch Mr Kaiser when

you meet him. If you read a document and the American sits opposite you, remember he is reading it too if he can help it—he proudly admitted that when he described his visit to the editorial office of *Inostrannaya Literatura*. But if you leave him alone in your office he will go through the papers you have on your desk. According to Kaiser himself, 'almost every time I visited a Soviet journalist in his office there was a thick stack of mimeographed sheets on the desk. The stack looked the same at *Pravda*, at *Izvestia* and at other papers and magazines. Once a man with whom I was talking had to leave his office for a moment, and I had a chance to look at the stack'. It was from TASS, the news agency. Or take Mr Kaiser at a Kremlin reception, drifting close to a group of senior Soviet officials talking among themselves. He worked his way still closer to them, 'just in time to hear him say, "But we weren't interested, we said no." Alas, Gromyko did not repeat what it was they said no to.' ³⁰ Apparently, eavesdropping and spying are part and parcel of the professional ethics of American journalists—after all, Robert Kaiser obviously takes pride in his techniques and describes them with relish.

That necessarily lengthy aside is not all. Mr. Kaiser treats the CIA's Soviet 'studies' as the gospel truth. As soon as he touches on serious issues, he inevitably says, 'when measuring the Soviet grain harvest, American intelligence analysts...', or he quotes CIA Director William Colby who 'told a congressional committee in 1974 that the Soviet Union...'. ³¹ And here is the most important point: 'The CIA calculates that Soviet and American military expenditures are about equal. In this computation they recognize the irrelevance of Soviet statistics; the agency's analysts calculate how much it would cost the United States, at current American prices, to acquire the weapons and manpower of the U.S.S.R.... That seems to be a sensible way to try to compare the two countries' military spending...'. ³² Of course, Mr. Kaiser sees anything emanating from the CIA as sensible.

That is a prime example of CIA 'science', which is really a provocation aimed at wrecking detente and saddle the world with a new round of the arms race. With a straight face, CIA scholars compare things that cannot be compared: the price level in a capitalist economy racked

by inflation and the cost of national defense in a planned socialist economy. To make this provocation even worse, the profits of American merchants of death, a built-in factor in the costs of the U.S. munitions industry, are also ascribed to the Soviet Union automatically to produce wildly exaggerated figures of Soviet defense spending and thus to intimidate Americans.

In mid-1976 the CIA published its *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Roubles, 1970-1975. SR 76-1012 IV, May 1976*. With surprising humility, the CIA admitted it had made mistakes in evaluating the Soviet defense expenditures for many years: the Soviet Union had been spending twice as much on defense as CIA analysts had thought. Advocates of the arms race noisily welcomed that staggering sensation. The hawks from the *National Center of Strategic Information*, specializing in the dissemination of 'Soviet threat' rumors, were delighted to hear those conclusions, but even they voiced their surprise at the CIA's mathematical antics. According to a 1978 publication of the Center,

'doubling the CIA estimates of Soviet defense expenditures clearly was in the appropriate direction. But the presentation of the new estimates raises serious questions concerning the consistency and credibility of the results.

'First the revised estimates are not compatible with the CIA estimates of Soviet GNP in 1970 and 1973. There are no published CIA estimates of Soviet GNP for other years.

'Second, the CIA previously stated that its recalculation of rouble-dollar conversion ratios would not have a significant effect on estimates. Now it has doubled these estimates, and attributed 90 per cent of the increase to price changes. This throws the burden of explanation on the conversion ratios raising questions of how and why the CIA changed its rouble-dollar ratios so much and so fast between April-December 1975, when their preliminary recalculations indicated no radical changes were in the offing, and May 1976, when they doubled their estimates...' ³³

But the harm had already been done. The new provocation, invented by anonymous CIA authors, was a godsend for the campaign about a 'Soviet military threat' that

was going on at the same time. There were cries about the Soviet Union preparing to 'strike first', etc. In his introduction to the *National Center of Strategic Information* document, Eugene Rostow wrote: 'In our present state of imminent or actual strategic inferiority, it will require a crash program employing bombers and cruise missiles, as well as the more orthodox land- and submarine-based missile launchers', and so on and so forth. Mr. Rostow's philosophy was quite straightforward: passivity would be suicidal if nothing at all was done for containment. 'We must therefore return to the line of policy initiated by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson a generation ago, and adapt it to the dangers and opportunities of a changing world.' ³⁴ All that echoes the old NSC directive 68.

The diverse collaboration of the American academic community with the CIA is merely an example—albeit a particularly repulsive one—of what is done in the United States to serve the class interests of the ruling elite. It is the logical consummation of the long path so-called liberal political thought in the United States has traveled since World War II. But why does the American academic community, which once flirted with leftist concepts and was, in part, even serious about them, now serve U.S. government agencies, including the CIA, so faithfully, and, usually, with such pride? The reason is simple: it is anti-communism. Still, it is surprising how a primitive ideology can dominate the thinking of intelligent people.

That means we have to probe deeper for an explanation, and in the pragmatic bourgeois society created by the bourgeoisie for the bourgeoisie that will lead us to money. The British author Godfrey Hodgson, who pondered on why American intellectuals had rallied around the establishment banner in recent years remarked:

'Funds from the federal and state governments and from private foundations were becoming available on a scale undreamed of. The salaries and the social status of professors were rising... It was pleasant for men whose wives had typed out their dissertations on the kitchen table to become directors of research institutes, commanding generals of armies of researchers... It was not long before sociologists, political scientists, even historians, were being called in-

to service by the government... Either way, that generally recommended those studies which assumed the permanence and the paramountcy of the Cold War... For if the fear of being investigated had shown the intellectuals the stick during the first half of the fifties, the hope of being consulted had shown them the carrot in the second. Alternatives were not what the government wanted. It wanted solutions. It expected to get them from men who displayed a maximum of technical ingenuity with a minimum of dissent.'

Intelligence services were those governmental agencies that offered scientists the best, and not only the best-paying conditions of employment. Godfrey Hodgson concluded:

'Government service, especially in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the forerunner of the CIA and a freewheeling organization with a marked predilection for the products of the Ivy League, gave a whole generation of intellectuals and academics a lasting taste for power and an orientation toward government service. "We were kids," one of them, Carl Kaysen, later McGeorge Bundy's deputy in the White House and now the head of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, once memorably reminisced: "We were kids, captains and majors, telling the whole world what to do." When they went back to their law offices or their classrooms, they took with them attitudes, and contacts, they had formed with OSS. And they were all to meet again: George Ball, David Bruce, Allen Dulles, Arthur Goldberg, John Kenneth Galbraith, Arthur Schlesinger, Walter Rostow, Paul Nitze, and the rest.'

³⁵ They were to meet again at high government level, especially in the CIA, where they molded others in their own image and produced those who are today engaged in 'research'. Their work for the CIA makes it impossible to list their names. Having sold themselves completely to the CIA, they materially serve the class interests of the U.S. ruling elite, and in their spare time they willingly talk about academic 'independence' and other fine things so dear to the intellectual's heart. But in all probability talking that way is also part of their professional duties. 'Psychological warfare' uses devious techniques.

Since these people are scholars representing top-level intellectuals on government service, a few words about the moral aspect of the matter are in order. These intellectuals are well-disciplined soldiers of 'psychological warfare'. They have armed U.S. imperialism with the latest, though perverted, achievements of science—from complex weapons systems to inhuman mind control techniques. The latter are known as the CIA's MCULTRA Program. The abbreviation stands for "mind control" plus 'ultra', the name of the Allied code-breaking service during World War II. According to competent American researchers, 'put them together and you have the best kept secret of the Cold War: mind-control experimentation'.³⁶

The moral issue is clear and familiar. Western intellectuals are well acquainted with the memoirs Albert Speer, Hitler's munitions minister, wrote after serving 20 years in prison on the sentence passed by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Those 20 years gave him ample time to think about why he, a man of outstanding talent, had volunteered to serve criminals. He did not spare himself in the book: 'Sometimes I ask myself who this young man really was, this young man who has now become so alien to me, who walked through the workshops of the Linz steelworks... twenty-five years ago [Speer was 36 when he became minister in 1942—N.Y.]... I was inescapably contaminated morally; from fear of discovering something which might have made me turn from my course, I had closed my eyes... In writing this book my intention has been not only to describe the past, but to issue warnings for the future.'³⁷ The warning is that morality trampled underfoot makes defeat inescapable.

This warning, which is an age-old truth, went unheeded in the West. Essentially, the CIA leads its scholar collaborators along the way once traveled by Speer. And it is ironic to hear cries about 'moral obligations' uttered by those marching in columns at the bidding of their CIA escort.

In the mid-fifties the Soviet Union launched a serious and comprehensive effort to strengthen socialist legality. It was a process of consolidating the socialist principles in the building of a new society, with communism as the ultimate goal. Concern about developing socialist democracy, harsh criticism of the negative phenomena during the personality cult were naturally reflected in the nation's spiritual life. The Soviet people welcomed and supported Party's policy.

However, for a number of reasons—usually highly personal ones—some people chose a different path. They began to disseminate rumors that maligned the Soviet system and interpreted the strengthening of socialist legality as license to violate the norms of socialist society. They declared themselves 'ideologically' free. Individually and collectively they were absolutely inconsequential compared to the multimillion Soviet people. But Western intelligence services and the mass media, especially those of the United States, blew up their activities out of all proportion. The moment those so-called dissidents began to clamor for recognition, mostly on cue from the West, the CIA felt its dream had come true: the long-awaited 'opposition' to the Soviet system had finally materialized and could be used as an assault force in psychological warfare against the Soviet Union.

Today there is no doubt that the emergence of the 'opposition' was essentially a reflection of a large-scale and planned psychological warfare operation. Western intelligence services, above all the CIA, launched a concerted effort to try and 'erode' the ideological basis of Soviet society precisely in the middle and latter half of the 1950s. That coincided with the wave of conformism and the so-called

consensus in the United States. The results of these processes became clearly discernible by the mid-seventies, and in 1976 Godfrey Hodgson, a serious British journalist, used hindsight to conclude in his *America in Our Time*:

'In September 1955, at precisely the moment when consensus was settling like snow over U.S. politics, something very similar was happening in American intellectual life. That month, some one hundred fifty intellectuals from many countries foregathered at a conference in Milan to debate "The Future of Freedom". They had been invited there at the initiative of an organization called the Congress for Cultural Freedom and their proceedings were later reported in the Congress's London monthly review, *Encounter*, by the sociologist Edward Shils. (Both the congress and *Encounter* were later found to have been in receipt of secret funds from the Central Intelligence Agency.) The title the editor put on Shils's article was *The End of Ideology*?

'The idea was not new. "Liberal civilization begins when the age of ideology is over", Lewis Feuer had written in an article called "Beyond Ideology", published earlier that same year. Seymour Martin Lipset called one of the chapters in his *Political Man*, published in 1960, "The End of Ideology". But the person with whom the phrase came to be most closely associated was Lipset's close friend the sociologist and journalist Daniel Bell. Originally a product of one of the many fragments of the New York socialist Left, Bell became the labor editor of *Fortune* magazine and was also for a time the director of international seminars for the Congress for Cultural Freedom (that were naturally paid by the CIA—N.Y.). His career epitomized, in fact, the intellectual consensus that underpinned its political equivalent during the 1950s. He saw clearly its double foundation: on the fear of communism abroad and on the assumption that American society could solve its problems without irresolvable conflict.

' "Politics today", he wrote in 1960, "is not a reflex of any internal class divisions but is shaped by

international events. And foreign policy, the expression of politics, is a response to many factors, the most important of which has been the estimate of Russian intentions ... the need for containment."

'Both those two highly explicit formulations are taken from the book, published in 1960, which Bell, too, called *The End of Ideology*.

'What Bell meant by that was, above all, the end of the ideology of the Left. "By the end of ideology," even his friend Irving Kristol, the editor who had originally published Shils's article of the same title (on CIA money—N.Y.), was constrained to comment, "Mr. Bell appears to mean, above all, the collapse of the socialist ideal."

'Bell and his group, in fact, announced the death of ideology somewhat in the way in which the death of royalty used to be announced. "The King is dead", said the courtiers, "Long live the King!"'

In other words, with socialist ideology dead, and bourgeois ideology reigning supreme. That was the goal of a legion of bourgeois writers who took their cue from Bell (and, according to Hodgson, from the CIA) and painstakingly emphasized the need for immediate 'deideologisation' throughout the world. That central notion gave rise to concepts of 'creative freedom', 'non-partizanship', and the like. Naturally, they were to be implemented first and foremost in the Soviet Union. Those Soviet citizens who proclaimed that their 'thinking was different' acted as pawns for the CIA (whether they realized that or not) to implement its plans.

Today, over 20 years later, spokesmen for the tiny 'dissident' handful nostalgically paint an 'ideology-free' picture of the first steps of 'dissent' in the Soviet Union. In 1978 Andrei Siniavsky, who has long since left the Soviet Union after serving a prison term for anti-government activities, began publishing the tiny magazine *Sintaksis* in Paris. He dedicated the first issue to Alexander Ginzburg, who is according to Siniavsky an innocent victim. That first issue traced the genesis of *samizdat*, the illegal squibs 'dissidents' disseminated among themselves. According to *Sintaksis*, it all began in the following way: 'The sud-

den discovery of the simple fact that poetry existing without permission can be published without permission. That was the way *samizdat* began, although the word itself was yet to be coined. The books of poems collected by Alexander Ginzburg remained a memorial to the poetic euphoria of the late 1950s... Alexander Ginzburg—we all know what happened to him—turned from collections of poetry to compiling and publishing *The White Book*. *Samizdat* gave birth to *Khronika*. But it began with poetry.'

Certain explanations are in order here. Although the collections were called *Sintaksis* (Syntax) and were supposedly 'ideology-free', their pornographic content—both literary and political smut—make it impossible to quote them. About that time Siniavsky began to publish his *samizdat* anti-Soviet squibs in the West, hiding behind the pen-name of Abram Terts. Naturally, he has always valued the poems selected by Ginzburg above all others. To him, the most important thing was 'creative freedom', allegedly nonexistent throughout Russian history. Why, take Pushkin as an example. According to Abram Terts' *Strolls with Pushkin*, published in the West in 1975, the contribution of the great Russian poet could not stand any comparison with what Ginzburg and Siniavsky advocated.

Soviet people cherish the legacy of Pushkin that includes patriotism and civic virtues. But Abram Terts completely ignores Pushkin's role in Russian and world literature and describes him as follows: 'If... we look for Pushkin's prototype in his contemporary environment, the best man would be Khlestakov, the poet's human alter ego... Like Khlestakov, he flutters and affects the French ways, like Pushkin, Khlestakov is flighty, garrulous, insolent, and empty.' 'Who else has managed to fool his way into literature with such ease?' 'Pushkin lived off women, he made a fortune off them.' 'His life was a playful joke... and so was his death—he simply overbluffed.' 'A man of boyish rashness, he died that way too, amid a scandal.' 'A crazed poet.' About *Eugene Onegin*: 'Pushkin wrote a novel about nothing in particular... his works are like a reference book, a telephone directory... Instead of describing life, he simply itemized it.' About the goals of Pushkin's work: 'There were no goals. He wrote for the hell of it and juggled with motives; he substituted women for civil virtue, money for women, diversion for lofty ideals, and business

ventures for diversion.' 'Everything Pushkin invented—everlasting shame be on it—is all for rent in art.'

For Abram Terts, this mockery of Pushkin is not an end in itself but a prelude to his main blow: 'Progress in literature began with Pushkin... Oh, that tasteless, frenzied desire of the 19th century to describe everything... That frantic yearning to itemize every inch of fleeting reality... in stacks of protocols with dull titles: *The Poor People*, *The Dead Souls*, *An Ordinary Story*, *A Boring Story* (if it is boring, why tell it?), until not a single corner remained undescribed... *War and Peace* (all war and all peace in one book!).'

At one stroke Abram Terts maligned all Russian literature and dismissed Pushkin, Dostoyevsky, Gogol, Goncharov, Chekhov, Tolstoy. They did not measure up to *samizdat* criteria. The explanation here is not only Abram Terts' megalomania (he claims to be an author too) but also obviously a plan to clear the coast for certain 'ideology-free' literary pillars who would suit the CIA and Abram Terts and would stand out in greater relief.

One of the people who at that time got caught in the web of the dissidents—let us call him X (he suffered greatly and is no longer among the living)—recalled the literary demimonde of those years in the memoirs he wrote shortly before his death. Cursing his delusions, he wrote bitterly, producing sketches of the emergent 'ideology-free *samizdat*' and of those whom the West declared to be the 'true spokesmen' of the Soviet people. X was a gifted author: judge for yourself of his style and disgust with his own past:

'Let us now take a look at the salons, Moscow's literary salons of the 1960s. Those were apartments of some literary widows and pseudo-literary hostesses, where the "elite of literature and art" gathered.

'An evening in such a salon was considered a success if one, or, better still, two members of the artistic world's older generation could be goaded into attending. To be quite truthful, however, some literary lions attended quite willingly. It was fashionable to invite beginners to these "literary evenings", young poets, authors, artists and just "outstanding young people", accompanied by affectedly bohemian young women who could be described in one, not quite literary word. The lions had for some time thought

themselves duty-bound to associate more often with the younger generation. Just in case: "who knows, anything can happen..." The atmosphere of such "literary evenings" with the lions smelled strongly of cognac and coffee. The young poets and novice authors recited their works. After a glass of cognac, the lion uttered something encouraging and recounted two or three jokes about literary luminaries; another glass had him muttering something vague but portentous about liberalization and democratic transformation. The "outstanding young people" indistinctly grumbled something abusive and chanted "literary gendarmes" and the KGB. The bohemian girls smoked, affected poses, whispered secretively, giggled and sighed. They wanted to marry an author who drove his own car.

'You want to know who those "outstanding young people" were? "Outstanding" should here be understood literally—they did all they could to make themselves stand out. Take Alexander Ginzburg as an example. A frequent guest in the salons, he posed as a poet and prose writer, a disciple of Boris Pasternak, although no one had ever had the honor to see any of his works. They said he had been a student but had been "persecuted for his beliefs" and disappeared for two years. Then he reappeared and performed in some theater. Then he was about to be persecuted again but recanted just in time... True, some "gentlemen" of the underworld who knew Ginzburg better maintained that he had "disappeared" for two years for swindling and not for his beliefs, but those "gentlemen" were never invited to the salons... Other "outstanding young people" were of that ilk too, all those Bukovskys, Osipovs, Khaustovs, Amalriks; putting it bluntly they were dropouts, conceited and pretentious idlers who blamed their own inferiority complex on society. They were cowardly, lazy and malicious, and they sensed that the salons offer great opportunities for satisfying their personal vanity.

'Having spent a decent amount of time in the literary lady's salon, having admired the famous liberal-minded daddy-o—"the old man likes you"—and having seen for themselves that the old man lived not by bread alone but by cognac too, the "outstanding young people", together with the bohemian girls, went to a different, simpler sa-

lon—that is, to the apartment of one of them; true, there was no cognac there, but vodka there was and one could drink it not from small vodka glasses but from more capacious containers. There, getting drunk, they spoke loudly, convincing one another that if the “old man” talked about “liberalization”, then we are free to do as we please, if famous grownups say, “these ... what do you call them ... democratic transformations”, then down with everything! We’ll get away with it! Times have changed! A “thaw” is on!*

The gleeful cry of “thaw” went round the salons. It referred to the period from 1956 to the 1960s. “Today’s a thaw, and what was before was bitter cold.” Since it was a thaw, moldy “lame ducks” and other vermin—nobody even suspected they were still alive—crawled out of the woodwork into the sun, and their offended little faces appeared in the salons too. There they were welcomed and plied with cognac. After all, they were a rarity, an attraction. Meanwhile, cunning and vicious Ivan Denisoviches** scurried about Moscow streets, gleefully spilling sops on the “paths the higher-ups walk”.

‘Of course. It was a thaw, and toadstools are the first to get into the sun.’

Newcomers could now be glimpsed among the toadstools—some with various diplomatic passports, others with plain tourist visas. They quickly understood who they were dealing with and what bait could be used to make those idlers do the bidding of the CIA and other Western intelligence services. Psychological warfare strategists believed, for example, that 24-year-old Ginzburg could find better use for his business talents. Really, getting his hands on literary compositions at graduating examinations in schools for young workers and offering to take the place of idlers at those examinations for 50 roubles. But then something completely unexpected happened: a newsreel crew came to film examinations in the school where Ginzburg was cribbing under a false name. He smiled into the camera, but the people who knew the student Ginzburg was im-

* Those who employed the word ‘thaw’ in the mid-fifties did not really invent it; one hundred years before, after the Crimean War, it was quite fashionable in Russia.

** The main protagonist of Solzhenitsyn’s *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*.

personating saw the newsreel. The court sentenced the swindler to two years of corrective labor. That was Ginzburg’s first conflict with the law, in the early 1960s. It was later pictured by Western propaganda as merciless persecution of a seeker after truth.

But all that was still in the future. Meanwhile, the CIA decided to secure the cooperation of such a valuable man. For obvious reasons he was contacted and guided in his *samizdat* activities not directly but through the NTS. That organization supplied him with money and printing plates for *Posev*, an underground newspaper that specially emphasized it was a ‘Moscow edition’. Ginzburg was now ready to call for terrorism. As concerns poetry, he found an associate in Yuri Galanskov. The latter wrote poems, which were not quite mature and sometimes anti-Soviet, and was therefore declared a poet, on silent signal from the CIA. What happened later is well-known. In 1968, Ginzburg was sentenced to five years of corrective labor for crimes committed on the instructions of the NTS—anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. Galanskov was also convicted.

The CIA was happy—the first stage of the operation had gone well: there were people in the Soviet Union who had broken free of ‘ideology’ and were being ‘persecuted for their beliefs’. What remained was putting a martyr’s halo on one of them. Galanskov suited them fine: an unbalanced and frail man, he followed Ginzburg’s advice and refused medical assistance, although a gastrointestinal operation was in order. When the doctors finally operated him in 1972, it was too late. The Western media, the CIA’s willing tools, made all possible and impossible capital out of Galanskov’s death: it was alleged that the victim was an innocent poet.

Five years later, while wheedling money from their sponsors, the NTS admitted that Galanskov had been its agent. The people deceived by the CIA-NTS campaign in defense of the ‘poet’ were stunned: talking about a framed-up innocent man was one thing, but defending a paid agent was quite another. There was consternation in those quarters in the West which make it their business to be concerned about Soviet ‘dissenters’. Then, on May 4, 1977, Artemov, leader of the NTS, declared publicly in Frankfurt: ‘There has been harsh criticism of our disclosure of the fact that Galanskov was a member of the NTS. Some

even assert that they know for sure that it is not true. But Galanskov's letters to the NTS headquarters prove that, naturally, he never admitted his membership in our organization and even expressly denied it when necessary.

'Others do not question our relations with Galanskov but accuse us of "divulging" them: they allege that this corroborates the court's verdict and puts all those who defended him in a "very difficult" position—"that means they defended the cause of the NTS!" He died in prison in the autumn of 1972, almost five years ago. We never published anything as long as we could keep it a secret. But we cannot forever "hush up" Galanskov's links with the NTS.'

So much for the much-vaunted 'ideology-free' poetry combined with very prosaic subversion.

2

But what about the genesis of *samizdat*? People in the know have no doubt about the path leading to it. Archpriest A. Kiselev, chaplain of the Vlasov army, published his book *General Vlasov's Image* (in Russian) in the United States in the mid-seventies. In the introduction he wrote: 'Today, when history is falsified and people's images are distorted until they become unrecognizable, can we keep silent about the historical truth?' Silent he was not. About Vlasov propaganda he said: 'It is a recognized fact that in many cases printed matter—leaflets, appeals, and newspapers—not only circulated in the European Soviet Union, but also reached Siberia and its eastern fringes. Prisoners brought the text of the Smolensk Appeal with them—originally dropped from German planes over the frontline or enemy-held areas—already reprinted somewhere in the Soviet Union. That was the beginning of *samizdat*.'

This very apt explanation at least says plainly what *samizdat* is all about. In World War II, it was Nazi propaganda. Incidentally, the Smolensk Appeal was compiled by Nazi intelligence in the name of Vlasov the traitor who had nothing to do with the text since he was not even in Smolensk at the time. It pays to remember the archpriest's admission—*samizdat* in the hands of Soviet country's enemies is a weapon like any other.

Of course, the confessions of a renegade priest are hardly acceptable for the enlightened part of the American

public. Respectable US scholars never cite such opinions about the origins of *samizdat* for the simple reason that it would be improper to admit out loud the spiritual kinship of the anti-Soviet *samizdat* and Dr. Goebbels' propaganda.

American researchers probe deeper: the historian John Lewis Gaddis we have mentioned earlier discovered in 1978 that the founder of *samizdat* had been George Kennan, uncle to the George F. Kennan we know. In the late 19th century he traveled widely in Russia, concentrating on the tsarist system of penal colonies and exile. After returning to the United States, Kennan awed audiences all over the country with his vivid accounts of Russian prisons, often delivered in convict garb to the accompaniment of clanking chains. His prolific writings evoked outrage throughout much of the world, including Russia itself, where they circulated surreptitiously in an early form of *samizdat*.²

Russian revolutionaries regarded Kennan's farcical exploitation of the suffering of the salt of Russian society as a mockery of the people who struggled against the monster of tsarism. The prominent Russian revolutionary Stepaniak-Kravchinsky spoke very harshly about George Kennan making money out of the plight of political prisoners.

Enough of history. CIA professionals expressly point to the origins of *samizdat*. Ray Cline: 'Without CIA help, émigré groups from the USSR and Eastern Europe could not have published in translation the many documents they received from their old countries. This includes some of the celebrated Soviet *samizdat* protest literature.'

H. Rositzke: 'Perhaps the most tangible product of these "psywar" operations was the opening up of American contacts with the political dissidents within the Soviet Union. The earliest links with dissident groups in Moscow were forged at the Moscow Youth Festival in 1957, which was featured by a largely spontaneous dialogue between Soviet and Western youth. At the USIA exhibition in Moscow two years later the first underground literature and "illegal" student magazines came into Western hands. This marked the beginning of the publication of Soviet underground documents in the West—and in many cases their being smuggled back into the Soviet Union for wider distribution. The collection and publication of manuscripts

produced in the Soviet Union had by now become a large-scale enterprise.'³

In the years Rositzke refers to, 1957-1959, a man darted about Moscow who yearned to see his name on book covers and for whom the CIA, Siniavsky and his ilk cleared the coast and organized a publicity campaign. His name was Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Psychological warfare strategists especially appreciated the fact that Solzhenitsyn could supply an experienced editor with what the latter could, after a certain amount of work, turn into books,^{*} and that he craved the fame of a great writer. In other words, both Solzhenitsyn's convictions and his literary occupation suited the CIA: by 1967 the Agency had already sponsored about 1,000 books, all of them different but all of them anti-communist.

In 1961 the CIA's Chief of the Covert Action Staff said: 'Books differ from all other propaganda media, primarily because one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other single medium ... this is, of course, not true of all books at all times and with all readers—but it is true significantly often enough to make books the most important weapon of strategic (long-range) propaganda.'

According to that competent specialist, unnamed in the official U.S. document, the CIA using books for subversive purposes seeks to:

'a) Get books published or distributed abroad without revealing any U.S. influence, by covertly subsidizing foreign publications or booksellers.

'b) Get books published which should not be "contaminated", by any overt tie-in with the U.S. government, especially if the position of the author is "delicate".

'c) Get books published for operational reasons, regardless of commercial viability.

^{*} Jacob Beam, U.S. ambassador to the USSR at the juncture of the 1960s and 1970s, spoke much in his memoirs about his strictly unofficial activities and about the contacts of his diplomats with Moscow 'dissenters'. He wrote: 'Solzhenitsyn in particular posed a problem for all concerned ... Solzhenitsyn's first drafts contained masses of eloquent but undigested writing which had to be organized into a coherent whole. The original manuscript of his *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich* ... was overloaded with vulgarisms and obscure passages which had to be edited out.'

'd) Initiate and subsidize indigenous national or international organizations for book publishing or distributing purposes.

'e) Stimulate the writing of politically significant books by unknown foreign authors—either by directly subsidizing the author, if covert contact is feasible, or indirectly, through literary agents or publishers.'

Solzhenitsyn fitted into every element of this formula for producing a 'prominent author' as part of CIA subversion against the Soviet Union. As is often the case, at first the future 'author' received his spiritual fare from the NTS, a CIA subsidiary. This imparted a certain flavor to Solzhenitsyn's works and sometimes led to comical consequences. At any rate, the CIA's 'Operation Solzhenitsyn' was doomed to failure from the very start: it was based on a complete denial of the Soviet system which is cherished by all Soviet people.

3

First, about the political creed of the NTS and Solzhenitsyn as it appears in his various works. Let us try and single out the essentials.

The enemies of communism inevitably fall back on the philosophy of Berdiayev. Solzhenitsyn has borrowed much from him, too, and the NTS publishes Berdiayev's works in a special pocket-size smuggler's format. But Solzhenitsyn has deliberately overlooked one of Berdiayev's quotations—in all probability because it offered too apt a description of Solzhenitsyn himself and his literary aims.

Berdiayev once remarked that Dostoyevsky foresaw the rise of the spirit of Smerdiakov: 'He knew that a lackey would rise in Russia and, in an hour of deadly peril for our country, say: "I hate all of Russia", "I not only refuse to be an armed hussar, but on the contrary, I wish all soldiers were dead." Asked: "And when the enemy comes who will defend us?", the rebel lackey answered: "In the year 1812 there was the great invasion of Napoleon I, Emperor of the French, and it would have been wonderful had the French conquered us then: a clever nation would have conquered and annexed quite a stupid one. Life would have been quite different then!"'

Spiritually, Solzhenitsyn and that lackey are birds of a feather. During the war, in an hour of deadly peril, he reviled the Supreme High Command and was therefore removed from the army and sentenced under wartime laws. He remained a sympathizer with the enemy who was bent on conquering the Soviet people by death and destruction.

Like Smerdiakov, he recalls 1812 and says: 'A simple truth, but one can arrive at it only by suffering: blessed are defeats, not victories in wars!... We are so used to taking pride in our victory over Napoleon that we forget: that was what delayed the emancipation of serfs another 50 years, that was what enabled the strengthened Crown to rout the Decembrists (with French occupation of Russia not being feasible).' Leaving aside the erroneous cause-and-effect relationship—the Russian march into Paris was what helped shape the Decembrists—let us listen for the voice of Smerdiakov.

The lackey keeps bemoaning the fact that countless invasions of Russia have always collapsed. Solzhenitsyn would like to know why history has gone this way and not otherwise: 'Everyone has learned by heart and accepted the truism: "It is the result that counts." Whence has it come to us? First from the glory of our banners and the so-called honor of our country. We strangled, flogged, and moved down our neighbors, we expanded—and the country increasingly believed that "It is the result that counts".'

But throughout its long history, the Russian people have many times saved mankind from those who wanted to rule what was then known as the civilized world. Russia stopped the Tatars from hacking their way into Europe. Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire. Charles XII of Sweden was routed in Russia. Napoleon's Grande Armée perished there too. Did Russians molest those neighbors? Did they not repulse the predators at the price of great effort, blood, and sacrifice? They had to fight for their freedom and the freedom of other peoples. Russians would have long since perished as a nation if countless generations of their ancestors had not courageously and steadfastly guarded the country's frontiers, arms in hand.

Solzhenitsyn's style has been obviously influenced by the language and syntax of the Russian writer Sergei Sergeyev-Tsensky. The imitator would have done well also to borrow his views on Russian history. Describing the Cri-

mean War, when 'neighbors' living thousands of miles away—the French and the British—came to make war on Russia, Sergeyev-Tsensky remarked in his typically level-headed, and unhurried way: 'Perhaps it was the legends or songs or stories the older generations of soldiers had long handed down to the younger generations that instilled in them a sense of invincibility... It were the soldier's legs that traversed thousands of miles before reaching Russia's borders that made him feel confident. For Russian soldiers themselves were rural dwellers and they knew what land meant no matter who they fought for it, and without any special explanations by their officers, they could understand that only an invincible army could have won the vast country Russia was. Geography taught them history and self-confidence, and they climbed the Inkerman Heights as masters to drive out the uninvited guests.'⁶

The Smerdiakovian regret that a 'clever nation' (the Germans) failed to conquer 'quite a stupid one' permeates Solzhenitsyn's *August 1914*. The author uses precisely this approach to describe the engagement of Russian and German armies in East Prussia in August 1914.

This servile admiration of German militarism is what the Polish journalist E. Romanowski singled out in his detailed analysis of the book. Outraged at the fawning on the allegedly invincible war machine of the Kaiser, Romanowski wrote: 'Far from everything was as orderly as described by the author, who is petrified with admiration and kneeling before the German militarists. Writing is very difficult in such a posture, and the field of vision is different too, at any rate the object is enlarged out of proportion... (the author) is blinded by the shining boots of the German generals.' The posture suits Smerdiakov the lackey perfectly.

The Polish journalist, a Slav, continues: 'Having consigned history to oblivion, the author turns everything upside down, while what he has written coincides with the paeans to the battle of Tannenberg sung in Nazi Germany... Solzhenitsyn's words have a terrible and blasphemous ring. If only they could be heard by the Polish and Soviet soldiers who are buried in this soil and who gave their lives to crush forever the "Drang nach Osten". On the pages of his book, Solzhenitsyn attempts to refight the past wars.'⁷

The spirit of Smerdiakov is part of the accursed past of tsarist Russia, swept away by the October Revolution. What Solzhenitsyn presents as the latest discovery born of his 'profound' analysis is actually a rehash of very old concepts held by the reactionary forces of prerevolutionary Russia which had long tried to subjugate the great country to Germany.

General Alexei Brusilov, one of the greatest Russian generals of World War I, recalled: 'The Germans, both domestic and foreign, were omnipotent in our country... There was a powerful Russo-German party in St. Petersburg which demanded a strong alliance with Germany at any cost, no matter how humiliating; meanwhile Germany flaunted its contempt for us. In these circumstances, how could the people's minds be prepared for this clearly inevitable war that was to decide the future of Russia. Obviously, this preparation accomplished nothing—or rather it produced negative results.'⁸

That is obvious to all those who love Russian history and are close to the Russian people. For example, N. Pavlov's lengthy article about *August 1914*, entitled *The Militant Obscurantist* and published in the Bulgarian newspaper *Otechestvenen Front*, stressed Solzhenitsyn's apologia of German militarism: 'It is common knowledge that the author has a regrettable penchant for extolling everything connected with Kaiser Germany... Having revived the corpse of the "Russo-German party"—an object of hatred among Slavs—which tried to force a great country to its knees before German imperialism, Solzhenitsyn gladly adopts its arguments too.'⁹

This was not at all a matter of literary likes and dislikes, but a very acute political issue of that time. Solzhenitsyn mourns forfeited opportunities and tries to re-fight history many decades later: 'In Bismarck's lifetime there was the league of three emperors, and Eastern Europe enjoyed peace for half a century. The Russo-German peace was more useful than all those manifestations with Paris clowns.'

Solzhenitsyn is not alone in his conclusions. Here is a quotation from one of his spiritual allies: 'I have come to the firm conclusion that the tasks facing the Russian people can be solved in alliance and cooperation with the German people. The interests of the Russian people have

always been close to those of the German people. The greatest achievements of the Russian people are inseparably linked with those periods in its history when it associated its destiny with Germany.' The quotation is from Vlasov's 'Open Letter' (1943): '*Why I Have Chosen to Fight Against Bolshevism*'.

The spiritual alliance with Vlasov is objectively inevitable both for the NTS and for Solzhenitsyn. Putting it mildly, it is a dubious distinction, and Solzhenitsyn was terribly angry: '*Litgazeta* even found a special term to describe me: a "literary Vlasovite". And within a few days it poured forth from all printing shops, from all shop windows.'

Literaturnaya Gazeta was absolutely right. Perhaps its only oversight was that it failed to explain that today the term was a synonym of the spirit of Smerdiakov. The latter hoped that a 'clever' nation would put everything in order in Russia and wished that all its soldiers should be killed, so that no one would dare take up arms and hinder the teaching of the 'stupid' nation. Solzhenitsyn cherishes the same dream. The past depresses him: Russians have always routed would-be conquerors. Look back, Solzhenitsyn wails, and see why you, Russians, did not meekly submit to foreign yoke? You sinned and did not understand genuine freedom: 'freedom is SELF-RESTRICTION!—self-restriction for the sake of others!... Self-restriction has a wealth of aspects—international, political, cultural, national, social, party aspects. We, Russians, should sort out those that are our own. And show an example of generosity.'

So, according to Solzhenitsyn's twisted logic, generosity means deliberately giving up the status of a great power. He insists: 'One might retort: but how far can a nation, society, state go in self-restriction? An entire nation cannot afford the luxury of arbitrary and totally independent decisions that an individual enjoys. If a nation restricts itself while its neighbors do not, should it be ready to resist violence? Yes, of course. Defense forces should be retained, but they must be truly defense forces.'

The references to resistance cannot be taken seriously. Still, how strong must those defense forces be? Solzhenitsyn's expert advice is: 'We need *ten times less* for military needs' and should 'greatly reduce military prepara-

tions for years to come'. But disarmament is meaningless unless it applies to both sides. That is what the Soviet Union tirelessly advocates. Today it is generally accepted that there is a strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States. Among other things, it shapes the balance of power on the international scene. But Solzhenitsyn suggests that the Soviet military potential be cut down to ten per cent of that of the United States. Some generosity!

As to the United States, Solzhenitsyn has special plans for that country. Speaking to an audience of 3,000 assembled by the AFL-CIO leadership in Washington on June 30, 1975, he said: 'A burden weighs up on America. Whether you want it or not, the course of history has thrust upon you the task of world leadership.'¹⁰ Could it be that plagiarism is a habit with Solzhenitsyn? When President Truman was launching the 'cold war' with its runaway arms race, he told Americans in December 1945: 'Whether we like it or not, we must all recognize that the victory which we have won has placed upon the American people the continuing burden of responsibility for world leadership.'¹¹

In an address, delivered in New York on July 9, 1975, Solzhenitsyn elucidated his Washington speech in his typical disjointed manner: 'I would like to draw your attention: you have those theorists who say, stop the nuclear arming of the United States. We now already have, America today has enough nuclear weapons to destroy half the world, the other side. Why should we need more? ... There was a time when the Soviet Union could not stand any comparison with you as regards nuclear weapons. Then it got level with you, it did. Then—everyone admits it now—it is now beginning to outstrip you. Well, now the ratio is perhaps more than one to one. Then it will be two to one ... The clouds are gathering, a storm is brewing.'

It follows that the West must arm itself to the teeth. Like an agent provocateur, Solzhenitsyn uses a double standard in talking to the West and to the U.S.S.R. According to him, the United States is to 'lead' the world by securing absolute military superiority and to dictate to all nations. The Soviet people, who have turned a new page of history and are building a new society, are to restrict themselves, bow and kneel before imperialism. Moreover, to make it easier, they should, as a start, erode the

Soviet military potential. Such is the program of the latter-day Smerdiakov.

Still, Solzhenitsyn insists that he cares for Russia's future. Typically, he and those few who share his views love to lecture people. A nation of more than 260 million people lives, works happily, and builds a new society, and those idlers plot the future for Soviet people. They have the means to do it—they are on the payroll of international reaction. The situation is familiar (since 1917): people living on the capitalist dole parade their concern for the freedom of the Soviet people.

But the CIA is no charity institution. Money has to be worked off—which is what Solzhenitsyn is doing, although, to be fair, the returns from the investment are not too great: the ideological wares he produces are processed from the muddy waters of the NTS.

The multipurpose slogan he advanced—'thou shalt not live by lies'—has turned out to be a mere paraphrase of the NTS slogan 'truth to counter lies', laid down in the NTSNP program in 1938 and unchanged ever since, under its various bosses. In the eyes of the NTS leaders, the phrase has a distinct connotation: it is a password used to recognize an ally. When Poremsky was selling yet another lie to his masters in late 1975, he said: 'The millions "who do not live by lies" are already taking shape as an organization—shared ideological purposefulness that finds expression in a system of definite reaction to actions, if not in the action proper'. Solzhenitsyn gave the NTS password and joined the CIA-NTS subversion team.

The CIA has acquired a loyal servant. Solzhenitsyn's entire primitive ideology merely parrots the tritest clichés of Western anti-Soviet propaganda. Despite his wild claims, essentially he only popularizes anticommunist doctrines and, in his zeal, does not even take the trouble to alter them but usually merely plagiarizes. Nowadays, Solzhenitsyn's major work is the notorious *Gulag Archipelago*.

The book is now *de rigueur* in anti-Soviet propaganda—of course, with appropriate bows and scrapes to the great thinker. *Gulag Archipelago* is advertised as the result of independent research, etc.—to the general public of the West, of course. Western scholars, on the other hand, clearly point to the source of the author's inspiration: 'Although Solzhenitsyn introduced the "gulag" into the World's voca-

bulary,' the American historian Daniel Yergin observes, 'it had been noted in English much earlier. The magazine *Plain Talk* ran an article "Gulag-Slavery, Inc." in its May 1947 issue, with a map showing the major camps. Solzhenitsyn may even have seen the map in Russia.'¹²

In all probability, NTS leaders were, as authors, justly proud when Solzhenitsyn's thick volumes appeared. They must have been glad that CIA-NTS instructions had been carried out to the letter. After all, this time their anti-Soviet fabrications did not appear on the sorry pages of *Posev*: the Western press publicized them all over the world as the work of a famous author.

On November 16, 1974, Solzhenitsyn held a press conference in Zurich *On the Future of Russia*. He told the motley audience that he had his own program: 'I call the program I propose for my country a moral revolution. I have set it forth in the document "Thou Shalt Not Live By Lies".' Let us now turn to the document *Strategic Issues of the Liberation Struggle*, drawn up by the NTS Council Strategic Commission in 1971-1972. The paper says: 'The NTS guides its members in their most difficult task of morally improving themselves and their people. Russia has to be rebuilt not only politically but also spiritually. Only a moral revolution can guarantee a successful civil revolution!'

It is clear that Solzhenitsyn has copied the initial provisions of his 'moral revolution' almost verbatim from the NTS document. Let us compare them further:

The NTS

We need 'spontaneous sabotage'.

Do not attend meetings; if you do, do not speak or applaud...

Take no part in official processions or demonstrations...

Take no part in any elections...

(*Strategic Issues*, pp. 30-41)

Solzhenitsyn

We need a 'civil disobedience' campaign.

He shall not allow himself to be dragged to a meeting...

He shall not allow himself to be forced to join a demonstration or rally.

He shall not raise his hand to vote...

(Solzhenitsyn, 'Thou Shalt Not Live By Lies', *Posev*, 1974, No. 3, p. 9)

Solzhenitsyn slavishly follows NTS instructions. The NTS document quoted above refers to the list as follows: 'This is a tentative list.' Solzhenitsyn's description of his list: 'Of course, we have not listed every possible and necessary step.' (Quoted, respectively, from *Strategic Issues*, p. 40; Solzhenitsyn's *Thou Shalt Not Live By Lies*, p. 9.)

The NTS has long been busy advising us how to behave. The Soviet people can only respond with disgust. But the NTS printing presses do not stop. The NTS needs these documents to justify its existence for the CIA, to create the impression that the NTS is busy subverting the U.S.S.R. and thus earn its handouts. The only new aspect is Solzhenitsyn's participation.

He wants to be recognized as a theoretician. Take, for example, *From Under the Rubble*, an anti-Soviet collection published in the West. Solzhenitsyn authored a third of its contents.

He believes that the collection is so significant that it can only be compared to the notorious *Vekhi* (*Landmarks*). The latter, in his view, is still extremely valuable: 'Today, 60 odd years later, *Landmarks* remain landmarks and truly show us the way.' The philosopher, it seems, can only walk on NTS crutches. The NTS has long made a new printing of *Landmarks* and insists that it is an invaluable book.

To praise *Landmarks*, Solzhenitsyn does not use the original but a simplified digest by Berdiayev: the NTS has republished the latter's article 'The Spirits of the Russian Revolution'. Solzhenitsyn's entire philosophy coincides with Berdiayev's conclusions. Besides, he diligently follows CIA and NTS recommendations.

Berdiayev

Today, most of Russia's intelligentsia would have reacted to *Landmarks* in a different way than at the time they appeared. Today, even those who reviled *Landmarks* begin to recognize their truth.

Solzhenitsyn

The fateful features of Russia's prerevolutionary educated stratum were thoroughly examined in *Landmarks*—and angrily rejected by the entire intelligentsia, by all party trends... The only encouraging thing is that 60

But the road to renaissance lies through repentance, through realization of one's sins, through cleansing the people's spirit of the evil spirits.

years later, the stratum that can support that book is apparently growing in Russia.

Only after going through a period of repentance by many people can Russia's air, Russia's soil be cleansed.

(*From Under the Rubble*, pp. 217, 130)

Solzhenitsyn's 'repentance' is thus a plagiarism of Berdiayev. The latter wrote soon after the October Revolution, and he saw 'repentance' as the keystone to reversing history. Berdiayev's pipe-dream failed to materialize. Solzhenitsyn still hopes it will.

Naturally, the NTS, with an eye to the CIA, hastened to claim all credit for *From Under the Rubble*. R. Redlikh in *Posev* is ecstatically advertising it to those directing subversion against the Soviet Union, *Posev's* regular readers: 'First let me discuss its spirit, not the letter or detail. We know this spirit. It comprises the three pillars of our youth (the time of collaboration with the Nazis—N.Y.): idealism, nationalism, activism... Many of those who still uphold these pillars have joined us and are still with us—meaning they are also with *From Under the Rubble*.'

Redlikh, formerly of the Gestapo, aptly describes the people who put the collection together: 'We feel that the authors of *From Under the Rubble* are our brothers not only because *Posev* Publishers have at the earliest opportunity made a new printing of *Landmarks*. The *Landmarks* that Solzhenitsyn calls prophetic... We fully share the attitude of the authors of *From Under the Rubble* toward today's political regime in Russia... Solzhenitsyn is a thousand times right.' Delighted at the way the collection rehashes the inarticulate instructions of the NTS (not very imaginatively but verbosely), Redlikh spouts: 'Solzhenitsyn urges us to a moral revolution. And we accept his appeal. It is true, we must begin with ourselves (this from the NTS men!—N.Y.). But not for our own sake... A political revolution will inevitably follow a moral revolution in our country... Here we cannot stop halfway, and if

Russia has a future, it will be a complete and decisive victory over Bolshevism, while the fundamental restructuring of our social being is what any dictionary describes as revolution.'

Obviously nostalgic about his Gestapo past, Redlikh thirsts for blood. With the bluntness of a hangman, he explains what the 'moral revolution' should accomplish: 'I fear that the authors of *From Under the Rubble*—well, not that they stop halfway, but, having pointed the right way... they nevertheless somewhat hold back those who are ready to embark on it. Peace is very valuable. But "I came not to send peace, but the sword" and, although "he who takes up the sword will perish by the sword", warriors of the Lord took it up too... Russia's spiritual rebirth cannot be separated from its political liberation, or the moral revolution from the overthrow of the government.' Redlikh is outspoken enough.

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Redlikh is outspoken not because he has already taken the path of 'moral revolution' and hence candidly reveals the ultimate objectives of the NTS. Note that he made this statement in March 1975, when the campaign to 'investigate' the CIA was gathering momentum in the United States. The NTS members must have followed it with bated breath. They thought their sponsor and, more importantly, their source of income was in a tight spot. They could not even rule out the possibility of the thrifty American legislators checking CIA books and cutting expenditure on useless projects—like financing the NTS. Of course, none of this came to pass, but at that time no one could be sure.

The NTS spongers are doing their best to prove their worth. Hence the frantic publicity of Solzhenitsyn's collection and other wares. Hence revelations hardly possible at other times, the delight with Solzhenitsyn's 'moral revolution' that disguised a call for armed struggle against the Soviet State. In other words, lo and behold: we have reared Solzhenitsyn and his ilk; therefore we are earning the cash we receive. But no matter what the motives are, these revelations help analyze the author's 'creative effort'.

It is quite clear what and whom Solzhenitsyn opposes.

But what does he advocate? What is his constructive program—if it can be called that at all? In his 'moral revolution' he demands immediate rejection of Marxism 'rather sooner than later'.

This twist, prompted by the CIA that is so anxious to 'end ideology', suits Solzhenitsyn to the ground: disarm yourselves totally, give up your strength. But even here the prophet plagiarizes. The appeal for a rejection of Marxism parrots CIA guidelines and NTS instructions that say: 'Only a political force capable of exposing the communist lie and advancing a progressive social system and ideology to replace it can defeat communism as a political force, destroy it as a social system, and leave no trace of it as an ideology. Besides, Solzhenitsyn welcomes these precepts because they echo his rejection of socialism. At one of his press conferences in the West he was asked: 'Judging by your works, you adhere to a socialist viewpoint. Is that true?' Solzhenitsyn retorted hotly: 'That is a mistake! A careful analysis of my books will prove that the author never displays a socialist viewpoint.'

He is dead set against socialism and everything the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, have created since 1917. He is even more intransigent than the enemies of the Soviet Union who are now forced to recognize the progress it has made in communist construction and the advances of the world socialist system.

Moreover, Solzhenitsyn cannot even accept capitalism refurbished according to the recipes of right-wing Social Democrats of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal. He refuses to recognize that capitalist government have accepted reform to prevent social explosion. Essentially, he rejects all existing forms of state structure with one exception which we will presently discuss.

Solzhenitsyn touchingly shares NTS views on an ideal society. He paints a rosy picture of the 'new' state, a veritable promised land. But the *Posev* architects, laying their plans for a future Russia, take care to note that 'Russian members of the opposition and revolutionaries should already now describe the regime in the penitentiaries which will no doubt exist in the new Russia'. We cannot doubt the competence of the NTS or its interest in this aspect: after all, they were among the jailers in Nazi mass extermination camps.

A certain I. Voshchinin, an NTS theoretician, rationalized—in rather vague terms—on *Posev* pages: 'Any system must have its specific purpose and special organizational principles of its own... In the choice of purpose solidarity is extremely specific.' Thus emigres discuss the best way of jailing the Soviet people.

However, reprisals are not an end in itself for the NTS and Solzhenitsyn but rather a concomitant of the system they dream about. The builders of a new world use *Landmarks* as their foremost manual. According to Solzhenitsyn: 'Today we still regard *Landmarks* as a gift from the future.' Let us take a look at that manual. Solzhenitsyn would like the system, which existed prior to 1917 and which he admires, to be restored at least sometime in the future. *Landmarks* says it virtually on behalf of Solzhenitsyn and his ilk: 'The way we are, we cannot even dream of merging with the people—we should fear them more than any punishment inflicted by the authorities, and we should bless these authorities that alone protect us from the wrath of the people by their bayonets and prisons.'

It is quite clear where Solzhenitsyn and his ilk, prompted by *Landmarks*, intend to spearhead their class reprisals. But *Landmarks* also taught extreme hypocrisy in achieving the goals of the bourgeoisie. The book piously said: 'Marxism with its doctrine of the class struggle within the state as an organization of class domination was the ultimate in the anti-state renegade mentality of the intelligentsia.' Having thus maligned the salt of the people that had taken up arms against the autocracy, the authors of *Landmarks* offered the creed of bourgeois ideology to the Russian intelligentsia: 'We must recognize at last that "bourgeois" science is precisely genuine objective science, while the "subjective" science of our Narodniks and the "class" science of our Marxists are much closer to a special type of religious belief than to science.' Incidentally, the West should not have advertise Bell and others as the discoverers of 'deideologization' in the late 1950s. The authors of *Landmarks* did it long before.

Russian revolutionaries faced execution and penal servitude to win happiness and social emancipation for the people. *Landmarks* expressly condemned the road they took and declared that the Russian intelligentsia lacked vitality. The country which stood on the eve of revolution—a

revolution that inspired legendary heroism—was contrasted to the philistine West. According to *Landmarks*, 'That is the essential difference between our intelligentsia and its counterpart in the West, where concern about personal welfare is a social norm and something self-evident... The fanatical disdain of any egoism, both personal and national, which was one of the basic dogmas of the intelligentsia, has brought us incalculable damage. Egoism, self-assertion is a great force; it is what makes the Western bourgeoisie a powerful if unconscious tool of God's will in this world.' Of course, for the bourgeoisie stuffing its wallets and living off its neighbors' blood and sweat is God's will. Solzhenitsyn the millionaire naturally agrees. But the Soviet people do not, and that was why they cleansed their country by revolution. Today, the NTS and Solzhenitsyn dream of restoring their 'kingdom of heaven' in this world. Pygmies would like to ride on the shoulders of a great nation. But even though they look back on the *Landmarks* put out 50 odd years ago, they have learned their lesson. The tsar's prisons and bayonets they are nostalgic for turned out to be ineffective. The solidarists want to put a hangman's noose, not a yoke on the neck of the people.

'What is the organizational principle of solidarism?' Voshchinin asks, and answers: 'Ensuring a "place in the sun" for each citizen, and also, serving as a firm basis of the government edifice.'

Now, about the 'place in the sun'. Voshchinin: 'People differ in their needs and abilities, and these differences grow as human history progresses... Law and government must be based on the recognition of the above factors which are quite objective.' This means that the government apparatus with all its power will be used to consolidate this inequality.

There is nothing new about that line. Bourgeois ideologists have long used it to justify government organization under capitalism. A classic example in the history of bourgeois political thought is the concept advanced by James Madison, one of the founding fathers of the Constitution of the United States. He insisted in *The Federalist* in 1787: 'The diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of these faculties is the first object of government.'¹³ But the 'found-

ing fathers' of the U.S.A. and today's solidarists use the precept to draw different conclusions about the methods of protecting the interests of the propertied minority. The American bourgeoisie considered bourgeois democracy sufficient for that purpose.

But it does not suit the solidarists. Says Voshchinin: 'Unlike the "liberal" system where intermediate organizations can exist without any system, the objective of solidarism is to create an orderly structure of intermediate organizations and to ensure their public and legal character.' The terms and formulas have a familiar ring: the solidarists have stolen the first pages of the fascist gospel. Essentially, they have reworded the ideological basis of Mussolini's 'corporate' state and Franco's 'organic democracy'. In other words, the solidarists believe that fascism is the only system of government acceptable in the U.S.S.R. And since they are on the CIA payroll, the Agency surely shares and supports their views. In this connection we might recall the same NSC Directive 20/1 about the future of Russia without the Soviets.

As to Solzhenitsyn, he was quite outspoken in *From Under the Rubble* in this regard. He firmly believes that such a system is a natural extension of the trends of the early 20th century which were cut short in 1917 by the people when they took state power into their own hands: 'Today less than ever before in the past century, we should see the Western parliamentary system as the only way out for our country... Those Government norms included many authoritarian ones as well... Russia, too, lived under an authoritarian system of several forms for many centuries—and it also preserved itself and its health... And if Russia was used to living under authoritarian systems... perhaps we should recognize that an evolution from one authoritarian form to another would be more natural for it, smoother and less painful. There will be objections: this road is not at all discernible, and new forms even less so. But no one has yet outlined for us any real ways for the transition from the existing form to a democratic republic of the Western type.'

Whatever course the dissidents' 'creative' thought takes, it inevitably leads to an authoritarian model. Solzhenitsyn has written about Sakharov: 'The interesting thing is that Sakharov, while praising Western democ-

racy ... let's slip quite a different dream of his: "very intellectual ... world leadership", a "world government"... That is an entirely different principle—that of AUTHORITARIAN government, which can be either bad or excellent, but the ways of shaping it, the principles guiding its organization and functioning cannot have much in common with contemporary democracy.'

From Under the Rubble, largely Solzhenitsyn's creation, is a manifesto of militant authoritarianism and fascism. That explains why it is especially valuable to Redlikh of the NTS (formerly of the Gestapo). Running ahead a little, he reassures those who share the views of the collection's authors: 'And although the left is bound to regard the movement it represents as "reactionary" (we have also been branded "fascists" and are familiar with the affliction), we will have to live with it without bearing a grudge: resentment does not improve one's appearance, and there is no use for us to nurse grievances.'

Remarkably stubborn in his beliefs, Solzhenitsyn has no reason to take offense. He is perhaps the most tireless advocate of authoritarianism as a universally acceptable system. Naturally, reactionaries throughout the world hasten to echo his slogans because he urges them to put an end to the Soviet system and socialist democracy. But that is not all he advocates. Fascist political jargon has long reserved choice invective for the so-called plutocracy which is unable to bring fascist order into people's lives. Fascists are the attack dogs of monopoly capital and they revile democracy. Hitler promised to build the Third Reich on the rubble of the Weimar 'pigsty' because, he maintained, bourgeois democracy in Germany was bankrupt. The Nazis alleged that their dictatorship was the summit of human history and that the 'new order' would never end. At any rate, all fascist regimes without exception have always poured scorn on Western democracy.

Solzhenitsyn is a dedicated successor to the ideologues of fascism. He insists that the Western world 'is almost dying. The Western world and the entire Western civilization have been catastrophically weakened. That is largely the result of the historical, psychological, and moral crisis of the culture and philosophical system which was conceived during the Renaissance and reached its peak in the works of the 18th-century Enlighteners'.

The main thrust of all of Solzhenitsyn's writings is the attempt to prove that the future will be authoritarian and fascist. Take *August 1914*, the book Solzhenitsyn considers his central work. He plans to follow this 'node' with 20 or however many other such 'nodes', all in the same vein. In his interpretation of the events of 1914 he mercilessly criticizes the then Russian system because, in his opinion, the people who stood at the helm were incapable of dealing properly with the coming social upheaval.

First and foremost, this approach is applied to describe the incompetence of the tsar's generals and bureaucrats. Everything is a mess, the intelligentsia is engaged in empty talk. It does not take much foresight to expect that the books which will follow *August 1914* will explain the revolution's victory by those factors alone. In the book, the 'technocrats'—those who, in the opinion of Solzhenitsyn, should govern the country—are head and shoulders above the pitiful caricatures of tsarist officials at all levels.

This reflects Solzhenitsyn's extremely and in all probability deliberately superficial approach to problems. Under capitalism, power stems from private ownership of the means of production, and 'managers'—people like Obodovsky, one of the novel's protagonists—would never be allowed to wield power for they are merely skilled servants.

But that is not the most important point. Solzhenitsyn arbitrarily used 'technocracy' doctrines to justify authoritarian rule, his pet theme. To make his theories palatable for the general public, he sets them forth in the form of a novel. That is all there is to his *belles lettres*.

Why then does the West extol Solzhenitsyn even though he advocates concepts alien to a large part of the ruling classes, say, in the United States? Was that not obvious even when he was formally still only a writer of fiction, when he did not yet write political articles or act as a prophet? The Bulgarian journalist N. Pavlov, in his article 'The Militant Obscurantist' we have quoted earlier, described this phenomenon with considerable insight even before Solzhenitsyn's revelations in *From Under the Rubble*:

'Imperialist propaganda has long pictured Solzhenitsyn as a champion of "liberalization" and other slogans widely used in bourgeois-democratic countries. The ideological content of *August 1914* utterly destroys that pleasant stereotype. The things quoted above—the rejection of political ac-

tivity and of parliamentarism, and consequently the atomization of society, flattering remarks about the technocrats' ability to govern—are the common philosophical ground of totalitarian, fascist regimes. All champions of barbarous fascist doctrines—in Italy in the 1920s, in Germany in the 1930s—began, under capitalism, by eliminating all parties but their own and ended with the physical extermination of dissenters. Viewed from this angle, Obodovsky and Arkhangorodsky, the author's favorite and quite loquacious heroes, are harbingers of what later endangered civilization throughout the world—fascism. The United States fought side by side with the Soviet Union against that terrible menace.

'So, upon closer examination it appears that this remarkable luminary of "liberalism", as bourgeois propaganda asserts he is, is in actual fact, a mediocre and unoriginal proponent of authoritarian concepts. The moment the people Solzhenitsyn describes and praises are given power, a bloodbath will result. The author is far to the right of bourgeois democracy. Those in the West who hail Solzhenitsyn are sure to know that and realize that he cannot be used in that part of the world. Hence the striking bias in the reviews of the book in the Western press: this side is completely ignored. He is stubbornly supported for an obvious reason—indeed, why should the international bourgeoisie that uses dictatorial regimes against the world revolutionary process refuse to use an ideologist who preaches totalitarianism? His credentials are impeccable: they are his unreasoning hatred of the Soviet Union.'¹⁴

All that was perfectly true of the period when Solzhenitsyn was in the Soviet Union: one could still easily hush up what accompanied his anti-Sovietism—his hatred of both socialist democracy and democracy in general. But after he became a citizen of the 'free world', there were inevitable questions about his political credo. No matter how affectionately Solzhenitsyn was treated in the Western countries, they remain bourgeois democratic. They had been saved from fascism in the Second World War at so high a price. Then, all of a sudden, a smug fascist urges to put an end to it all.

When the 'prophet' made his appearance in the West, the following conversation ensued at a Cabinet meeting in Washington. According to *Newsweek*, President Nixon said

that Solzhenitsyn was 'to the right of Barry Goldwater'. To which Secretary of State Kissinger, a historian, replied: 'No. Mr. President, he is to the right of the czars.'

If that is what they said at the White House, then Solzhenitsyn's pronouncements brought great chagrin to professional ideologues. His sermons evoked something close to despair among them. *Newsweek* had long mourned Solzhenitsyn's fate in the Soviet Union, but even its veteran editors could not but gasp. They found themselves in a difficult position, so it is best to let them speak for themselves:

'The subtlest intellectual trap of them all is to mistake subject matter for ideology—and now Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn has come West to embarrass some of its intellectuals once again... For most Westerners, the message was clear enough: Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was ideologically and temperamentally one of them, a libertarian and democrat whose exile to the West... was really a sort of final reward and homecoming. This conceit didn't last long... What emerged... was a far less tidy and containable vision than anyone had previously had of Solzhenitsyn—a picture of a... highly authoritarian, a disbeliever in democracy... The singularity of Solzhenitsyn's views has already begun to trouble some Western supporters, who fear that "Western journalists and politicians will seize on this statement and attack him and try to undermine the power of his novels", in the words of Thompson Bradley, a professor of Russian literature at Swarthmore College. Indeed, Solzhenitsyn... tones down many... original antidemocratic sentiments—though it is still not clear which version he truly believes. Whether the West will pout because one of its leading ideological heroes has turned out to be a non-political holy fool is yet to be seen.'¹⁵

That is why, while appreciating his anticommunist views, Western newsmen nevertheless asked him about his personal opinion of the West, probably expecting him to go back, for politeness' sake, on his authoritarian remarks. At first he hotly refused to take anything back and instead accused the curious of not reading properly what he had written: 'They read but they see things that are quite different from what is written', he complained at a press conference in Zurich in November 1974.

But no one wanted to go into semantic niceties, and at

a press conference in Stockholm in December 1974 he was bluntly asked about his attitude to Western democracy. He forced himself to say: 'I only want to make a correction to avoid misunderstanding: I am not against democracy in general...' He was beginning to learn his lesson, like a chameleon on a striped surface.

Then he began to learn fast—in all probability, because he got a clear idea of what his masters wanted. Very soon he illustrated the old truth that he who pays the piper calls the tune. Of course, he did not arrive at that truth unaided but prompted by the CIA through the NTS.

In the early summer of 1975 Solzhenitsyn began his tour of the United States. Simultaneously, the NTS tried to cushion the effect of Solzhenitsyn's words by prompt comment—naturally, only to convince Americans that he did not oppose their way of life and to prevent him from injuring, even unintentionally, the sacred cow of democracy. Even before Solzhenitsyn had time to say anything in the United States *Posev* told those ready to listen to Solzhenitsyn's sermons: 'We are all ready to follow him as a prophet. But follow as far as the point where he is "inclined" to reject democracy (I repeat, not only actual democracy but also its principal ideas).' As we see, the Nazis from the NTS don the democratic cloak when circumstances require it. And, since a change of uniform was ordered, Solzhenitsyn followed the NTS recommendations.

He toured the United States to advertise himself and, among other things, to visit the ideological mecca of anti-communism—the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California. It contains a vast library on the history of Russia and the Soviet Union, and the material is mostly anticommunist. Many 'experts on the Soviet Union' have written their books dipping into that collection. Solzhenitsyn was promptly elected an honorary member of the Hoover Institution. Solzhenitsyn was touched, and said: 'I hope I will be able to use your unique collection of documents and your library for the rest of my life.' Director W. G. Campbell replied encouragingly that he also hoped for long and fruitful cooperation.

But this cooperation has to be paid for. The man who only yesterday swore loudly that he would never change his convictions changed them practically overnight. He flat-

tered his listeners in New York when he said on July 9, 1975: 'I have traveled enough in your country—in different states and different corners—to say I am convinced that provincial America is healthy, strong, and generous.' That was the time of the anniversary celebrations, so the author continued politely: 'The leaders of your country that is embarking on its third century will perhaps bear a weight unheard of in all American history. In the times that are soon to come, your leaders will need profound intuition, spiritual foresight, and noble qualities of mind and spirit. I pray to God that at those moments you are led by personalities as great as those that created your country.'

Naturally, there was applause: why should not Americans, and not only Americans, pay tribute to George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and other founding fathers of the United States, worthy sons of their age? But Solzhenitsyn had his own aims in mind when he invoked the great names. 'The people who created your country,' Solzhenitsyn preached as though he knew for certain their innermost thoughts, 'never let a moral compass fall from their hands... And they gauged their practical policy by that moral compass... The leaders who created your country never said, let slavery reign nearby, we will join it in detente to prevent it from spreading to us.'

If we talk about 'slavery', the founding fathers had never expounded the views Solzhenitsyn ascribed to them. In their time, slavery was a legal institution and reigned in the United States and not nearby. Washington and Madison were rich slaveowners and saw nothing wrong about it. But that is not the point—perhaps it was simply the writer's ignorance of history.

Solzhenitsyn would like to isolate the founding fathers from their time and their class, and enlist them into the ranks of soldiers of the 'cold war'. But what they did warn their countrymen against—above all, Washington in his famous *Farewell Address to the American People*—was the mortal danger of replacing practical policy by ideological considerations, whatever they may be. They were firmly in favor of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; that was the essence of the founding fathers' spiritual legacy. How the right-wing extremists in the United States and Solzhenitsyn as their ally interpret it is another matter.

He would like to inscribe the names of Washington and Jefferson on the banner of the notorious 'moral revolution', the global anticommunist crusade.

5

Solzhenitsyn marked the first anniversary of his expulsion from the Soviet Union by publishing a sort of memoir in Paris, entitled *How a Calf Butted an Oak. Essays About Literary Life*. Its 600-odd pages are a detailed chronological account of Solzhenitsyn's life in the Soviet Union since the late 1950s. The book paints a revolting image of Solzhenitsyn the hypocrite.

Why did Solzhenitsyn decide to expose himself? One might think that once in the West, he found himself among his allies, wanted to stand out in the mediocre anti-Soviet crowd, and so he wrote his *Calf*. But it was all much more complicated.

The publication of the *Calf* can only be evaluated correctly if we regard it in the context of psychological warfare. We have already mentioned Redlikh's unusual revelations in the spring of 1975. The *Calf* appeared at that time too. It was not a mere coincidence. The CIA wanted a big new report on the record of its literary contractor to show how well it waged psychological warfare.

There is another clearly perceptible objective. After all, the NTS's various instructions practically never reach the Soviet Union. They are composed mostly for the benefit of a handful of emigres in Frankfurt, and no doubt are attached to the requests addressed to the CIA for money to finance the NTS's continued 'activities'—in other words, to support the small group of people who refuse to earn their living by honest work. And in the middle of it all a large book appeared written by a man who made a fortune on subversion against the Soviet people. It was not a literary work but a popular manual of psychological warfare methods. It was in all respects more accessible than the NTS material with its clumsy and incoherent language.

Actually, that was how *Posev* advertized it in a lengthy review entitled *A Combat Journal*. Having gleefully described Solzhenitsyn's subversive efforts inside the Soviet Union (observing security rules and referring only to what

the book itself found safe enough to admit), the magazine concluded: 'It can hardly be called anything but a combat journal... The author is turning into a strategist of political struggle.' *Posev* was, for obvious reasons, too flattering; in actual fact, the author is a regular NTS man.

Without any risk of exaggeration one can say that the book views Soviet realities through the eyes of CIA. The author stubbornly tries to find some 'underground' in the USSR and even divides it into different categories. The CIA-NTS directive assessing the situation in the Soviet Union at the juncture of the 1960s and 1970s speaks of the alleged 'upper-story underground' and 'lower-story underground'. 'The umbilical cord connecting these two "undergrounds" are the groups and figures that have surfaced and become nationally known... for example... Solzhenitsyn is typical of the "lower" story... Besides, both types of struggle need open figures and groups to surface not only technically but also politically at the decisive moment or shortly before it. That is the strategic significance of the figures and groups that have surfaced as an opposition, no matter how insignificant or hopeless their efforts may seem.'

Inflating his worth in the eyes of the CIA, Solzhenitsyn boasts in detail about his efforts to organize an anti-Soviet underground: 'You get acquainted with someone and it leads you to another contact, here you use a code word in a letter or for recognizing someone you meet, there you pick up an alias, then a chain of several people—you wake up one morning: dear me, I have long turned into a man of the underground!' To report his accomplishments and teach his followers, he carefully describes the tactics he used to try and publish anti-Soviet squibs in the Soviet press.

It broke his heart to learn he could not use the Soviet media to play on the personality cult theme. Descriptions of prison life were losing their usefulness as a means of subversion. That called for a prompt change of tactics and for publishing these stories in the West. In the summer of 1968 Solzhenitsyn finished *The Gulag Archipelago*, in his opinion the most powerful weapon to be turned against the Soviet Union. That was not by any means the result of his personal research. Both the title and the topic had been prompted by appropriate sources. In 1946-1950 the U.S. State Department and the American Federation of Labor compiled a map of the GULag and dumped it on the mass

market in 1951. In September 1954 the State Department published an official report on 'forced labor' in the U.S.S.R. Solzhenitsyn had only to summarize all that and sign his name to it in the interests of the CIA and its psychological warfare. But if that 'powerful' weapon, as Solzhenitsyn and, no doubt, the CIA regarded it, was ready as early as 1968, why was it published in the West more than five years later?

Solzhenitsyn recalls June 2, 1968: 'The *Archipelago* has been finished, copied on film, and the film put into a capsule... The dispatch will be a very risky venture... Unfortunate accidents that hamper the dispatch... the news of success. The freedom! The lightness!—a long article against me in *Literaturna* (26.6.68) passes by like a puffy summer cloud, not like a thunderburst, almost like a humorous piece. I scan it quickly, looking for blows that hurt—and I cannot find a single one! How unimaginative they are, how devoid of clear thinking... No one has guessed my weak spot: that I did not object, did not protest against the publication of the *Circle* (*The First Circle*—N.Y.)—why?... He is a fighter who wrestles free, not he who gains the upper hand.' (pp. 239-241).

Solzhenitsyn does not really have to strike poses or pour scorn. At that time everyone treated him as a stumbling beginner but an author nevertheless. No one could have guessed about his secret life. People argued and disagreed with him, but as is usually done among decent people. Of course it was difficult to discern a man of criminal mentality under the guise of a sufferer. Solzhenitsyn understood that perfectly well, and did all he could to preserve his disguise as long as possible. According to the NTS, 'The significance of an underground is not in its size but in its political qualities'. Hence 'camouflage is recognized as acceptable and often necessary'. The publication of *The Gulag Archipelago* at that time would have exposed Solzhenitsyn, and he had other vast plans.

Some people believed that Solzhenitsyn could not tear himself away from the prison life theme, but he was thinking different thoughts. The year 1968 was a turning point for him. 'That was when I turned 50 and that coincided with a turning point in my work: I was no longer writing about the camps, I had finished everything else and was facing a new giant job—a novel about 1917 (at first I

thought it would take me about ten years)' (pp. 317-318). That would be a 'major' book (p. 167), compared to it everything that had appeared before was insignificant, written merely for the sake of publicity, even scandalous publicity.

Certain quarters in the West and Solzhenitsyn himself decided to compensate for the scarce literary output by a Nobel Prize. The book quotes the words which he kept repeating to his associates and which immediately reached the CIA: 'I need that prize! As a stepping stone in my position, in my struggle! And the sooner I receive it, the more secure I will be and the stronger I will hit!... To reach the Nobel podium and to strike!' (p. 316). In his countless talks with Western well-wishers, he even set the deadline: 'For me, 1970 was the last year I still needed a Nobel Prize, when it could still be of help. After that I would have started the battle without it' (p. 324). Why 1970? Because *August 1914*, the first part of his novel, was to be published in 1971, and he wanted it to appear as a book by a Nobel Prize winner.

And—who would have thought it?—in 1970 Solzhenitsyn did win the Nobel Prize for what he had published by that time. It was miracle—at least Solzhenitsyn assures his readers it was: 'Only now, no, only today do I see how wondrously God led that task to its completion' (p. 416). Oh well, then it must have been some supernatural hand that guided the Swedish gentlemen. Though the hand of the CIA must have been in it, too.

Right after the Nobel Prize, *August 1914* appeared, but it fell short of the author's expectations. The book presented Solzhenitsyn's creed: antipatriotism, authoritarianism, and so on. When indignant reviews appeared, he was forced to conclude: '*August* marked the beginning of a split among my readers, the loss of supporters, fewer people remain with me than leave. I was praised as long as I appeared to be against only Stalin's abuses... In my first books I still wore a mask... Then, I could not avoid revealing myself: it was time to speak more precisely and to go deeper. Inevitably, I lost readers, I lost contemporaries in the hope of gaining future generations. But it hurts when your losses are among those closest to you' (p. 352). The Nobel Prize failed to delude honest people. The *August 1914* foray was a failure.

Solzhenitsyn and his sponsors believed that he would get into trouble over his anti-Soviet antics, so two American correspondents in Moscow, Hedrick Smith of *The New York Times* and Robert Kaiser of *The Washington Post*, decided to interview Solzhenitsyn. It was all so terribly conspiratorial—the world had to be told that foreigners ran great risks if they attempted to contact Solzhenitsyn. The idiocy of it can only be described by Robert Kaiser himself. Deadly serious, he wrote about the meeting in his book, published in the United States in 1976:

'At the time the whole episode was surrounded with excitement and not a little foreboding; we had no idea what the consequences might be for us (expulsion seemed a distinct possibility) or for Solzhenitsyn. What follows is that original account, slightly edited three years later: We had been told to bring tape-recorders and cameras to record the interview, and Solzhenitsyn's family, for posterity. We were also asked to look as inconspicuous as possible. So I wrapped my tape recorder and camera in old copies of *Pravda* and put them in a string bag of the type all Russians carry in their pockets or purses. I put on dungarees and an old ski parka, an outfit that would pass unnoticed among students at Moscow State University, and set off from my apartment ... at 10 a.m. First I went to the American embassy to tell the consul what we were doing, a precaution we had agreed to in advance. If he hadn't heard from us by 7 p.m., I said (in a note handed across his desk), he should make inquiries. (We had both been in Moscow for only seven months, and still felt self-consciously uncertain about our status there. We took these precautions knowing we would never forgive ourselves if something went wrong because we *hadn't* taken them. Whether they were necessary or even helpful is an open question.) From the embassy I went across the street to Moscow's largest bread store, where I bought a late breakfast of two big sweet-rolls. Then, as requested, I started riding buses, trying to confirm that no one was following me. There was no sign of anyone suspicious.

'I met Rick around the corner from Solzhenitsyn's flat, which was just off Gorki Street ... and walked

to his entrance ... As we walked in, we saw a uniformed policeman standing in front of the door ... We decided to walk back out of the courtyard, around the block and in through the entrance at the opposite end ... The policeman was gone. We walked right in and up one flight of stairs to the first-floor landing. Solzhenitsyn's door was right in front of us, but so was a woman ostensibly waiting for the elevator. We stood there awkwardly until she did indeed go into the lift, and then I rang the bell.

'A bolt turned and the door opened. It was equipped with a chain lock that allowed it to open only about five inches. It opened that much and there he was, the shaggy beard instantly recognizable. He looked us over. I don't think either of us said anything, but he seemed satisfied, and took off the chain. We stepped in and shook hands. I think he was as nervous as we were in the beginning, because we had to say three times which of us was which ... All the curtains were drawn ... He shuffled some papers he had apparently been working on, then handed a pile to us. They turned out to be "transcripts" of something he had headed "Interview with the *New York Times* and the *Washington Post*" ... We realized that he had never been interested in our questions. He had always intended to conduct an interview with himself. This put Rick in a nervous state. He had long been afraid that we might be trapped into doing something that served Solzhenitsyn's interests but not ours.'

With some difficulty, the intrepid journalists finally persuaded Solzhenitsyn to accept their rules of the game. They talked for four hours, each of them jittery with fear. When the interview was over, Smith and Kaiser left and got into the car parked nearby by Smith's wife. But when they were making a U-turn to get away from the 'dangerous' zone, a taxi smashed into their car. 'In a stern voice Rick said, "Take the stuff and go, go, go!" I had the same idea and was gathering up our equipment and the one precious copy of the prepared interview. Before the taxi driver could pull over, I was out of the car and across the street, climbing on to a trolley bus ... The accident turned out to be legitimate—the taxi driver had to pay *The New York Times* for repairs to the car ...' ¹⁶

That was how Solzhenitsyn's contacts with people from the 'free world' were organised. The latter took ridiculous precautions (like those described above) for obvious reasons: they understood full well they were using their official status for not entirely right and proper purposes. Being mere pawns in the game, they did what they could. Meanwhile, serious people in Washington did things only they could do.

Thereupon, the CIA played Solzhenitsyn's 'trump' card. At the juncture of 1973 and 1974 *The Gulag Archipelago* was published in the West amid a deafening publicity campaign.

The book has nothing in common with *belles lettres*. It is just one more trick of psychological warfare. A seasoned agent provocateur, Solzhenitsyn plunged into the CIA's most indecent politics. The Nobel Prize had gone to his head. He boasted: 'Now I can talk to the government as an equal of sorts. There is nothing shameful about that: I have acquired a position of strength and I will speak from it. I will yield nothing, but I will suggest that they yield' (p. 326).

With breathtaking impertinence he set forth his various demands in high-flown statements published in the West and broadcast to the Soviet Union in Russian. Today he proudly admits that he had long been in close contact with Western radio 'voices'. No matter what Solzhenitsyn sent them, it was all immediately beamed back to the Soviet Union.

Solzhenitsyn called on the West to follow Cato's example—the Soviet Union must be destroyed and, since detente was in the way, it should be scrapped. He declared that ever since the October Revolution the West, and particularly the United States, had always made 'mistakes' in its relations with the Soviet Union: it had reconciled itself to the existence of the U.S.S.R., instead of routing communism by armed force. He has said it in the *Archipelago*, the *Call*, and all his speeches in the West. He gave the most condensed summary of that thesis in his speech at a luncheon given by George Meany of the AFL-CIO in the Washington Hilton Hotel on June 30, 1975: 'The refusal to support the tsar, the recognition of the U.S.S.R. in 1933, the alliance in the war against the Germans... were immoral compromises' with communism.

He tongue-lashed Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Winston Churchill for their alliance with the Soviet Union against the Nazis, although it had been in the national interests of the United States and Britain. He maintained that their wartime policy 'clearly demonstrated their systematic myopia and even foolishness' of cooperating with the Soviet Union; this was especially unforgivable in the case of the United States, which already had 'the atomic bomb in its hands'. Recalling the latter half of the 1940s, Solzhenitsyn confesses that he and his friends had 'ridiculed Churchill and Roosevelt'.

Why? Because, Solzhenitsyn-Smerdiakov explains, they treated Russia as a force to be reckoned with. That was wrong: 'Generally, that war opened our eyes to the fact that being Russian was the worst fate of all.' He said this in the first volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*. In the second volume he added: 'No nation is more despised, more abandoned, more alien and useless than the Russian nation.' He said so about the nation that had made the October Revolution and had made the decisive contribution to the Victory of 1945.

While still in the Soviet Union, he went out of his way to build up an anti-Soviet campaign in the West. 'I keep thinking about a way to shake the West' (p. 368). To subvert the Soviet Union from within by any means available, while the anti-Soviet campaign gained momentum. To put an end to the situation in which 'the West is almost on its knees before them' (p. 232).

On CIA instructions, Solzhenitsyn and a handful of outcasts kept telling the West: do not improve relations with the Soviet Union, do not extend the most-favored nation clause to include the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn's torrent of slander was supported by the reactionary media. He said in this regard: 'The ink was still fresh on my interviews and the article bitterly reproaching the West for its weakness and lack of sense when they were already becoming obsolete: the agitated West went at it harder than ever.' He found that the campaign was so strong it 'surprised everyone—including the West itself that had not displayed such a mass persistence against the country of communism for a long time' (pp. 384, 381). The word 'mass' was of course an overstatement, but the CIA and other Western intelligence agencies indeed committed their not inconsiderable

erable propaganda and financial resources to the campaign.

The logical outcome of Solzhenitsyn's actions was that he was expelled from the Soviet Union and joined his masters.

6

Solzhenitsyn wrote without respite to drag the West into a violent confrontation with the Soviet Union as soon as possible, into launching an immediate crusade against communism. Good God, he exclaims looking back, you have missed so many chances. Why did you act the way you did during World War II?

Again and again, he reproached Nazi Germany for lack of foresight. The third volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*, published in 1975, contains these hysterical outbursts: 'And if the comers had not been so hopelessly pig-headed and conceited... we would hardly have marked the 25th anniversary of Russian communism.' In other words, by 1942 Nazi Germany would have defeated the U.S.S.R. Solzhenitsyn avoids an obvious conclusion: if, in that heroic and tragic year of 1942, the Red Army had not held its ground, today there would have been nobody left to read his squibs, and he himself would hardly have been in a position to write anything. The Nazi 'new order' would have sent all enlightened people to the gas ovens. Only the 'master race' and the slaves would have remained. And Mr. Solzhenitsyn would hardly have qualified as an ethnic German.

'A fine record the West has,' Solzhenitsyn says indignantly. 'Why did the Western allies fight that war only for their West European freedom, only against Nazism, and not for freedom in general? Wasn't it more natural for us (Solzhenitsyn, apparently—N.Y.) to believe that our allies were dedicated to the very *principle* of freedom—and would not forsake us?' Confusing everything in his wild dreams, he says: 'Naturally, prior to 1941 the population of the Soviet Union believed: the arrival of a foreign army *means* the overthrow of the communist regime, we expected nothing else from that arrival. We were waiting for a political program freeing us from Bolshevism.' The message is clear: you, the Western democracies, should have been allied with the Nazis in a joint crusade against the U.S.S.R., to the delight of Mr. Solzhenitsyn.

In March 1976 he remonstrated with the British television audience, kindly helped by the BBC: 'In the 1950s, after the war was over, my generation practically worshipped the West as the shining light of freedom, the stronghold of the spirit, our hope, our ally. We all thought that, although our liberation would be difficult, the West would help us throw off slavery.' ¹⁷ This sweeping pronouncement needs to be clarified: who did the author mean by 'us' and 'our generation?' That can be found in the third volume of *The Gulag Archipelago*: 'Just as Romain Rolland's generation was depressed in its youth by the constant expectation of war, our prisoners generation was depressed by its absence.' At that time, the former Nazi collaborators and war criminals 'were most excited, of course, by reports from Korea... We were especially inspired by those U.N. soldiers. What a banner! Who could it fail to unite? They symbolize mankind's future!' Therefore, emboldened by what they saw as the beginning of World War III, they whined from behind bars: 'Just you wait, you bastards. Truman will show you! They'll drop an atom bomb on you!'

There is no doubt that the traitors who fought on the side of the Nazis thought so and still do. The NTS and Solzhenitsyn are good examples. They urge a new invasion of the U.S.S.R. Henry Kissinger, then U.S. Secretary of State, aptly summed up Solzhenitsyn's verbose appeals during his tour of the United States in the summer of 1975: 'The message of Solzhenitsyn is that the United States should pursue an aggressive policy to overthrow the Soviet Union...'

'I do believe that if his views became the national policy of the United States... we would be confronting a considerable threat of military conflict.' ¹⁸

And here is what Joseph Kraft wrote in *The Washington Post*: 'To him (Solzhenitsyn) communism is not only a revolutionary ideology which enormously complicates peaceful relations between sovereign states. To him it is evil incarnate... From that vantage point all contact between the Western World and the Communist World is bad... But the application of an intense personal morality to international relations does not yield good policies... Because Solzhenitsyn's views have so little to do with practical American reality, the worship of his presence seems to me slightly ominous.' ¹⁹

Some advisers of President Ford warned the White House that Solzhenitsyn was 'obviously mentally unbalanced'.

Leading U.S. publications are absolutely certain that Solzhenitsyn's principal objective is the undermining of Soviet-American relations.

In the spring of 1976 he gave a series of talks in France, Britain, and Spain. That they would be anticommunist was a foregone conclusion even before he appeared on TV screens, but the striking thing about them was their timing. In France he spoke between two rounds of cantonal elections; in Spain he appeared at the time of a conference of Civil War Veterans, an ultrareactionary organization.²⁰ According to *Blanco y Negro*, a widely read Spanish magazine, Solzhenitsyn's speeches nettled the left but were enthusiastically welcomed by the right. That was natural: he felt he was in the saddle, he was needed, so he held forth in a clearly fascist vein.

His appearance on French television on March 9, 1976, contained perhaps the most explicit reference to his main point: 'Today's situation in the West is not only a political but also spiritual crisis, probably 300 years old. This crisis stems from the fact that since the Middle Ages we have plunged into the material, we have wanted to possess many material things, to live for bodily pleasure and we have forgotten the moral tasks.'

Leaving aside the religious mysticism, the essence of this point is clear: Solzhenitsyn believes that the world has gone astray, apparently since the English revolution. He went further than his spiritual forerunners. Let us recall Benito Mussolini's words: 'We are the antithesis of the whole set of ideas of 1789,' or the words of Dr. Goebbels: 'We will strike 1789 out from history.' But history stamped out Mussolini and Goebbels, and their ideological follower would do well to remember that.

He expected his ideas to be welcome in Spain. So he praised Franco's dictatorship which, in his opinion, had brought 'absolute freedom' to the Spanish people. But the proud nation had a different opinion. *Cambio 16* remarked that Solzhenitsyn's speech was addressed to the mentally retarded. In the words of a moderate Spanish leader, one must ask oneself whether the writer possibly suffered from a serious mental disorder that had crippled his political sanity and enabled the right-wing extremists to use his per-

sonality in their assault on social democracy, human rights, and the workers' freedoms.

Naturally, Europeans quickly tired of Solzhenitsyn's apocalyptic ramblings and paranoid appeals. Having seen the prophet in action with their own eyes, they shared their impressions with their newspapers.

One of such letters, printed in *The Times* of London deserves to be quoted if only as proof that Solzhenitsyn's 'blitz' did not affect the British sense of humor. Written by one Kenneth Tynan, it reads as follows:

'Sir, now that Britain has been so sternly stood in the corner by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, many of your readers may be under the impression that the exiled novelist regards the entire Western world as a lost cause. I am happy to assure them that this is not the case. Mr Solzhenitsyn sees at least one beacon of enlightenment in the surrounding gloom. In the course of a recent 48-minute interview on Spanish T. V., he enthusiastically described General Franco's victory in the Spanish Civil War as a victory for "the concept of Christianity". He went on to congratulate the Spanish people—in whose midst he had spent eight whole days—on possessing what he described as "absolute freedom".'

'We can safely dismiss as Bolshevik extremists those Spanish citizens whose first impulse, on hearing these opinions, was an overwhelming desire to spit squarely in the great moralist's eye.

'Yours sincerely, Kenneth Tynan.'²¹

The 1976 European tour practically ended Operation Solzhenitsyn in the West. The CIA found him obviously useless for its current policies there (in all probability, temporarily) and discharged the 'prophet' from active service. Since then Solzhenitsyn has spoken seldom—in other words, they shut him up, although he is still often mentioned as a 'fighter' against communism, etc. The CIA simply used an old trick of the Western intelligence services. Earlier, the Abwehr and the SS had used the same with Vlasov, Solzhenitsyn's spiritual forerunner. The Wehrmacht fed him, but he was practically forbidden to make statements, although Dr. Goebbels' propaganda machine invoked the traitor's name very often. Of course, times changed: Nazi Germany was doomed and could not spend much on Vlasov. The CIA is immeasurably better off, and the 'prophet' is

better off too, but he lives in isolation, near Cavendish in Vermont.

An American journalist who came to see Solzhenitsyn's home in 1977 described the place in detail in an article entitled 'Solzhenitsyn's Haven: Prison of His Design'. There is some doubt as to the design being really his. CIA professionals must surely have worked on the blueprints. The journalist could not learn anything about what it was like inside—the house is out of bounds to everyone—but he did see the impressive barbed wire fence around the estate. Various types of electronic equipment 'guarded' Solzhenitsyn from unwanted visitors. The people of Cavendish talked a great deal about their new neighbor with an unlisted phone number. A housewife once met him and said hello, calling him by his name. She told the journalist that Solzhenitsyn was terribly scared when he saw he was recognized.

In June 1978 he appeared in the flesh at Harvard, among the 11 persons to be awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Philosophy. The speech he delivered was a repetition of what he had said at the time of arrival in the West, touched up a bit by the CIA censors. But this time he got carried away and added something of his own: he reproached the West for its lack of resolution in fighting communism. That would have been accepted, but he added what was interpreted as an insult: 'The Western world has lost its civic courage... All the authorities in the Western countries have become abruptly enervated.' The enervated authorities promptly scolded Solzhenitsyn.

The NTS *Posev* published Solzhenitsyn's speech after a long delay. The magazine sighed: 'There is now a new source of anxiety in America: Solzhenitsyn. *The New York Times* called him a man possessed by maniacal notions and a messianic complex. *Posev* recalled *Landmarks* and insisted that Solzhenitsyn was misunderstood: he meant no offense to the powers-that-be. 'The authors of *Landmarks* proceeded from an analysis of the major cultural trends of the new times, and they forecast the Russian revolution and all its consequences. Today Solzhenitsyn readdresses these prophecies—after all, the situation in the West makes it possible, it resembles, the prerevolutionary Russian situation down to details.'

But those explanations are designed for a tiny emigre minority. *The New York Times* carries much more weight.

When the West abruptly stepped up the anti-Soviet campaign in early 1980, Solzhenitsyn raised his voice too. In April 1980 *Foreign Affairs* published another of his vitriolic anticommunist sermons. The article fully conforms with the CIA's current tactics of stubbornly attempting to undermine the Soviet Union from within. It insists that 'even a fully united Western world can no longer prevail except by allying itself with the opponents of socialism within the socialist countries. One must immediately cease to believe in detente because to coexist with communism on the same planet is impossible'.²² Of course, it is not much of a contribution to the anti-Soviet campaign, but a contribution it is nevertheless. Solzhenitsyn's appearance in the big Western press means that imperialism is tapping all its reserves to try and plunge the world back into the Cold War.

7

What has happened to Solzhenitsyn is typical. People like him are useful in psychological warfare while they are in the Soviet Union. Once in the West they quickly discover that they are only allowed to do what the intelligence services say they should do. They are not supposed to ad-lib. The only things that are wanted from them are their names and notoriety. The outcasts arriving in the West from the U.S.S.R. experience that themselves.

Take, for example, Vladimir Bukovsky, a hardened criminal. The Western media made up all kinds of stories about his fate. He was said to be on the verge of dying. But the 'martyr' appeared in the West alive, well, and very much kicking. He delivered speeches, gave interviews, and generally acted as a very vigorous man. In February 1977 he was even received in the White House. The criminal earned praise for maligning the Soviet Union.

Reporting on his activities that delight the NTS, *Posev* remarked: 'We hope that Western political and public figures will learn something from V. Bukovsky's experience that would be useful in their relations with the Soviet Union.' Like a true professional criminal, the new star of anti-Sovietism was careful: 'When they asked Bukovsky what the Western position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union

should be, he repeated that he could neither give advice nor impose his views.'

But soon he gave in to temptation and, thinking himself a great strategist, began to offer advice. For the CIA, the situation was ridiculous and insufferable: a puppet wanted to guide the puppeteer. The result was that in September 1977 Bukovsky complained at an anti-Soviet gathering in Paris: 'When I was in the US State Department I suddenly discovered that the man responsible for the entire Eastern policy ... a fat and very important man, saw me as a small insect crawling across his path. And he knew better than I did what America needed and what the Soviet Union needed. I could not prove anything to him.' True, Bukovsky was careful here too: he complained about the State Department and not about CIA officials, his usual contacts.

But he was right about one thing: the CIA does treat these outcasts as 'small insects'. Intelligence agencies are well aware of the enormous gap between the image of these people designed by these agencies and built up by the mass media and their true worth. The CIA can easily squash any 'small insect' if it gets out of control: its professionals are past masters at torture and execution. At any rate, anyone who crosses the path of the CIA must know that the Agency can make him do the vanishing trick any time it wants. CIA collaborators have been warned about that too, although the torture chambers are there above all for the class opponents of the social system existing in the United States.

In September 1978 the *Golos Rodiny* weekly, published by the Soviet Committee for Cultural Contacts with Compatriots Abroad, featured an article by the Soviet lawyer A. Trainin, entitled 'Talk from the Shoulder'. The author examined U.S. practice of dealing with undesirables without trial. He said:

'In the United States, people suspected of being agents of a foreign nation are usually not brought to trial but killed in the torture chambers of the intelligence services, after having made a confession. If they do not confess, they die nevertheless. These people are U.S. citizens who, according to official propaganda, fully enjoy human rights.'

The lists of those tortured to death have never been published by the 'free press'. Most probably, they are buried

in the top secret archives of U.S. intelligence services. But we do know the ghoulish things that happen to people who dare challenge the Iron Heel.

Recent examples are readily available. The first half of the 1970s in the United States witnessed harsh criticism of the CIA and the entire 'intelligence community'. It was not only a case of outrage among decent people but also one of consternation in certain quarters over the poor record of the intelligence services. The CIA countered with a broadside of books written by its employees and extolling the Agency for the services it rendered to the Iron Heel. *Without Cloak or Dagger. The Truth About the New Espionage* (1974)²³ by Miles Copeland, formerly a high-level CIA executive, was one such book. The author, a professional, did not stoop to crude propaganda.

Copeland assured the true masters of America that the protection of their interests was in good hands. He explicitly stated what awaited those considered politically dangerous: 'If the security people are convinced that the suspect is guilty, they have no choice but to pick him up and do whatever is necessary to get at the truth—even if it means spoiling any chances of later bringing him to trial. So if a hot suspect refuses to talk, they pick him up, take him to a room in the basement, and "try to reason with him", as a sober-faced friend of mine in the CIA puts it' (p. 186).

The CIA, Copeland added, would prefer 'having him "die of the measles", as wags at the CIA put it, than be punished by legal means' (p. 182).

Interrogation in the CIA's torture chambers makes the suspect unfit to appear in court. He is then 'quietly liquidated under circumstances that are so terrifying as to defy description' (p. 257).

Copeland cited the case of a government employee, code-named Mickey, murdered by the CIA in 1964. The man was kidnapped and 'died "of a heart attack" ... just as his interrogation was ending ... "There is literally *nothing* extraordinary to be found in his case history," the chief investigating officer told Admiral William Raborn, then Director of the Central Intelligence Agency ... Nothing would have been gained by calling public attention to the fact that such an important penetration had taken place ...' (pp. 26-28).

Apart from the press, there were the man's relatives, his family. 'And when "Mickey" died of a "heart attack" or "measles", or whatever—his colleagues and their families were as kind and helpful to his bereaved family as they would have been to the family of any other colleague' (p. 188).

A man who has gone through the CIA's torture chambers is rarely set free to live out his days in some obscure place, under strict supervision—but only if that is 'in the national interests'. Not a word about it filters down to the press.²⁴ Generally, the United States has gone very far in its policy of reprisals, and the prison regime there has always been exceptionally brutal. As early as the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville of France, a classic author by U.S. standards, was horrified by the views expounded by Elam Lynds, Warden of New York: 'During all this conversation', he wrote, 'which lasted several hours, Mr. Elam Lynds constantly returned to this point—that it was necessary to begin with curbing the spirit of the prisoner.'²⁵

Over 100 years ago, the US prison reformer F. Gray insisted that it was imperative that 'minds should be broken ... crushed and destroyed by severe treatment'²⁶. Crushed they are, and the rich experience accumulated in this regard goes back over 200 years. U.S. journalist Jessica Mitford emphasized in her 1975 survey of U.S. prisons: 'This twin objective, I discovered, is essentially what both prison administration and a host of well-intentioned reformers have pursued from that day to this, albeit, they do not express in Warden Lynds' forthright fashion, and over the years methods of achieving it have changed.'²⁷

They have changed, among other things, in that American prison wardens snatch up foreign 'innovations' with enthusiasm. In the middle of the 20th century U.S. prison specialists were alarmed to find that they faced powerful competition: the Maoists, it turned out, were more successful in breaking their victims' backs and will. The best minds were promptly charged with studying the record of their Chinese colleagues. Edgar Schein, who researched the issue, allayed the misgivings of America's jailers: 'The process of coercive persuasion observed in Chinese Communist prisons has its counterpart in various kinds of total institutions in our own society.'²⁸ Naturally, this conclusion was made in a CIA-financed comprehensive study of the Chinese

methods. Instead of gathering dust on library shelves, this piece of academic research was recommended as a manual to be followed. After all, the Maoists offered valuable lessons: in April 1961, D. Bennett, Chief of the Federal prison administration, convened a representative conference of the heads of the prison agency to hear Schein speak on the problem. Having paid tribute to U.S. accomplishments in the field, the scholar maintained that the experts must not rest on their laurels but make use of the Maoist achievements. According to Schein, 'The first of these Asian methods which "may be quite acceptable to us", is physical humiliation. In trying to get (the prisoner) to confess, they would beat, kick, shout at, spit on, humiliate, revile and otherwise abuse the prisoner twenty-four hours a day for weeks and months on end.'

'That procedure is an integral part of brainwashing,'* precisely what Schein wanted: 'I would like to have you think of brainwashing not in terms of politics, ethics and morals, but in terms of deliberate changing of behavior and attitudes by a group of men who have relatively complete control over the environment in which the captive population lives. If we find similar methods being used by the (Chinese) Communists and by some of our own institutions of change, we have a dilemma, of course. Should we then condemn our own methods because they resemble brainwashing? I prefer to think that the (Chinese) Communists have drawn on the same reservoir of human wisdom and knowledge as we have, but have applied this wisdom to achieve goals which we cannot condone. These same techniques in the service of different goals, however, may be quite acceptable to us... Let me remind you, I am not drawing these parallels in order to condemn some of our approaches, rather my aim is just the opposite. I am trying to show that Chinese methods are not so mysterious, not so different and not so awful... What I am hoping is that the audience here will believe that we here in Wa-

* The term 'brainwashing' was introduced by E. Hunter, a U.S. journalist and CIA employee, who first used it in an article published by *The Miami Daily News* in September 1950. In 1951 Hunter gave a definition of the term in his book *Brainwashing in Red China*: 'The calculated destruction of men's minds'. That was his description of the Maoist policy aimed at crushing resistance within the country.

shington are anxious to have you undertake some of these things; do things perhaps on your own.' ²⁹

U.S. jailers tackled the task with abandon: after all, the CIA suggested that. One of the results could be seen from a petition submitted to the United Nations by U.S. prisoners in 1972. The unfortunate authors pointed to the 'Chinese methods' used in the Asklepieion Program in the Federal prison of Marion, Illinois. They compared Schein's scholarly expostulations to the jailers' practice and listed 24 methods of physical and psychological pressure. There was no storm of outraged public opinion in the United States. A Dr. Groder, the man responsible for the program, was merely invited to testify before a Congressional committee. The good doctor explained at length the advantages offered by transplanting the Chinese methods to the fertile soil of American democracy. A. Schaflin and E. Opton of the United States—authors who studied the issue—concluded in 1978: 'Dr. Groder's written description of Asklepieion indeed makes it clear that the very ambitious aim of Chinese thought reform—to "unfreeze" the prisoner's former set of beliefs about himself (that is, to degrade his self-concept, to shatter his personal identities), to "change" his personality, and to "refreeze" the new beliefs into his new personality—are parallel with his own goals for Asklepieion. To achieve such ambitious ends the Chinese sometimes used drastic and violent means; it is unlikely that Dr. Groder could succeed with less'. ³⁰

The punitive policy of the United States has always followed a strictly class approach, and it has been spearheaded against those already at the bottom of the American political pyramid. The powers-that-be found the 'Chinese methods' especially appropriate in the 1960s and early 1970s, during the mass protest against U.S. imperialist policy in Southeast Asia. According to Jessica Mitford, 'The term "political prisoner" gained common currency. This term has been adopted by prisoners convicted of offences that, in common usage, are not considered political. They argue that they are the victims of class and/or ethnic oppression, that imprisonment is employed to coerce their acquiescence to a status quo of deprivation, indignity, injustice.' Today, there are about 1.4 million prisoners in the United States, 80 per cent of them coming from the 12 per cent of the able-bodied population with minimal income.

They are being 're-educated' by methods including Chinese ones in order that they reconcile themselves to their status and unquestioningly accept the political system existing in the United States.

All that applies to regular prisons. No one knows what goes on in the CIA's torture chambers.

It took an extraordinary turn of events to produce some information about it, although far from complete and clearly biased. In the late 1970s, the sessions of the House committee which investigated the assassinations of President John Kennedy and the Rev. Martin Luther King revived the interest in CIA activities. Retired CIA officers appeared before the committee and answered certain questions. With regard to President Kennedy's assassination there was again speculation about whether there had been a conspiracy against the President and, in any event, what role the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, and the like had played: how come they failed to protect the President. Congressional 'investigations' of that type invariably clear the CIA and even present it as an agency tirelessly working to protect U.S. 'national security'. In the course of the 'investigation', the CIA reveals new information to enhance its prestige.

That was precisely what happened: in the autumn of 1978 the CIA furnished the House committee with proof of its vigilance that beat all records. The case concerned Yuri Nosenko, a Soviet citizen who, while on a business trip abroad early in 1964, betrayed his country and took asylum in the United States. He was immediately handed over to the CIA department in charge of debriefing traitors. The department subjects anyone looking for asylum in the great democracy to months of ruthless interrogation. Only after making sure that the traitor has been thoroughly milked—meaning that he has told U.S. intelligence all he knows about the Soviet Union—is he allowed to subsist in the West, often under an assumed name and under constant CIA surveillance. Some traitors disappear without a trace in the process—they are liquidated for some reason or other—while others have been known to 'commit suicide', although that hardly sounds plausible: after all, they had got what they wanted—'freedom' in the West.

Nosenko's job gave him an idea about what information the CIA was looking for, so he promptly revealed the state

secrets he knew to his interrogators. But he held an unimportant job and knew pitifully little. The CIA immediately felt suspicious, because Nosenko inflated his worth and passed himself off as an important man. There were shrugs at the CIA: an important man was bound to know more. The interrogators became more demanding, and Nosenko, a drunk to boot, foolishly kept insisting on his high-level status and inventing absurd stories. Apart from obvious lies, he blurted out that he knew the details of Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the USSR.

This was in 1964. The Warren Commission was investigating the assassination of President Kennedy. Nosenko's 'revelation' was a bombshell for the people in charge of U.S. intelligence. They knew about him—the decision on granting him political asylum had been taken by the so-called Interdepartmental Committee on Defectors and not by the CIA alone. Besides CIA officers, the Committee comprises representatives of the State Department, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the FBI, Army and Naval Intelligence, and the National Security Agency. The Committee takes decisions on all cases seeking asylum in the United States. On April 2, 1964, CIA Director of Operations Richard Helms also invoked the assistance of the judiciary—he received an authorization from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach, endorsed by Attorney General Robert Kennedy, to place the defector in the CIA's secret prison near Washington, D.C., and to apply hostile interrogation methods to him. Perhaps this meant that apart from tried and tested American techniques, Nosenko was to be subjected to the new Chinese ones too.

Official U.S. records have this to say about what followed. The traitor was expecting his thirty pieces of silver from the CIA. Instead, he was thrown into solitary confinement in a windowless cell and, to put it bluntly, tortured. He was brutally beaten, injected with various 'truth serums', and his jailers manipulated watches and lighting conditions to turn day into night and vice versa for weeks and months on end, thereby confusing his biological clock and sense of time. The traitor was given tattered army fatigues to wear, and his diet was some kind of revolting gruel. This lasted for over three years. One might say that it served the traitor right, but the important point here is not his plight but the methods U.S. intelligence services use

on their victims, even though the case cited was a mistake. How does procedure like that square with the vaunted 'rule of law' in the United States? We cited this example because similar cases, which are no doubt plentiful, are never disclosed.

Nosenko was imprisoned and tortured in the mistaken belief that he could supply sensational evidence related to the assassination of President Kennedy. Attorney General Robert Kennedy frequently called the CIA to ascertain whether or not Nosenko 'had broken'. Each of his calls was followed by greater pressure—meaning torture—applied to the victim. But Nosenko had nothing to confess. On June 24, 1964, Richard Helms had a top secret meeting with Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren. No one knows what they talked about and the minutes of the session the Warren Commission held on that day are still classified. At any rate, neither the Warren Commission report nor the numerous related documents about the assassination of John F. Kennedy ever mentioned the Nosenko case. On September 28, 1964, when the Warren Commission report was published, Washington announced that the inquiry into the assassination was closed.³¹

The story was made public only in September 1978 in the House of Representatives committee investigating the assassinations of President Kennedy and Martin Luther King.

The British journalist A. Summers writes:

'This extraordinary treatment (of Nosenko) caused Congressional outrage when it was revealed to the Assassination Committee in 1978.'³² Why? The afore-mentioned committee provides the answer: 'The fashion in which Nosenko was treated by the Agency—his interrogation and confinement—virtually ruined him as a valid source of information.'³³ So this, it turns out, is what wrought Congressional outrage.

There were many articles about it in the Western press. In October 1978, *Vendredi, Samedi, Dimanche*, a little-known French newspaper had these interesting things to report about the new investigation on Capitol Hill: Richard Helms, then Director of Operations of the CIA, took a decision of enormous significance for the inquiry into the Dallas tragedy. He simply ignored Nosenko's evidence. In 1978, he admitted: 'True, that was my fault...'

'Then followed another major development,' the paper reported. 'Helms confirmed having received authorization from Nicholas Katzenbach to subject Nosenko to "hostile interrogation", an exceptional procedure. For three years Nosenko was confined to a concrete cell, on a meager diet, without any contact with the outside world, and subjected to physical and chemical pressure to make him "crack". Strange treatment of a man who was looking for asylum in America. Helms claimed that he had received Katzenbach's authorization on April 2, 1964. "Never in my entire life," Katzenbach told the commission of inquiry, "Mr. Helms never raised the issue of Nosenko with me. I would never have given him the authorization he maintains he received from me."

'What does all that mean? Either Katzenbach has been stricken with amnesia, or Richard Helms, already convicted last year (in 1977 Helms was fined 2,000 dollars—*N. Y.*) for giving false evidence before a Congressional committee, is now trying to hide the fact that he had taken the decision regarding Nosenko on his own initiative.

'And here is another, even more impressive fact. On June 24, 1964, Helms requested a top secret meeting with Chief Justice Earl Warren, president of the first commission of inquiry into the assassination of President Kennedy. No notes were taken during that meeting. Warren has apparently forgotten the conversation. But what did Helms whisper in Warren's ear that day?'³⁴

Naturally, the French newspaper could not answer that question, but it very aptly drew attention to the skill displayed by certain people in the United States in covering their tracks. Another significant point is that those US officials who are entrusted with upholding rule of law consider it their duty to overlook obvious legal violations when the intelligence services, above all the CIA, insist on it.

Here is the end of the Nosenko story. The traitor was kept in the CIA's torture chambers until October 1967. Transcripts of his interrogation sessions filled almost 1,000 pages. Counterintelligence officers finally came to advise him, quite sincerely, to commit suicide. He was in no hurry to take their advice, and so there was talk that the undesirable witness should be liquidated. But that did not happen. By that time the CIA was at loggerheads with the FBI, and even within the CIA fears were voiced that the

procedure might scare off potential traitors and that CIA clandestine operations would suffer as a result. The inter-agency quarrel saved the turncoat's life—otherwise he would have surely died. In the autumn of 1967 Nosenko was handed over to the CIA Office of Security which again questioned him for about a year, and then he was 'set free' to live under an assumed name in a house bought by the CIA. He was given an allowance and granted U.S. citizenship. 'In return, he would agree not to talk to any unauthorized persons about his experiences with the CIA.'³⁵ That would have been the end of the matter were it not for yet another round of interoffice squabbles, this time in connection with Watergate. William Colby, the new CIA Director, decided to improve the Agency's efficiency and fired the chiefs of counterintelligence, having accused them, among other things, of squandering resources on senseless ventures (although one could tell from the start that Nosenko was a run-of-the-mill scoundrel and not a 'Soviet plant').

Apart from the disgusting image of the traitor, the story is a typical example of CIA methods. Besides, it clearly shows that those in Washington who voice their concern about human rights throughout the world know full well that these rights are ignored in the United States. The American propaganda campaign in support of human rights is merely a provocation staged as an integral part of psychological warfare.

8

To a great extent, that campaign was an admission that the CIA policy and methods going back to the OSS days—methods like Operation Solzhenitsyn—had gone bankrupt. They were based on the assumption that frenzied appeals for the overthrow of the Soviet system would find supporters in the Soviet Union. Like the terrorists the CIA had sent into the U.S.S.R. via the NTS, the 'dissenters' who preached these slogans found absolutely no support. In the autumn of 1977, *The New York Times* was forced to conclude that 'dissidence in Russia is living out its short life span. This has already become obvious. No matter how sad it may be, it is better to admit it forthrightly'.³⁶

But the CIA is still waging its psychological warfare.

It has merely replaced its defeated troops with reinforcements consisting of the pseudo-champions of 'human rights'. Their arrival at the firing line was an old trick. The U.S. political and academic figures who published *Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations*, a rather sensible collection, in 1978, traced the origins of that campaign to the anti-Soviet ventures undertaken by the capitalist world against the Soviet Union since 1917. Professor David Riesman who teaches sociology at Harvard noted in his essay *The Danger of the Human Rights Campaign*: 'The campaign for human rights vis-a-vis the Soviet Union of course did not begin with President Carter. In one sense it goes back to the very beginning of the Soviet regime.'

Another scholar, Stephen F. Cohen, drew attention to the following: 'The Carter Administration has defined this issue in terms of Soviet "human rights", which is inexact. The issue is political rights or liberties. The term "human rights" includes a whole range of economic and other welfare problems, in which the Soviet Union, in the world context, can boast considerable achievement.'³⁷

The CIA's strategic objective in this campaign remains the undermining of the Soviet system, and the ultimate goal, although no longer put in so many words, is its overthrow. The lessons of Operation Solzhenitsyn and other similar ventures have not been wasted. There is ample proof of that, the more telltale contained, of course, in limited documents. As early as the Lyndon Johnson years, the President's influential aide Eric Goldman, a professor of history, wrote that there was a document he would try and assess in the most thorough and just way. The document in question, now in the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, was submitted to the State Department by a Dr. K. P. Mangold who had worked as an engineer in the U.S.S.R. in 1934-1936. Goldman was delighted with Dr. Mangold's memo, dated 1964, in which he promised victory to the United States in its rivalry with the Soviet Union if his recommendations were adopted. The simple fact that the letter, addressed to the Office of Soviet Affairs at the State Department, found its way to the top shows the importance Washington attached to that memo. Mangold recommended the following:

'In 1917 there was only a relatively weak middle class in Russia. Today there is a large intellectual middle class

that is mostly non-party... It could take over the leadership of a popular revolution. This middle class will also desire a democracy with constitutional guarantees... (that is, American "democracy"—N. Y.). We should identify our political interests with those of this non-party middle class instead of with the political interests of the "fat" communists. A democratic revolution in Russia will lead to the de-centralization and disintegration of the Russian power bloc. It offers us the best chance of winning the cold war decisively without running the risk of a nuclear war that may lead to universal extinction...

'But no popular uprising is possible as long as millions of indoctrinated and sincerely dedicated communists in the lower party ranks control all the armed forces up to the rank of major, colonel, and even general. It is only by demoralizing these sincere communists and by causing them to fight among themselves that a popular revolution can be brought about. However, they can be demoralized ideologically only by using arguments which are irrefutable on the basis of their own political philosophy... I have been able to "brainwash" sincerely dedicated communists. The technique is quite simple.' Then recommendations followed, based on the American propaganda concept of 'human rights', as how to slander Marxist-Leninist philosophy. On the whole, it was all nonsense. But Mangold concluded triumphantly:

'I could wear out any sincerely dedicated communist in due time, as a rule, in two or three months, provided I could get to see him about once a week. After a successful "brainwashing" the sincerely dedicated communists ended up somewhere between shameless opportunists and sincerely dedicated oppositionals.'³⁸

Top-level U.S. leaders searched assiduously for a philosopher's stone to secure victory over the U.S.S.R. by psychological warfare, they even treated seriously the wild schemes quoted above. At any rate, their line of reasoning is clear. They have fallen into the habit of blaming the Soviet Union for the discontent felt in the United States with capitalist ways and regarding it as a scapegoat for any difficulties that might face Washington. The mentality that took shape in the White House—at least during the war in Vietnam—shocked even Goldman, and he was 'open-minded' enough: we have seen that he was not put off by

Mangold's hare-brained schemes. Goldman's memoirs offer the following sketch of what the President told a Cabinet officer and three aides in his office in 1966:

'President Johnson pounded knees, mine and others. "Liberal critics! It's the Russians who are behind the whole thing." He extolled the FBI and the CIA; they kept him informed about what was "really going on". It was the Russians who stirred up the whole agitation... The Russians were in constant touch with anti-war senators—and he named names. These senators ate lunch and went to parties at the Soviet embassy; children of their staff people dated Russians. "The Russians think up things for the senators to say. I often know before they do what their speeches are going to say."

'I was staggered. Did President Johnson really believe that his critics were Soviet puppets? Was he thinking in such Joseph McCarthyite terms... It was obvious that the three other men were not going to challenge him. One white House aide sat slumped in his chair looking embarrassed; the other was so casual that it was apparent he had been through this before. The Cabinet officer swayed back and forth in the resigned manner of a man who accepted the fact that such was the price of his office.

'I did not want it on my conscience that I too had sat silent while a President of the United States talked such dangerous nonsense. LBJ was now at the point where he was stating that during a Senate hearing on Vietnam a member of the Soviet embassy had delivered a message of instructions to one of the Committee members. I interrupted, "Mr. President." But as always it was difficult to cut into one of these monologues. Finally I made my way in: "Mr. President, you *know* that what you are saying simply is not accurate."

'The President looked at me in a curious way. I have often recalled that look, and I still wonder what it meant.'³⁹

Actually, there was no mystery here. Goldman was soon asked to resign from the White House staff. The episode is yet another indication of the behavior patterns of U.S. leaders. It also explains some of the reasons for the almost

clinical hatred of 'those Russians' who are allegedly guilty of all sorts of terrible things. Need we point out that it had been President Johnson with his 'the best and the brightest', and not the Russians who drove the United States into the quagmire of the Vietnam war.

This mentality seized upon every opportunity, no matter how slight, for launching a large-scale offensive against the Soviet Union and carrying the warfare over to its home ground. The 'human rights' campaign promised just that. In all likelihood, the man who laid its basis was Zbigniew Brzezinski: he briefly appeared on the American political scene at the end of Lyndon Johnson's presidency and then blossomed fully in the Carter Administration. The Soviet jurist A. Trainin, whom we have quoted earlier, examined the workings of this campaign to 'uphold human rights'. The following section of the chapter is a long quotation from Trainin's article.

9

In February 1974 Solzhenitsyn was shown out of the Soviet Union, to the intense chagrin of anticommunists throughout the world. But that annoyance paled before the rage of Western intelligence services: Operation Solzhenitsyn, which had shown such promise in anti-Soviet subversion, was over. The new situation called for analytical efforts and the drawing up of plans for the future. Not that the intelligence services were concerned about Solzhenitsyn's fate (once used, he was no longer of interest). In their opinion, it was much more important to analyze the appropriateness and efficiency of the methods used in connection with that man.

In the United States, the task was taken up by the Columbia University Research Institute on Communist Affairs, at that time headed by Zbigniew Brzezinski. In 1975 it produced *Dissent in the USSR: Policy, Ideology and People*, almost 500 pages of small print.⁴⁰ By the time the book was published, the institute was renamed the Research Institute on International Change. Brzezinski remained its director, and Professor R. Tokes, the collection's editor, gratefully acknowledged Brzezinski's guidance. Tokes particularly stressed that his ideological team of 13 authors had agreed to limit themselves to the period ending in

February 1974, in their opinion 'an important milestone in the history of contemporary Soviet dissent' (p. 10).

Tokes explained that by 'dissenters' the authors meant all those who were against the October Revolution of 1917 that gave birth to the Soviet state (p. 11). The professor and his team tried to evaluate the strength of dissenters in the Soviet Union. They were not guided by academic curiosity but by a down-to-earth task: it was time to ascertain whether, say, Solzhenitsyn really enjoyed widespread support in the Soviet Union. In other words, the propaganda efficiency of 'dissent' had to be evaluated, if only for the sake of estimating financial outlays for subversion. The results were depressing. The book concluded that 'dissent and dissenters may be a natural product of over fifty years of Soviet history, but just as natural is their failure to strike a responsive chord among the masses' (p. 155). The conclusion practically permeated the book. The analysts felt cheated: upon a closer examination, the dissenters turned out to be a handful of outcasts. The assurances they used to give to Western intelligence services were pure baloney. The book admitted: 'It is evident that the cautious optimism that still survived among some Soviet dissidents and foreign observers in 1970 gave way to the deep pessimism of 1974' (p. 91). The disconcerting revelation was that in the Soviet Union, the people did not oppose the popular government—a fact that was obvious from the start and needed no expensive studies to be confirmed.

The journalist George Feifer had visited the Soviet Union several times and could not find anything better to do than to delve into dissident burrows (in his opinion, a dirty apartment is a sure sign of dissent). He clearly pointed to those who inflated the dissident image in the West. Here is his account of a visit he and his 'trusted friends' paid to a certain apartment in Moscow:

'We pushed through the jumble of clothes hanging in the hall and into the smoky bed-sitting room; a replica of hundreds inhabited by the small circle of Moscow's "smart" young intelligentsia. Furnished with an eclectic assortment of cheap pieces, the room was further cramped by icons, old prints, and broken tsarist artifacts propped between tables, chairs, the sagging studio couch, and drearily papered walls. A substantial collection of books, largely yellow pre-revolutionary volumes and Western literature unpublished

in Russia, spilled from bookcases into untidy piles on the floor, where they were surrounded by empty bottles and an accumulation of dirty dishes. Two other friends sat happily among this hospitable disorder: a Chekhovian, blond-bearded artist and a balding doctor with an English tweed jacket and a supply of Gitanes. In the kitchen two graduate students ... were, we imagined, making love ... We smoked to Bach preludes, danced to the tapes of Western pop songs, drank the remains of the vodka, wine and cognac' (pp. 418-419).

Mr. Feifer enjoyed the conversation: for example, one of the drunks 'dreamed of machine-gunning the Politburo' (p. 419). Such is the description of 'dissidents' in everyday life, supplied by a Western journalist who is obviously hostile to communism and who is forced to conclude that those people represented the West's only hope for 'evolution' of the Soviet system from within.

It is perfectly clear how such people come to be praised and admired. According to Feifer, they 'live not according to the facts but according to their perception of them. And they perceived their own people as enormously backward ... Those Soviet experts who write almost exclusively about dissidents sometimes put their subjects in an unreal perspective ... I know Westerners who, although dubious of several protestors' personalities, refrain from expressing their judgement in writing ... Even some Moscow correspondents feel constrained from reporting the unthinkable: that several celebrated protestors have considerable personal quirks and seem less than totally admirable ... not assuming, as many have tended to do, that a dissenter is *ipso facto* a person of unimpeachable virtue. One way to avoid damaging disillusionment is not to feed on illusions in the first place' (pp. 426-429).

Enough about the dissidents' personalities, even though the description is by a man to whom they unburdened themselves without any inhibitions. We can see that even Feifer was disgusted with them. But what about their potential value in the struggle against the Soviet government? Professor Tokes was quite categorical about that: 'Even with will to power—and very few dissenters display this kind of determination—lack of resources prevents them from qualifying as revolutionary in any practical sense. Revolutions require not only will and resources but *leader-*

ship that in alliance with the dissident masses, can challenge the incumbents with the hope of success. Barring a cataclysmic event such as a nuclear war, the formation of this kind of revolutionary antiregime alliance in the U.S.S.R. must be treated as unlikely in the foreseeable future' (p. 18).

We are grateful to the American scholars for their worldshaking discovery that Soviet power is firm and stable. But seriously: the book should have convinced the West that praising and supporting dissenters was a hopeless venture. That was the conclusion made in a lengthy 'scholarly' study that analyzed everything 'dissidents' had produced—from Solzhenitsyn's numerous volumes to the graffiti found on public lavatory walls. That should have ended it. But the scholars did not write their study to declare the matter closed; they examined the hopelessness of previous techniques to seek a new way of fighting against the Soviet Union and subverting it from within.

Anticommunist theorists believe that the 'dissenters' failures stem from the fact that, while they could cite many things they opposed, they lacked a positive program. And so the 'human rights' issue was moved to the forefront. Those who began to harp on it had probably never heard about human rights before, but this was soon taken care of. The term itself—a human rights activist—would be a 'means of self-identification' (p. 98), and the 'Human Rights Movement—a genuine political opposition' (p. 114). Most importantly, it would be much easier to rally the West to support them, and embarrassing situations could be avoided, such as when UN Secretary-General U Thant refused to consider various appeals addressed to him on the grounds that the petitioners did not represent anyone (p. 112).

The plot was as follows: dissenters in the U.S.S.R. taking up the 'human rights' slogan would simplify things. Mr. Feifer himself, although he criticized the dissidents, exclaimed: 'We all root for the dissenters... To help the cause, take a trip to Russia, if that is feasible, and see what service one can offer there or find a place for some supporting role in the West' (p. 430). True, in the same breath he warned: 'At the same time, it is too much to expect dissenters, after all they endure, to be saints' (p. 429). In other words, no matter how much these people

talked about 'human rights', scum they were and scum they would remain. The West realized that no other people could be found for its purpose and that it would have to make do with whoever was available. That was the strategy. What remained was to find agents within the Soviet Union.

It is a law of Soviet history that anyone opposing the Soviet government inevitably turns to foreign anticommunists for help. That is understandable: these people can find no support in a country of the people, by the people and for the people. That was so in the post-revolutionary period, when those fighting against Soviet power appealed for help to the armies of foreign interventionists. The rule remained unchanged. It is common knowledge where all invasions finally led to and, given the current balance of forces in the world, imperialism is not at all eager to stage a direct confrontation and learn yet another bitter lesson.

One more tested historical rule is that our enemies have tried to counter the ideas of the October Revolution, the cornerstone of the Soviet state, by 'democratic' slogans inevitably including those on 'human rights'. The enemies of Soviet power have always used the 'human rights' rhetoric merely to try and erode the Bolsheviks' popular support. Today's dissenters pursue the same goal. Surprisingly, they are supported both by Solzhenitsyn, an advocate of authoritarian rule even by Western standards, and by Sakharov the 'technocrat'. Another interesting fact is that Solzhenitsyn and some other notorious outcasts were unable (or unwilling) to completely give up their family traditions: they came from families that had been quite well off before the Revolution. Solzhenitsyn's books mourn the fortune his parents had lost. Obviously, these people are also spiritual heirs to those who tried to cling to their property and oppose the Revolution in 1917. Equally obviously, their dreams and objectives are near and dear to the powers-that-be of the capitalist world.

The masterminds of the new anti-Soviet campaign launched by Western intelligence services appointed a certain Orlov 'champion of human rights number one'. His credentials were impeccable: in December 1975 he wrote an article and disseminated it through illegal channels. The intelligence services in the West took note and started the ball rolling. In May 1976 Orlov and a few associates de-

clared they would inform the West about the state of 'human rights' in the Soviet Union. Actually, the group as such never existed, but the letterhead was invented to lend more weight to various expressly anti-Soviet statements, whether made jointly or individually.

Today, the accomplishments of socialism are an objective fact. Millions of people see socialism as their future. Winds of change are sweeping the world. The capitalists are naturally against it, and so is Mr. Orlov. With regard to the general trend of social progress he maintains: "Too many people in the world believe that "state" property is the only alternative to private property... The yearning for change, especially change toward socialism is literally a sickness of our times. Of course, that wish is often based on just emotions felt against capitalist exploitation and the egoism of the rich classes. But apart from emotions, it is also based on the generally fallacious idea that people can solve all their problems by social transformations, and on the even more false myth of "scientific socialism"... If Western democracy fails to gain strength from a high moral potential and a clearer understanding of its objectives, it will fail in effectively resisting the onslaught of totalitarian socialism."

The definitions here are in the vague and simply incorrect language of a layman, but the meaning is clear: the bourgeoisie, to arms! Defend your money! Remember tsarist Russia where 'as a result of the egoism, inflexibility and myopia of the ruling elite, social evolution was delayed for too long, so that post-1905 reforms unleashed, rather than assuaged, the accumulated hatred.' Orlov rushed to defend capitalism by such means and acts that landed him right in court.

He and his associates proceeded to concoct slanderous fabrications and send them to the West. Each squib carried a typeset letterhead of the 'group'. But the 'human rights activists', while holding forth on their desire to help observe the Helsinki accords, overlooked one small detail: while the accords were aimed at strengthening peace and international cooperation, those people were deliberately working in the opposite direction, trying to undermine détente.

The investigation and the trial thoroughly examined the content of the squibs which, under an arrangement with

Western intelligence services, were handed over to the mass media and disseminated throughout the world. Experts were consulted, scores of witnesses questioned, and it was proved that all those 'documents' without exception were slanderous fabrications aimed at subverting the Soviet social and state system and frustrating the efforts of the Soviet Union to promote international cooperation.

Often Orlov simply invented all he put into his squibs. But a large-scale campaign to 'protect human rights' called for appropriately ample, including material, resources, and a quasi-legitimate two-way channel that would convey money to the Soviet Union and slanderous 'information' to the West. Western intelligence services focused on their old acquaintance Ginzburg. And so Orlov the 'theoretician' was joined by Ginzburg the 'troubleshooter', who also declared his 'concern over human rights' in the U.S.S.R. Now, who is Ginzburg?

His credentials, though different from Orlov's, are also impeccable. Ginzburg had already established himself as a 'human rights activist', although on a much smaller scale and in rather remote areas.

According to his fellow convicts in 1968-1972, he arrived in the corrective labor colony with a lot of fanfare. A parasite, he introduced himself as a poet, author, journalist, a disciple of Pasternak, a friend of Tvardovsky, a winner of some Italian literary prize, and grandson of Baron Ginzburg. Modestly, the baron's heir never mentioned that he had only a secondary school education.

Called Alik in the colony, he really cut an imposing figure: his foreign sponsors remembered him and kept sending him parcels and money, making him very popular with convicts. According to witness I. who served time together with Ginzburg, 'Alik's friends were a large and motley crowd, and that is putting it mildly. For example, there were former Nazi policemen, diehard Bandera-ites and equally diehard Lithuanian nationalists... and finally, common criminals. Ginzburg kept issuing tidbits to all of them: there was coffee, tea, American cigarettes, various delicacies, etc... They all drank, ate and smoked and, since rich uncles from abroad took good care to make it last, they felt they must help Alik: he could not manage it all by himself. That meant "consolidation": everyone must pitch in to help him further the "common cause" by copying the

"more interesting" sentences, by writing articles (Alik would edit them and determine how they would be used), and by drawing up collective "protests" addressed to various government and juridical authorities and public figures. Those protests were subsequently sent in sealed envelopes to the U.S.S.R. Procurator's Office and copies forwarded via "secret channels" to the West to be publicized by the mass media.'

The witness concluded with the following description of Ginzburg's operations in the corrective labor colony: 'Besides, Alik kept a whole store of consumer goods for his friends offering foreign-made socks, leather gloves, excellent jeans that could be passed off as heavy-duty fatigues, warm sweaters and mufflers—all for his friends... And his special friends, those common criminals, could get (under the counter) Japanese-made pornographic tri-d postcards. Pens too, and not just any pens but gold-tipped Parkers... And even some foreign instant coffee, almost impossible to get anywhere, even outside the prison. Alik had money too—meaning cash which by regulations you cannot keep in a corrective labor colony—but he had cash, and you could always borrow from him... Oh well, take a certain G., a Bandera-ite, already a convict for 15 years and, by the way, a pathological anti-Semite. How could he get hold of a foreign-made electric shaver—he had never seen the likes of it—and a lighter-cum-cigarette case to boot. Ginzburg the Jewish boy supplied it. Alik asked him for a copy of his sentence and, moreover, "interviewed" him about his fighting record in the Ukrainian Rebel Army and about his "pholosophy" today. The man's credo was simple: "Hanging all Russians and Jews to make Ukraine free". In the interview, he said nothing about Jews, for "political" reasons.'

When in 1973 Ginzburg was released, he decided to work along the same lines, but on a much larger scale. In April 1974 Western radio 'voices' declared that dissenters in the Soviet Union had a guardian angel: Ginzburg, now a resident of the town of Tarusa, Kaluga Region, was put in charge of the Solzhenitsyn Fund, established to support victims of 'political persecution' in the Soviet Union. The broadcasts even gave the benefactor's address, the house on Lesnaya Street in Tarusa that Ginzburg bought with money he received from some shady source: all the money

he ever earned by honest work would not be enough to buy a pair of trousers. According to his 'authoritative' statement to foreign journalists on February 2, 1977, he spent the equivalent of 360,000 dollars for such support in two years.

Both during the investigation and at the trial Ginzburg refused to explain how he spent that money. The investigators thus had to make a thorough examination of his clientele. There were no starry-eyed idealists among them. The money, it turned out, went to common criminals or to people guilty of particularly grave crimes against the state, and for good reason. According to witness F. who received 900 roubles from the fund, Ginzburg laid down the rules while still in the corrective labor colony: in a conversation with his fellow convicts, including F., Ginzburg said: 'The right of access to the fund is categorically limited to persons convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and for committing high treason by plotting to seize power, who had not recanted their activities while in prison.'

The investigation unearthed a number of people described as 'human rights activists' by Western propaganda and recipients of Ginzburg's 'charitable donations'. For example, a certain K., born in 1956, an ex-convict: he began with burglarizing a workers' cafeteria and then turned to anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. With an education of seven school grades, he wrote a 'Letter to His Imperial Highness' but could not mail it because he could not find the address. Instead, he complained about Soviet power to Ginzburg (although he did write to Senator Henry Jackson from the colony, asking for permission to come to the United States). Here is a small quotation from his testimony: 'Ginzburg saw from what I said that I would not give up my struggle against the existing Soviet system (for which he received about 1,000 rubles from the 'fund'—N.Y.). In turn, my conversation with Ginzburg convinced me that he was a dedicated opponent of Soviet power capable of carrying his struggle to any and even extreme lengths.'

Those criminal activities of Ginzburg's made it imperative to isolate him from society. Apart from disseminating slanderous rumors about the U.S.S.R. based on 'information supplied by the underworld which surrounded him, he

was guilty of direct incitement to grave crimes. No trick was too low for him. A certain M., a truck driver, was convicted for stealing television sets from a factory. Then he was sentenced for a different crime: posing as an officer of a security agency, he 'searched' the apartment of a gynecologist's widow and removed valuable items. He approached Ginzburg with some doubt: 'I already knew that Alexander Ilyich was Jewish and I warned him about certain "anti-Semitic" points of my case—meaning the "search" of the old Jewish lady's apartment and certain aspects of fascist ideology which I shared and which were recorded in the file of my criminal record. Ginzburg smiled and said he could not care less.' M. received some 1,200 roubles and, in his opinion, he was not rejected because the money was earmarked for those who, 'while in prison and after serving the term, did not cooperate with the authorities and did not change their convictions that had taken shape by the time of their detention'.

Ginzburg and his associates also sent modest amounts of money to people still in prison. Murderers and muggers were puzzled to receive money orders from someone they did not know.

According to witness S., still serving his term in prison, 'many convicts in our colony were somewhat surprised: some of those who received that money had very little to do with "political dissent" but very much with murder. Prisoner H. was convicted for war crimes; prisoner T., for killing one soldier and wounding another'. The list could go on and on.

Such is the true image of the 'human rights activist'. Ginzburg's one face was turned to criminals whom he tried to bind together by their hatred of Soviet power and his other face was turned to the West—he defended those criminals and painted a chilling picture of their 'plight' in prison. Ginzburg knew this was slander: after all, he had spent five years in prison.

The investigation revealed yet another fact: Ginzburg played a confidence trick on the Western intelligence services and on Solzhenitsyn who had entrusted him with their subversion money. The benefactor no doubt embezzled most of the 360,000 dollars: those who knew him became aware that he was living it up while in charge of the 'fund'. Besides, Ginzburg, like any mercenary, despised

the man on whose behalf he was paid and described Solzhenitsyn as follows: 'Of course, he is not one of Russia's great ones but he is undoubtedly number one among today's nonentities.'

Ginzburg himself was eager to become number one. According to witness H. who knew him in Tarusa, as soon as the Western 'voices' declared that Ginzburg had joined the 'human rights campaign', he was obviously overjoyed at that assessment of his work; he remarked that this lent a lot of weight to him both in our country and abroad and said, 'Whatever happens to me now, it will be blamed on the KGB'.

Witness G., who also lived in Tarusa and often talked with Ginzburg, said the latter repeatedly returned to the question of tactics, stressing that 'you have to protest all the time, and noisily'. He held forth on the 'need to lodge written protests, to stir up a new wave of *samizdat*; that, he held, would ensure the necessary political publicity'.

The aim was clear. As witness G. added, Ginzburg, 'freely admitted that they were only supported by a small band of intellectuals and thus they pinned all their hopes on the West and appealed to it for help. In his words, the only goal was political and especially economic pressure on the Soviet Union from the developed capitalist countries. The economic pressure would force the Soviet government into liberalizing (Ginzburg's term—*Auth.*) the existing system, and that would benefit both the dissidents inside the country and the leaders of capitalist nations...'⁴¹

The criminal activities of Ginzburg and his ilk were aimed, among other things, at rallying common criminals to the 'dissident' banner and using them to fight Soviet power. Anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda literally arms the criminal who is already in conflict with society. Several cases show that such propaganda pushed ex-convicts to commit particularly grave crimes against the state. It is only a small step from participation in Operation Human Rights to terrorism.

In 1976 the Georgian press gave comprehensive coverage to the trial of a certain Zhvania. With a record of three convictions for common crimes, he detonated three homemade explosive devices in Tbilisi, Sukhumi and Kutaisi. The coward hid his bombs in trash cans and similar places. One person was killed and several were injured.

The investigation and the trial traced his road from common crime to terrorism, and the major landmark on that road turned out to be his involvement in the 'struggle for human rights'. Having learned from Western Georgian-language broadcasts that this 'struggle' was allegedly going on, Zhvania started by running down Soviet power and ended by blowing up bombs. His sentence was appropriately severe.

Bukovsky, extolled in the West as a 'human rights activist', tried to set up terrorist 'teams of five'. The venture failed due to circumstances beyond Bukovsky's control: he could not find even the first five to follow him as their leader.

Among those detained in connection with the explosion in the Moscow subway in January 1977 there is a person convicted in 1964 under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. A Mrs. Khodorovich, formerly a Soviet citizen and now living in the West, bemoans the fate of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky. It has long been a habit with her: in 1964 she attended the trial of the criminal in question and reported her inventions about it to the Western media: the man in the dock, she maintained, was pure as the driven snow and his rights were 'trampled underfoot'. Prompted by the 'dissidents', Western propaganda raised a howl about it. The result is there for all to see: the 'champion of human rights' became the murderer of the Muscovites who died tragically in a booby-trapped subway car.

So, the outcry over the 'human rights issue' engineered by Western intelligence services tends to provide fertile breeding ground for terrorists.⁴²

Naturally, the West takes care to present its agents—the criminal 'human rights activists'—as noble idealists (at any rate, in no way connected with the CIA). That is not only a propaganda version but also a cover story used by some agents after they were caught red-handed. The story is so ridiculous that it has inevitably made the audience laugh—for example, at the 1977 open trial of Rudenko and Tikhy in Druzhkovka for antigovernment activity.

The court was astonished to hear Rudenko claim that the CIA had nothing to do with, say, Radio Liberty which broadcast the defendant's anti-Soviet fabrications. Amused, the presiding judge inquired why Rudenko did not read the press: the connection had been admitted repeatedly. The defendant asked whether the question was for the record. 'Why, no, it's for your benefit,' the judge shrugged. 'Oh well, if it were for the record, I would have lodged an objection,' Rudenko replied and the audience burst out laughing.

At his 1978 open trial in Kaluga, Ginzburg behaved much more flexibly than Rudenko who blindly stuck to the CIA cover story. The state prosecutor held that since Ginzburg had, during the investigation, contributed toward exposing CIA subversion, this was an extenuating factor, and thus he rated eight years in prison rather than the maximum sentence under Article 70, Part 2 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. In his final remarks at the trial, Ginzburg took it for granted and did not protest. Apparently, he did not want to sound ridiculous (the way Rudenko had) and did not deny that ultimately his criminal activities followed CIA guidelines. The court sustained the prosecutor's request.

That is the way the CIA's instructions end: with a whimper. The doctrine of 'plausible denial', drawn up in the quiet and safe offices of psychological warfare strategists in the United States, does not hold water. But it is a different matter as far as Western propaganda is concerned: it still contends that the Soviet Union's legitimate measures to combat crime are 'ominous'. Regrettably, not only professional propaganda specialists but also people considering themselves scholars share that view in the United States. The latter usually flaunt their intellectual independence—apparently, to impress the public. The Princeton historian Stephen F. Cohen (we quoted earlier from his article in *Common Sense in U.S.-Soviet Relations*) believes it is common sense to maintain that 'the most ominous of recent Soviet reactions (to the crimes of Ginzburg and others—*N. Y.*) is ... the official Soviet campaign linking dissidents, and potentially any reformer, to the American government and specially to the CIA. The emptiness of this charge is matched only by its grim revival of one of the worst themes of the Stalinist past.'

Mr. Cohen was obviously delighted with himself: a free thinker, an American intellectual from a respectable university was giving vent to his feelings. Besides, his contribution was not to some anti-Soviet scandal sheet but to a collection of articles by respected scholars. Former Senator James Fulbright wrote in the introduction to that collection: 'The articles in this book, which have been compiled by the American Committee on East-West Accord, are not those of extremists. The authors are experts and outstanding scholars of U.S.-Soviet relations. Their extensive experience reflected in the following analyses offers understanding, perspective and common sense...

'They deserve the widest possible audience both here and in the Soviet Union.'⁴³ That was written in April 1978.

In that same month—April 12, 1978, to be exact—the NTS Executive Committee made a statement regarding the conviction of a certain Lubman for high treason in Leningrad. According to the NTS, the man's only crime was writing a book on economic issues and asking the Italian Slavonic scholar Gabrielli to 'take his book abroad to be published... The NTS stresses that the authorities are returning to the methods that used to be their favorite weapons in the Stalin years, when everyone was accused of "spying"... The NTS goes to the U.S.S.R. not with guns, microphones or cameras, but with books, brochures and magazines'. A surprising coincidence of Mr. Cohen's statement and that by the CIA-financed NTS subversives, both in content and timing.

We are far from accusing Mr. Cohen of malicious intent, but one is expected, after all, to know what one is writing about. The facts are that Lubman was connected with the NTS. Gabrielli was an NTS runner and the customs inspectors at Moscow's Sheremetyevo Airport confiscated Lubman's 248-page manuscript from her. The lady was released, but the author was taken to court for the simple reason that he had not written about 'economic issues'. His manuscript was entitled *An Essay for Mr. Turner's Department, the CIA*. Lubman, who had already done some favors for Western intelligence, this time informed CIA Director Admiral Turner (he would love to be friends with the admiral) that he 'did not want to sit back and do nothing' because the United States must hurry and destroy the U.S.S.R. 'by any means available to a civilized country'.

Due to circumstances beyond the author's control, his work was read not by Admiral Turner but by the Leningrad Procurator's Office. The indictment summarized Lubman's book as follows: 'He addressed to the CIA documents manufactured in 1976-1977, which contained classified military information and recommendations on stepping up subversion against the U.S.S.R. by spying, terrorism, sabotage and radio propaganda'—all that on 248 pages. Lubman's brainchild was used as evidence; the author was convicted in the Leningrad City Court under Article 64 (paragraph A) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The sentence gave him ample time to meditate and maybe change his mind in a corrective labor colony.

That is what the 'human rights activists' really look like. That is how they end up for pulling CIA chestnuts out of the fire. Now, how sincere are those in the United States who take those 'activists' under their wing? What do they really think? Or could it be that they know not what they are doing?

In 1978, the U.S. Academy of Political Science published—naturally for the select specialist circle—a series of articles on the contemporary international situation in a book entitled *The Soviet Threat. Myth and Realities*. Dimitri K. Simes, Director of Soviet Studies in the Center for Strategic and International Studies at Georgetown University, drew the experts' attention to the gulf separating what the opponents of the Soviet system actually did from their image in the West. He cited the subversive work of Orlov and his accomplices as the most vivid example:

'A common view in the American media is that the group was established to monitor Soviet compliance with the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and that its members were unjustly prosecuted for legitimate activity. The facts, however, are slightly different. First, members of the group came almost exclusively from the ranks of the dissident community. Second, the group never had an interest in monitoring the first and second "baskets" dealing with security and economic issues of particular interest to the Soviet Government. Quite naturally for political dissenters, they focused on only one basket—"Basket Three". Third, several of the group's statements made it clear that the objective was not just to encourage observance of the Final Act, but

also to discredit abroad Soviet... practices. Moreover, the tone of the group's documents was, on a number of occasions, polemical and antagonistic to the regime...

'Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to ask how most Americans would feel about a group of their own dissidents pretending to monitor compliance with the Final Act but limiting its inquiries to human rights violations in the United States and using as its main technique appeals to foreign governments, including unfriendly ones. Members of such a group ... would likely encounter considerable hostility. Some would probably be subjected to an FBI investigation and would have difficulty obtaining government employment... One should not pretend that the Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Agreements in the U.S.S.R. was persecuted purely for its monitoring activities. Evaluation of the group's membership and statements suggests that its purposes were much broader and, in fact, included weakening Soviet international positions...

'The dissidents challenge the fundamentals of the regime.' 44

All that is quite true and to the point, but written for the benefit of the experts, not the general public.

11

What do those 'champions of human rights' say within their own coterie of 'activists' and Western accomplices? The American and other Western mass media picture anyone engaged in subversion inside the Soviet Union as an idealistic visionary *sans peur et sans reproche*, absolutely uncompromising, driven by his conscience to uphold 'human rights' and other fine ideals.

Guided by the law, the courts of the U.S.S.R. cannot share that enthusiastic assessment for the simple reason that the people in the dock are there because they are guilty of specific crimes against the state, for which they get their just deserts. Later we will discuss whether their sentences are really harsh. Meanwhile, let us consider the most recent examples of what their trials unearthed.

Take Velikanova who, personally and jointly with others, manufactured, made copies of, kept and disseminated in the U.S.S.R. slanderous inventions maligning the Sovi-

et social and state system. Velikanova supplied this material to Western organizations to be publicized in the media for subversive purposes. She had concocted the wildest tales about her country for ten years since 1969. She was repeatedly warned to desist but believed herself to be above Soviet law as a 'human rights activist' of world renown. Inevitably, on November 1, 1979 she was taken to court under Article 70 (Part 1) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation—for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

The West promptly raised a hue and cry over the great idealist in the dock. The NTS, whose job it is to be closest to the 'activists' in the Soviet Union, said: there was no one 'more selfless, modest, unselfish, tactful, courageous or truthful. She will not lie even to save herself' (*Posev*, January 1980). That is not quite true. Velikanova indeed refused to answer questions. But since she regarded herself as a personality of historical magnitude, she kept a file of her correspondence with associates in the West so that it would not all be lost to posterity. The letters highlight both her inner thoughts (possibly of interest to psychiatrists) and her practical work (clearly criminal in nature and therefore of interest to the court).

Among other things, the court examined Velikanova's letter to her contact M. in the United States, dated October 29, 1979. Mainly a squabble over money, the letter discussed possible ways of sending funds to the U.S.S.R. to support Velikanova's subversive 'cause'. The letter was to be sent through illegal channels.

'About your letters by mail,' she wrote. 'Why don't you make notes of what you write or something, so you won't get confused. Because in your July letter (maybe early August: there was no date) you said: "Grigory called, and I asked him to look for about 12 postcards; two of them are for Mother" (I quote you verbatim). On August 15 you wrote you had sent her a birthday present: "If you had not yet given her the two packages out of seven (?!), give them to her and tell her they are the ones she expected." And on August 27: "I am glad you liked the postcards. Alik called me today, and we decided to send you more, four sets of 32 each, from both of us. But you will have no use for that many, you cannot send them all. So give some to Arin and others."'

At first glance, that is an innocent letter about picture postcards. In actual fact, it is code. Again, Velikanova: 'That is why I took 1,200 roubles. I never got it before, so I do not know what you mean by "I am glad you liked the postcards"'. Now I asked for 3,200 more. And then three times 3,200 (four sets). I gather there will not be that much. All that is left here is maybe 5,000-6,000 more. And I do not think we should hurry now. It will be there. There is still money in the fund. And there are persistent rumors about a currency reform, so we are afraid that Soviet money in savings accounts (and especially not in savings accounts) might be lost... In future, let us talk about money in simpler terms. Suppose you write and tell me to make a present to Kolya worth a certain amount of money... Make the figure two orders smaller and even (let the exact sum be in dollars). And tell me to make a present to Mother worth a certain amount. I will then add the two figures together and add two zeros. If it is for the fund, you can say you are sending a parcel to me and my relatives to the sum of (the figure will be in Soviet currency, two orders smaller). And let me know what part of the parcel Kolya and myself are entitled to. I think you have set us up for a year. (The checks kept arriving. I hope they will not be affected by the reform, and they are sometimes quite useful)... If only you could get Tsvetayeva's book! And books on acupuncture and massage! The black market price for Tsvetayeva here is 120 roubles. If you manage to get it, better send it with someone and not by mail.'

Velikanova refused to say anything about that in court. So, in its verdict of August 23, 1980, the Moscow Criminal Court said: "Defendant T. M. Velikanova refused to testify in court with regard to the essence of the charge brought against her. The court believes that the charge against her has been proved and that T. M. Velikanova is guilty of the crimes committed." The verdict listed her crimes on almost 10 pages. Those crimes were committed willfully and in close collaboration with those engaged in anti-Soviet subversion from abroad. A detailed letter of instructions to Velikanova was written by a certain Alexeyeva who had been expelled from the Soviet Union:

'The most important thing: we have roots inside the country—you are those roots. Our contacts, our mutual

help, the fact that there is a movement in the country and we are part of it—all that lends our words such weight as neither the first nor the second emigration had.' In actual fact, there was no 'movement' but merely a constant flow of fabrications concocted by Velikanova and others. And that was done precisely to create the impression of a 'movement' and to reassure Alexeyeva.

Alexeyeva briefed her accomplice: 'On the day of dispatch send me a cable signed Clara. The contents do not matter: the signature will mean that the day the cable was sent was the day of dispatch' of yet another slanderous fabrication. 'And I can cable you at any address you supply and sign Katya on the day it arrives.' Then the material was handed over to a CIA radio station and beamed to the U.S.S.R. Alexeyeva again: 'Can you hear Radio Liberty in Moscow nowadays? It is very important for me to know that because there is no problem here: whatever we ask to broadcast, they do right away, and without any red tape or formalities about the source.' Of course there was no 'red tape'—Alexeyeva herself works for Radio Liberty, a subsidiary of the CIA. She makes her living in the West from CIA money (she complained to Velikanova it was 'peanuts', 400 dollars a month). True, the CIA pay is different for the traitors who have already come to the West and for those who are in the Soviet Union. Velikanova and Alexeyeva are an obvious example.

The defendants who were tried by Soviet courts in 1980 under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation turned out to be paid CIA agents. This was proved both by documents and by the information supplied by witnesses. And, among themselves, the 'human rights activists' do not deny that they serve a cause engineered by Western intelligence agencies. According to Litvinov's letter from the United States to Velikanova, 'For your personal information and, if you want, for the benefit of others but without reference to myself, there is much truth in what the KGB says about everything being intertwined and organized from a single center in the West. It is all much more gentle and refined but quite efficient, and most emigres rise to the bait because they are poor, and here all kinds of nice people who appear to share their goals willingly help them, publish their writings, etc. All that emigre activity has become part of the Western establishment;

say, intellectuals have long understood it all and they know who will say what and on what occasion.'

It is far from 'much more gentle and refined'. Now, Alexeyeva set a special task for Velikanova: the next shipment of fabrications 'would do well to touch on the trade union topic in suitable cases, and you might even look for it. Today, that is a task of paramount importance... Nowadays, each worker who emigrates to the West is very valuable too. We have used Ivanov in Italy, and here we will also try to use him in the trade unions, Radio Liberty, etc.'

What followed is well known from Ivanov himself, who left the U.S.S.R. for the United States in mid-1978. From there he wrote to *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on August 20, 1980 about the way he had been at first welcomed there and immediately drawn into anti-Soviet subversion. But Ivanov soon saw the light; life in the West turned out to be quite different from what the 'radio voices' had told him. 'I got the impression that all that dissident runaround is an integral part of some powerful mechanism on an almost global scale.' This realization prompted him to change his line of behavior and, when at an anti-Soviet gathering he was approached by Alexeyeva who 'shuffled her feet uneasily and then said, "Some people are coming to see you so you have to talk to them," I replied I did not have to do anything of the kind and they had better stay away.'

He resisted approaches by others, including NTS men and Radio Liberty officials. The results did not take long to materialize: he was fired from his job as electric assembly worker at the Edison Price factory. The last thing about which he wrote to *Literaturnaya Gazeta* was the following: 'A certain Yu. Mashkov, a recruiting agent for various anti-Soviet organizations, wrote me a letter. It was long and polite but it added, "Anyway, you are one of those who might be killed and not by muggers."'

Let us return to those convicted in Soviet courts in 1980. Velikanova was sentenced to four years in prison: the court took into consideration her age and health. Some defendants, charged with anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, recanted and received suspended sentences: for example, Regelson and Kapitanchuk who manufactured and disseminated inventions about religious persecution in the U.S.S.R. In court they admitted they did so on instructions

from Western intelligence services, above all the CIA, to embarrass the Soviet Union internationally. Asked by the prosecutor about the aim of his anti-Soviet fabrications, Kapitanchuk replied:

'The aim of all those documents is to provoke Western pressure to make the U.S.S.R. change its policy.'

Note also that the open trials did not make public all the facts ascertained by the investigation with regard to the ways the CIA used to direct and finance anti-Soviet subversion. In due time all that information will no doubt be declassified, but in the meantime there is absolutely no need to tell our enemies what our competent authorities know.

And finally, about the punishment meted out to the people guilty of such crimes. Let us again quote A. Trainin's article. In September 1978 he wrote:

'The trials of Orlov and Ginzburg offer us much food for thought. They were both convicted under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. I believe that the court was most lenient, especially toward Ginzburg. The investigation and the trial proved that the notorious "fund" Ginzburg administered was aimed, among other things, at recruiting people for antigovernment activity.'

'According to witness I., "all those who received assistance from the Solzhenitsyn Fund were supposed to stick to their anti-Sovietism and somehow 'assert themselves' in that role—meaning they were to continue with their anti-Soviet activities and take part in the 'ventures' staged by Ginzburg and his associates."

'Other similar examples can be cited. After talking to Ginzburg and receiving assistance from the fund, some people committed grave crimes against the state and were convicted. Thus Ginzburg's activities could be evaluated in terms of Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation—high treason. The article describes high treason as, among other things, "rendering assistance to a foreign power in pursuing activities hostile to the U.S.S.R."

'The *Commentary to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation* (Moscow, 1971, p. 159) explains: "rendering assistance to a foreign power in pursuing activities hostile to the U.S.S.R. means commission by a citizen of the

U.S.S.R., on assignment from an intelligence or other interested agency or a representative of a foreign power, or of his own accord, of acts aiding the activities by a foreign power aimed at undermining or weakening the Soviet state. Those acts may comprise recruitment of persons for engaging in activities hostile to the U.S.S.R., including especially grave crimes against the state . . ."

'Comment on the *Commentary* is superfluous. The court had every right to refer to Ginzburg's activities as crimes under Article 64 of the Criminal Code, with all the consequences that entailed. But the court displayed exceptional patience as far as Ginzburg and Orlov were concerned, and decided not to invoke that article. But the court's patience has its limits, and it remains to be seen whether Western, and particularly American, intelligence services let up on their subversion against the U.S.S.R.

'When the cases of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky were under investigation and they themselves were already in custody, H. Rositzke, a retired high-level executive of the CIA, published his book *CIA's Secret Operations* in the United States. According to the book, the aim of those operations is to "fight the Communist regimes on their own terrain by supporting resistance movements inside the orbit and by weakening the loyalty of their citizens through radio broadcasts, leaflets, and Western literature" (p. 153). All that, Rositzke emphasized, is part of the concept of "psychological warfare" waged against our country.

"Perhaps the most tangible product of these 'psywar' operations were the opening up of American contacts with the political dissidents within the Soviet Union... This marked the beginning of the publication of Soviet underground documents in the West—and in many cases their being smuggled back into the Soviet Union for wider distribution. The collection and publication of manuscripts produced in the Soviet Union has by now become a large-scale enterprise with many participants, both open and secret" (p. 163).

'Rositzke describes these ventures as "covert operations", and Washington's involvement in them is invariably denied for the following reasons:

"The rationale behind the U.S. government's taking activity without accepting official responsibility was expressed in the theory of 'plausible denial'. Plausible denial re-

quires that no covert operation can be traced back to the U.S. government, to the White House, the State and Defense departments, or the Central Intelligence Agency. It means that an operation, even if it is blown, can be denied as an officially sponsored act without the government's being caught in a barefaced lie.

"This 'deniability' was sought in variety of ways. Funds were passed to foreigners through secret contacts. Private organizations were established both in the United States and abroad, ostensibly by private citizens with private money, and funds funneled to them through dummy foundations (c.f. Solzhenitsyn Fund—*Author.*) and benefactors. Official Americans participating in 'unofficial' actions acted as private citizens. Proposed covert operations were equipped with cover stories supplying an innocuous explanation. The aim always was to find proxies" (p. 153).

'We are grateful to Mr. Rositzke for a timely (mid-1977) reminder about the way the CIA conducts its covert operations. The pattern held true in the cases of Orlov, Ginzburg and Shcharansky, and that was proven both by the investigation and at the trial. Operation Human Rights was drawn up by the CIA, no doubt given 'the go-ahead from above (why else such vociferous "plausible denials" now that the criminals have been convicted), and the pawns were caught red-handed. Soviet courts exposed them as paid agents of the CIA, and thus justice prevailed.'

12'

In conclusion, the profile of a man whom certain people in the West portray as something next to a prophet—a man named Andrei Sakharov. Out there in the West, it is considered bad form to cast the least slur, much less criticize, Sakharov—they want him a prophet, and that's that.

But there are those, even among the enemies of the Soviet Union (for whom Sakharov is 'one of theirs'), who disagree with his pronouncements. The priest Dudko, prosecuted in the U.S.S.R. in 1980 for subversive activity, had a letter from one Tetenok, who resides in the United States, dated January 7, 1979. 'I don't share Sakharov's standpoint,' it reads. 'Perhaps you'll remember that Andrew Young (the Black U.S. ambassador to the UN) once said

there were political prisoners in the U.S.A. whereupon the White House people jumped on him. Vance called him unprintable names. Then, when he met the Palestinians a second time, the Jews got wind of it and had him thrown out of his UN job. As you see, in the United States freedom of expression is tied up with certain commitments: if you've got to curse, curse the U.S.S.R. Sakharov behaves as though he knows military secrets, and is in on the plans in advance. That, at best, is a provocation, and means he is working for the West. Is Sakharov really so simple that he cannot grasp the spirit of the people, its roots, history, and culture?

Similar opinions are voiced by other human rights 'champions'. As for the letter quoted above, and other letters in the same vein which Dudko received, they may have contributed to his finally seeing he was wrong, doing things incompatible with his office, and repenting publicly.

Those who are engaged in subversion against the Soviet Union are beating the drums for Sakharov, and documenting his every move. Soviet evaluations of his activity are howled down. *Posev* (No. 8, 1980) reports that *Gorky Pravda* (of June 12, 1980), printed Nikolai Yakovlev's article, 'Traitors', containing crude attacks on Sakharov and Solzhenitsyn. Yakovlev is alleged to have said there was a food shortage in the Soviet Union because Sakharov had called on the Western countries to boycott the U.S.S.R. and keep up the arms race. Besides, said *Posev*, the *Gorky Komsomol paper* (of June 22, 1980) had 'by public request' reprinted an *Izvestia* article of February 15, 1980, 'A Would-Be Caesar', which grossly attacked and slandered Sakharov.

Since the reference is partly to me, I feel obliged to retort. The article 'Traitors' was not written in 1980, and is a reprint of part of my article, entitled 'A Mercenary and a Simpleton', which appeared in February 1974 in *Golos Rodiny*, a publication of the Soviet Committee for Cultural Contacts With Compatriots Abroad. As for the other article, 'A Would-Be Caesar', by Soviet journalists A. Efremov and A. Petrov, it is indeed a reprint; not from *Izvestia*, as I discovered after a search, but from *Komsomolskaya Pravda*.

Believe me, there isn't a hint of slander in either article. They examine Sakharov's views and show the aims

and methods of his subversive acts against the U.S.S.R. But let the reader judge for himself. (I, for one, was pleased to see that every word and punctuation mark in an article I had written some seven years ago still rang true.) Here is a piece out of that article ('A Mercenary and A Simpleton'):

The Waste of the Scientific and Technological Revolution

The scientific and technological revolution has created serious social problems. In the West joy over the opportunities offered by science and technology often turns into deep pessimism as people begin to ponder on the evil purposes the wonders of the 20th century may be made to serve by morally corrupt men. How should society be organized? How should the stupendous achievements of science be integrated in human society without destroying it? A variety of 'technocratic' concepts have sprung up equating technical knowledge with the ability to manage society.

The extravagant claims of the advocates of technocracy are a subject of study by futurologists, and of ridicule by science-fiction writers. In his story 'Absolute Technocracy' Lino Aldani, one of the fathers of science fiction, ridicules technocracy through one of his characters:

'Steve began to reflect on technocracy... There was a time when human society was hardly organized at all; the most incompetent people were made executives while someone of great intellectual ability might spend his whole life in miserable conditions. Anyway, that was what the text-books said. Barbarism flourished in the 20th century. Power was held, not by technical experts, but by politicians—a breed of men afflicted with megalomania and excessive fervor. It disappeared with the coming of the era of cybernetics and absolute technocracy... Steve did not quite understand what was so good about absolute technocracy. He knew just one thing, namely, that absolute technocracy was considered a real blessing to mankind. He grew up with a religious reverence for society's laws and accepted them as instinctively as a child learns to speak.'⁴⁵

Steve, an imaginary man of the future, was in a tragicomic situation. The above thoughts come to him as he is taking an exam in non-Euclidian geometry and the the-

ory of relativity—to qualify for the job of second-grade street sweeper. Aldoni invites his readers to laugh at the excesses to which the theory of technocracy would logically lead. They are laughable, but not at all funny.

The characters in my story are far cleverer than the simple-minded Steve. They know exactly what the blessings of technocracy are. True, Solzhenitsyn, a mathematician by training, and the physicist Sakharov know very little about the human sciences. One more thing they do not know is that the Industrial Revolution gave rise to anarchism, and that the current technological revolution also has its price: some people, for instance, are trying in vain to find a fitting place in society. But that does not disturb the two gentlemen. In a letter to the leaders of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, dated March 19, 1970, Sakharov, touching on some of the most complex social questions, tried to analyze the problem 'in the first approximation', as he put it in his professional jargon, adding that 'the important thing is, as mathematicians say, to prove the theorem that a solution exists'. Perhaps he was hinting at his own importance by using these expressions.

Equipped with this precise and appropriate method, the two men built a model of the ideal society. Solzhenitsyn took up the subject in his *August 1914*, where his characters say what a good thing it would be for mankind if order were introduced into the disorder in which it now lives. Arkhangorodsky, a successful businessman, addressing some revolutionaries, says: 'There are thousands of you, and it's a long time since any of you did any work. Does anybody ask why? It is not done. Nor are you exploiters. But you have never stopped consuming the national product. You say it will all be repaid by the revolution (p. 534). This uncommonly shrewd gentleman rejects all the known forms of organizing society. 'Don't you think a republic is a delicious dish of which you can never have enough. A hundred ambitious barristers—the greatest gabbers of all—will get together and gab their heads off. Anyway, the people won't ever be able to govern itself' (p. 536).

Solzhenitsyn's basic idea is, therefore, that politics and political parties are an unnecessary burden. The 'hundred ambitious barristers' in U.S. Senate have made a bad mistake. While they are wasting taxpayers' money on subver-

sive radio stations that pollute the air with Solzhenitsyn's poisonous rubbish, Solzhenitsyn has written them off as utterly useless. However, that is their problem.

Another sage, lovingly portrayed in the book and referred to as an engineer, adds: 'What I think is that an Engineers' Association could easily become a power in Russia. And it could be far more important and effective than any political party... Shrewd, intelligent people do not administer—they build and transform. Government is a dead load. But if it stood in the nation's way—well, I guess, then it would have to be taken' (p. 527). Happily this was avoided. The October Revolution occurred. But Solzhenitsyn goes back to his plans in *Gulag Archipelago*, this time in his own name.

Falsifying history, he asserts that the dictatorship of the proletariat is spearheaded against technologists. He deliberately confuses the political concept of proletarian dictatorship and the actual management of the economy. The October Revolution opened tremendous opportunities for science and technology. But according to Solzhenitsyn it was the other way round: 'How could engineers accept dictatorship from workers—their mere helpers in industry, little skilled, with but skimpy knowledge either of the physical or of the economic laws of production, who nevertheless installed themselves at the biggest desks to tell the engineers what to do?' (p. 392). Where could Solzhenitsyn have seen this but in the declarations of the so-called Workers' Opposition, which was repudiated by the Communist Party?

None of this poppycock would be worth mentioning but for the fact that it throws some light on Solzhenitsyn's overriding idea that society ought to be run by a technocracy.

Solzhenitsyn said much the same things as the character in Aldani's story, and in much the same way: 'Why shouldn't engineers think it more natural for society to have a pattern putting those in the lead who can intelligently regulate its activities? (And, excepting moral regulation alone, isn't it all that social cybernetics is about? Aren't professional politicians just boils on society's neck, preventing it from turning its head freely and moving its arms about?) Why shouldn't engineers have political views? After all, politics is not even a science, it is an empi-

rical field not described by any mathematical apparatus and subject to boot to man's egoism and blind passions' (pp. 392-93).

That brings us to the crux of the matter which, as we have seen, is succinctly stated by a science-fiction writer in a short story. In Solzhenitsyn's case, however, it is presented with the ostentation of a prophet in a novel many hundreds of pages long.

Since Solzhenitsyn mentions 'social cybernetics', whatever that may be, let us see what Norbert Wiener, the founder of cybernetics, thought of the usefulness to society of mathematical methods, cybernetics, and the like. Though deeply committed to the new hypotheses, Wiener was broad-minded enough to see that 'the human sciences are very poor testing-grounds for a new mathematical technique... There is much which we must leave, whether we like it or not, to the un-"scientific", narrative method of the professional historian.'⁴⁶ In his fascinating book, *God and Golem Inc.*, Wiener wrote: 'Render unto man the things which are man's and unto the computer the things which are the computer's'.⁴⁷

When cybernetics first appeared, it went to the heads of the advocates of technocracy. Long before Solzhenitsyn, they began inventing arguments to support the great worth to society of the precise sciences. Observing the fuss made by the latter-day Laputans, Wiener described as futile the hopes pinned on the new methods of precise science: 'They are certain that our control over our material environment has far outgrown our control over our social environment and our understanding thereof. Therefore, they consider that the main task of the immediate future is to extend to the fields of anthropology, of sociology, of economics, the methods of the natural sciences, in the hope of achieving a like measure of success in the social fields. From believing this necessary, they come to believe it possible. In this, I maintain, they show an excessive optimism and a misunderstanding of the nature of all scientific achievement.'⁴⁸

To illustrate his thought, Wiener amplified: 'We cannot attribute too much value to this type of wishful thinking. It is the mode of thought of the mice when faced with the problem of belling the cat. Undoubtedly it would be very pleasant for us mice if the predatory cats of this world were to be belled, but—who is going to do it? Who

is to assure us that ruthless power will not find its way back into the hands of those most avid for it?'⁴⁹

Wiener intimated that some learned mice had evil intents. That he is right is clear not only from the writings of Solzhenitsyn, from whom little can be expected in any field of science, but also from the sallies into the realm of politics of physicist Sakharov.

While Solzhenitsyn took many thousands of pages to elucidate his thoughts, and promises to add more 'sections' and 'units' to them, Sakharov is laudably laconic. His 38-page pamphlet, *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom*, had absorbed all his ideas, barring none. He has added nothing since he composed it in 1968. Setting out on his journey into unfamiliar terrain, Sakharov, like the scientist he is, naturally mentioned the man who served as his guide, that 'outstanding' writer, A. Solzhenitsyn (p. 22). Thereupon, drawing for his wisdom on that promiscuous source, Sakharov proceeded to spout drivel, presenting what he thinks is an ideal society, for the Soviet state is not to his liking.

He isn't simply anti-Soviet. He wallows in anti-Sovietism. 'Disgrace' is the only epithet he knows for anything Soviet.⁵⁰ Why? Because there's no 'democratisation', and because the opinion of busybodies like himself is disregarded. Mouthings on this score are as compulsive for Sakharov as mouthings about breaches of socialist legality are for Solzhenitsyn. They are the cellophane wrapping of their views and outlook. But the wrappings are secondhand. Years ago, the *Cadets* (Constitutional-Democrats) tried to palm off the same ware.

The Cadets, too, paraded as the 'brains of the nation' and pleaded for mass support. In the stormy autumn of 1917 they covered the walls and fences of Russian towns with posters urging voters to pick Ticket No. 1, (the Cadets or the People's Freedom Party) in the elections to the Constituent Assembly. Their standard text was: 'The People's Freedom Party has always stood for people's power... The Freedom Party has always brought forth public-spirited and knowledgeable men of experience.'

The people of Russia, as we know, saw through their intentions. Clearly, Sakharov's views are a hangover of the Cadet creed, with some allowances for the scientific and technological revolution. For in the crucial issue he sees

eye to eye with the Cadets: power must belong to capitalists.

He wants socialism to be absorbed by capitalism. For him capitalism is the better system. He paints an idyllic picture: 'The fact that there are millionaires in the United States is not really a serious economic burden since there are few of them. The aggregate consumption of the wealthy is less than 20 per cent, that is, less than the total growth of national consumption over a five-year period. Seen from this angle, a revolution that slows up economic progress for more than five years cannot be considered economically beneficial for the working people' (p. 29).

But there's a snag: how to spread the faultless system to all mankind? Science must come to its aid: 'International politics must be thoroughly saturated in scientific methodology' (p. 8). The thing to do is to put Marxism out of the way, to be 'realistic', and lo!, a world government will emerge on earth by the year 2000. The 'technocrats' have long been yearning for it. They are trying to claim followers of their precious chimera among people who haven't the least notion about it. U.S. physicist Edward Teller, maker of the hydrogen bomb, said with a straight face: 'I cannot rid myself of the thought that President Roosevelt may have planned to use the existence of the atomic bomb, after the war, as a powerful driving force toward world government.'⁵¹ But there were no atomic weapons during Roosevelt's lifetime. American historian W. A. Williams makes the perfectly justified point that 'the charge, later made by some, that Roosevelt should have gazed three months into the future of atomic physics is absurd'.⁵²

The world government idea was also at one time entertained by the great physicist Albert Einstein. When he spoke of it after World War II, Soviet scientists felt it their duty to speak up. In an open letter, 'On Some Misconceptions of Professor Albert Einstein' (in *New Times*, October 26, 1947), members of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences Vavilov, Ioffe, Semyonov, and Frumkin paid due tribute to Einstein, who had 'time and again raised his voice against the Nazi barbarities and in the post-war period against the danger of another war, against the wish of the U.S. monopolists to take complete charge of U.S. policy. Soviet scientists, like the Soviet public as a whole, welcome this activity, prompted by true humanism.'

But the talk about a world government, Vavilov, Ioffe, Semyonov, and Frumkin wrote, 'looks wrong to us and, moreover, dangerous to the cause of peace, to which Einstein is so committed.' They explained what the idea of a world government meant in current conditions: 'The slogan of a supranational superstate is no more than a cover for the world supremacy of capitalist monopolies... It is an irony of life that has brought Einstein to in effect backing the plans and designs of the worst enemies of peace and international cooperation. And because we hold Einstein in high regard as both scientist and public figure, we consider it our duty to say this in the frankest of terms, without any diplomatic embellishments.'⁵³ Physicist Sakharov would do well to read this letter of his senior colleagues.

What blessings, indeed, would a world government bestow on mankind, apart from putting it under the iron heel of U.S. monopoly capital? Very many, says Sakharov. Referring to the dangers of 'technocracy' that Norbert Wiener mentions in his book *Cybernetics*, and saying he has no intention of turning people into 'chickens or mice' with behavioral-control electrodes implanted in their brain (pp. 20-21), Sakharov then proceeds to unfold just that sort of future. Here is what he says: a world government will have many potentialities, for from the day of its inauguration 'the achievements of biology (at that time and later on) could be used for effective control and regulation of all vital processes at the biochemical, cytological, bodily, ecological, and social levels, from natality and ageing to psychic processes and heredity' (p. 35).

A fine prospect. That's were the Cadet ideology brings the 'technocrat' in our era of scientific and technological revolution! A world of living robots under the watchful eye and supervision of the moneybag oligarchy. But it would take iron nerve to make this world, at least in the case of its initiators. The dissidents, have they got the nerve? Says Solzhenitsyn: we are men of determination. In *Gulag Archipelago* he claims he and his friends are ready for anything. 'The same man,' he writes, 'does not behave in the same way at different ages and in different situations in which life may place him. Sometimes he is not unlike a fiend, at other times not unlike a saint. But he goes under the same name, and we ascribe everything to one and the

same person... But should Maliuta Skuratov* have called on us, we would probably not have disappointed him' (p. 176).

It isn't too hard to visualize Solzhenitsyn, a man with a clearly criminal psychology, in this role. But certainly not Sakharov. However ludicrous his notions may be, they belong to a well-meaning 'technocrat'. We can dismiss them with a good laugh. He should probably be advised to do what is done in any scholarly effort—to take a critical look at himself. If only in a mirror. He may then see light. The garb of an executioner, an apprentice of Maliuta Skuratov, is not for him.

The above theoretical beliefs of the dissidents lie at the root of their practice—subversive activity against their country. Its ways and means are varied. Of late, appeals to Western leaders to apply greater pressure on the Soviet Union all along the line have predominated. The politically puerile Sakharov is begging U.S. Congress not to grant the U.S.S.R. most-favoured-nation status. The malicious Solzhenitsyn says doing business with the U.S.S.R. is a 'second Munich'. In short, they are trying to wreck detente on the assumption that in a cold-war environment socialism is more vulnerable.

The dissidents are making war on 'communism', but are doing harm to everyone of us, to the last man. Because there isn't a family that wouldn't benefit from detente and more trade.

The dissidents have won the appreciation of Western reactionaries, because the manner of action they recommend is in accord with the latter's current mainline anti-communist strategy. And scientist Sakharov ought to draw conclusions from this obvious fact.

Imperialism is building up its military power. The military budget of the United States is approaching the 100-billion-dollar mark. This will have the effect of drawing off funds for defense from other Soviet undertakings. The exponents of this course in the West, a course that might be described as a 'strategy of attrition', hope thereby to hinder economic progress in the Soviet Union, cause certain shortages in the country, and thereby affect the morale of the Soviet people.

* Maliuta Skuratov, a contemporary of Ivan the Terrible, was known for his cruelty.—N. Y.

That is evidently the light in which they evaluate the activity of the dissidents: look, already there are people favoring surrender to imperialism. This they see as a point in favor of refined methods of defeating the Soviet Union, for they know that a purely military solution hasn't a chance in the world.

At the end of the fifties, a British military theorist, W. Jackson, summed up the invasions of Russia since ancient times in his book, *Seven Roads to Moscow*. He counted seven invasions and drew the following conclusion:

'Jumping the fence, on the other hand, has always failed, as stories of the Swedish, French and German roads have proved. Moreover, there has been a progressive increase in the magnitude of disasters which have overwhelmed each successive invasion. The only lasting road to Moscow was the Viking Road that provided the constructive services which the Russian people themselves asked. Let us hope that no one will ever be tempted to emulate Charles, Napoleon or Hitler in imposing a military solution of a kind which history has shown must fail, and which may well bring nuclear annihilation to mankind.'⁵⁴

Yet that, in substance, is what the dissidents are calling for: come, rule us, we will help you. The paranoid nature of these designs, like the Viking Road concept, is clear to all Soviet people. But the activity of dissidents serves to encourage certain Western circles. They tend to think there are internal divisions, that the U.S.S.R. has clay feet, and that the people are no longer united. At last, they think, their cherished hope is coming true. For hadn't Clausewitz drawn the following lesson from Napoleon's invasion of Russia:

'Russia is not the kind of country one can really conquer, that is, keep under occupation, at least not with the strength of the modern European states, and not with the 500,000 men whom Bonaparte deployed for the purpose. A country like that can be brought to her knees only by her own weaknesses or by the effects of internal division. To strike at these weak places of the political body, a convulsion reaching to the heart of the state is essential... The 1812 campaign failed because the enemy government stood firm and the people were loyal and resolute, because it just could not succeed.'⁵⁵

Pentagon analysts of World War II lecturing to the

U.S. officers corps, quote the above passage from Clausewitz to show 'how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz advice'.⁵⁶

The dissidents are trying to remedy the errors of the enemies of the Soviet Union, inviting them to take the toughest possible stance. Solzhenitsyn and his ilk are dirty trouble-makers who are even willing to help start a war to achieve their rabid anti-communist aims. They have undertaken the impossible. That is beyond question. But their trouble-making and slander is complicating the international situation and undermining world peace, because they give pretexts for successive anti-Soviet campaigns, meaning that they provide a cover for the designs of the extreme aggressive sections of international reaction.

I wrote this, as I have already said, some seven years ago. Wouldn't you say subsequent events have proved the article true? Recall the Carter Administration's embargo on trade with the Soviet Union. Recall the fantastic build-up of U.S. military expenditure, and that of its NATO allies. There is a difference, of course, for what I then described as a 'strategy of attrition' was treated in most general terms, whereas now it is the creed of the White House. In the United States people refer to it as the alpha and omega of American policy.

Now, let's see what my colleagues, A. Efimov and A. Petrov, wrote in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* on February 15, 1980:

A Would-Be Caesar

'I'm afraid that of late I haven't been satisfied with my scientific work... I'm very old as a theoretical physicist. 1974.'

'I am wholly aware of my incompetence in the intricate questions of social life. 1975.'

'It's ages since I've been to see a film. I read little. I haven't the time or the energy. Sometimes, in bed, I read a detective novel in English. 1977.'

'It is hard for me to carry the burden of worldwide fame. 1977.'

This epigraph, essentially more of an epitaph, was pronounced by Sakharov for Academician A. D. Sakharov. Everything is in the past: life with its concerns and achievements. The 'burden of worldwide fame' weighs on him like a tombstone—a fame in the West for what he had done *after* his scientific career had come to an end.

Unfortunately, there could have been no other denouement.

The path that led the man to his intellectual downfall and public disgrace began with the notorious ivory tower where he shut himself away from the big life around him. Sakharov's childhood and youth, that of the son of a venerable professor of mathematics, date to the twenties and thirties. One doesn't choose one's parents, of course, but parents tend to set one on one's course. And the professor's family had fenced itself off from the ferment and tumult of those stormy times. From the old world, Sakharov the boy inherited a German governess, and wistful sighs over the forfeited bourgeois prosperity.

He had thought that his chosen profession, that of physicist and mathematician, would be a dependable buffer against the unloved outside world. And it was at first. The tornado of war seemed to by-pass Sakharov. He was twenty in 1941, the year when so many of his coevals laid down their lives for their country. In any case, he made a personal contribution then by finishing Moscow University and setting out on a career in science.

It was a promising career, in the midst of gifted Soviet physicists, among whom Sakharov occupied a place of no small importance. Like his colleagues, he was awarded high government decorations. His work was generously rewarded. As the years went by the legend of Sakharov the super-scientist took hold in the West. People who worked with him were surprised. And for reasons we will discuss later, he had had to reckon with their opinion. That was why he grudgingly admitted: 'In the Western press I am often described as the father of the hydrogen bomb. This is a most incorrect reflection of the true (and difficult) circumstances of a collective invention. But I am not going to go into detail about that.'

The titanic power of thermonuclear weapons staggered Sakharov's imagination, forming a kind of syndrome, an obsessive idea. In some ways reminiscent of the Garin syn-

drome in Alexei Tolstoy's novel, *The Hyperboloid of Engineer Garin*. Sakharov could not draw the line between his part in the invention and the wish of possessing the nuclear bomb all by himself. That, indeed, is probably the reason for the process that culminated in the downfall of Sakharov the physicist and produced Sakharov as we know him now. Here is what he said about it himself: 'A means of total destruction was created that could potentially wipe out human civilization. But I noticed that the levers of control were in the hands of others.' He had evidently thought that for developing the nuclear weapon, the country would grant him these 'levers of control'. For what purpose? That he disclosed in a pamphlet in 1968.

That pamphlet was no modest undertaking, though it passed under the innocent title, *Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom*. It was nothing short of a claim to leadership, a manifesto of militant 'technocracy'. The technocrats, as Sakharov saw it, ought to rule mankind; then, by the year 2000, they would create a 'world government'. The conclusion that the author reserved a fitting place in it for himself, probably that of universal Caesar, is self-evident. Turning his back on scientific work, Sakharov spent the next five years in an attempt to form a mighty coalition of supporters. At first he thought his colleagues would follow him, abandon science, range themselves by his side. Hence the restraint in evaluating his own contribution to fundamental research and his boundless claim to power. Tactical reasons prompted modesty.

But nothing came of it. His colleagues, and in these five years he had pestered some of them quite assiduously, showed no desire at all to leave their laboratories. They marvelled at the academician's ideas, but were not enticed by the picture he painted: if a 'world government' were formed, Sakharov maintained, 'the achievements of biology (at that time and later on) could be used for effective control and regulation of all vital processes at the biochemical, cytological, bodily, ecological, and social levels, from natality and aging to psychic processes and heredity... Such a revolution is possible and safe, but only under a very "intelligent" and in a broad sense worldwide government'.

The idea reeked of authoritarianism and fascism, of a

bleak world of man-robots with Sakharov at the head. His 'technocratic' ravings were taken for what they were, with Sakharov gaining the reputation of an eccentric. That would have been the end of it if Sakharov hadn't suddenly won 'friends'—out in the West.

Though in those five years Sakharov had sought followers exclusively in the Soviet Union, his efforts attracted the attention of those whom he had not solicited—the anti-Communists and secret services of the West. They saw that the ambitious arranger of human affairs wanted socialism to be absorbed by capitalism, of which he spoke with extreme deference. This was enough in the light of the Western rulers' class interests to encourage and support Sakharov.

Sakharov's manifesto, which he secretly disseminated in the U.S.S.R., was instantly and widely publicised in the West. Henry Kissinger, then the U.S. President's national security adviser and, consequently, patron of the CIA and similar U.S. agencies, said: 'The Sakharov document is one of the most important on communist affairs in recent years.' Little wonder, for it contained in embryo all the demagogical twists and slanderous inventions that later became the foundation for the incendiary 'human rights' campaign.

Take the reputable *Handbook of World History. Concepts and Issues*, edited by Prof. J. Dunner, which appeared in New York in 1967. A hundred leading American historians and politologists took part in writing it. And here, in effect, is what it said on the subject of 'human rights': 'Human Rights is a term of recent origin... Because of its vagueness, "human rights" is a term of small value.'

Take another American handbook, *The New Language of Politics*, edited by William Satire. Even its 1972 revised and enlarged edition has no item under the head of human rights. The term is explained in the article on civil rights: 'A related term, human rights, has also been used, often by those who want to express pious concern for individual rights without seeming too pro-Negro.'

That was all. Nor did Washington set out on its 'human rights' adventure until it needed a pretext for interfering in the affairs of the U.S.S.R. with the aim of undermining the Soviet social and political system. So Sakharov, as we see, is at the root of the process.

This was Sakharov's second move, the move of a political adventurer and anti-Sovieteer. After the failure of his attempt to form a movement for giving rule to the 'technocrats', Sakharov decided to form a wide-scale 'human rights' organisation. The West's functional role, as he conceived it, was to ensure immunity in the U.S.S.R. for persons engaging in subversive activity. And, naturally, the head of the movement was Sakharov himself, taking charge not only of the 'human rights champions', but also of Washington. In short, the way was different, but the goal was the same—to be Caesar.

Sakharov's ambitions, one expects, caused smiles in the headquarters of Western secret services. They could not have been taken seriously. But the methods of subversion he suggested were seized upon. As a result, Sakharov became little more than a pawn in the hands of the Soviet Union's most deadly enemies. In the summer of 1973, Sakharov made criminal contact with foreigners in Moscow—giving anti-Soviet interviews, issuing all sorts of 'protests', calling at various Western embassies. And since he had thrown himself upon the mercy of the West, the special services there wasted no time to extract from him something that had no bearing at all on 'human rights'—information that was a state secret. Foreign agents went out of their way to flatter Sakharov. The result: in August 1973, Sakharov was invited to the Procurator's Office and warned that he was being used by forces hostile to the Soviet Union, and, worse still, by foreign secret services.

After the visit, he became more cautious but did not let up in his drive to build an anti-Soviet movement. Money was needed, and he got it from foreign sources. Not that he could complain of lacking means for himself and his family—the state gave him everything that was due to a person ranked as a member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. But he wanted foreign currency. And it was handed to him in 1975 under a 'respectable' cover—the Nobel Prize. Yet requests for handouts continued. A certain American lady named Murphy visited his home in the spring of 1977 and 'discovered' that the man subsisted in 'appalling poverty'. The tender-hearted lady appealed for aid to 'human rights champions' through the provincial *Main Line Times* in the U.S.A. Americans going to Russia, she advised, should take along anything that can be

sold—jeans, tights, ball-point pens—which the dissidents would convert into cash. Sakharov rewarded the lady handsomely for these commodities. Going home to the U.S.A. she had anti-Soviet letters concealed on her person.

In the state of Delaware, where the adventuress resides, she was acclaimed for her extraordinary courage in taking out Andrei Sakharov's letters from the Soviet Union. What it showed, however, was the high degree of decency of Soviet customs officers, who take the presumption of honesty and don't go searching under a lady's clothes.

But Sakharov and his confederates don't live off jeans, tights, and ball-point pens alone. Western secret services provide much larger sums, part of which are distributed directly by Sakharov. In an interview to *France Soir* of February 23, 1977, he complained about money shortages—'always having to help our friends, people we know and don't know'.

The 'friends' picking up handouts from Sakharov are many, and most of them have a questionable past and present. He was like a magnet, attracting criminal anti-social elements, and relished his new occupation of 'benefactor'. More, he kept inviting Western leaders to concert their efforts with his. He corresponded with presidents and prime ministers on this score. True, the traffic was usually one way, but on and off he'd received reply. There was an exchange of messages with U.S. President Carter, for example, after the Chernigov Regional Court condemned Ruban, a hardened thief, for stealing state property: he had been appropriating material, making souvenirs, and selling them. 'The real reason (for the conviction),' Sakharov explained to Carter, 'was that he had made a gift to the American people on the bicentennial of the U.S.A.: a book cover showing the Statue of Liberty.'

What wasn't the whole truth. Yes, there had been a 'gift', but there were hundreds of other objects, including some bordering on the obscene, and all made out of stolen material and all sold clandestinely. But the U.S. President tendered Sakharov official assurances: You may rest assured the American people and our government will firmly abide by their commitment to further respect for human rights not in our country alone, but the rest of the world. In other words, thief or profiteer, pin your hopes on the Carter-Sakharov duet.

But protecting followers who fall foul of the law or, more precisely, of clauses in the criminal Code dealing with thievery and embezzlement, is only one of the academician's concerns. Evidently, he was aware he couldn't get much done with an 'army' of that sort. Championing the cause of criminals was for Sakharov a pleasant sideline, no more. His main occupation was that of provocateur and traitor. Again and again, he called on the capitalist world to hit the Soviet Union. Like the theorist he is, he outlined the 'optimum' variant for the West's relations with the Soviet Union, assuming that the United States would 'have strength twice or three times superior to the Soviet'. In his pamphlet, *My Country and the World* (written in 1975), he set forth a strategy the West should follow if it wanted superior force:

'Only the strongest pressure, to which the Soviet authorities are vulnerable, has a chance of succeeding.

'The most important thing: unity of the Western powers, and one strategy in approaching the ever widening problems of relations with the socialist states.

'Unity must have a leader. Such a leader, both by rights and by virtue of its supreme responsibility, is the United States.

'I am afraid that at present the Western countries are not exerting enough pressure on the socialist countries.'

What kind of pressure? At the end of 1974, in a talk with Senator Buckley (which had spurred Sakharov to write the pamphlet) he kept telling the visiting arch-reactionary: 'The Western countries must be ready for certain sacrifices to achieve the tasks which history has set them, and especially the global challenge to socialism. Bear down on the U.S.S.R., limiting its imports of food, bear down on it in the price policy... All sorts of levers have got to be applied—overt and covert diplomacy, the press, demonstrations, other effective means: temporary refusals to cooperate in some field, legislative restrictions on trade and contacts.'

This formula, spelled out in his talk with Buckley, he repeats again and again, almost like an exhortation. In a book, *Anxieties and Hopes*, which appeared in the United States in 1978, he writes: 'All possible means of pressure must be employed to undermine prestige—covert and overt diplomacy, the press, demonstrations, and other methods,

like boycotts, refusals to cooperate in some field, legislative restrictions on trade and contacts.'

For what end? In *My Country and the World*, the 'great strategist' makes clear what the West would gain:

'I think that the aims of the socialist countries (especially the postwar consolidation of frontiers) do not wholly accord with the interests of the future of Europe.' As you see, he wants to undo what Soviet soldiers had paid for with their lives, and is enshrined in postwar international treaties. Sakharov wants the present frontiers in Europe revised. What Hitler Germany and its satellites had failed to do, the West would now achieve, so Sakharov thinks, if it applied 'pressure'.

The reforms that 'Caesar' Sakharov wants to carry out in the Soviet Union when he gains power amount, in effect, to establishing a capitalist order:

'Partial denationalization of all types of trade, excluding, perhaps, heavy industry, the chief modes of transport and communication... Partial decollectivization... Restriction of the monopoly on foreign trade...'

Sakharov wants us to renege on everything the country gained through the October Revolution. With Western assistance, he wants to turn the clock back to before 1917. He still thinks it is possible to do what international imperialism failed to do at the time of the Civil War and the armed intervention against the then young Soviet Republic. He wants to undo what the Soviet people defended in the greatest of all wars against the Nazi fiend. He declares himself a class ally of those who had killed Soviet people. Yes, an ally of murderers. Small wonder he pleaded with the American authorities not to extradite father and son Brazinkas, the criminals who killed a stewardess in a hijack of a Soviet plane. Small wonder he defended Zatikyan and his accomplices, who had placed a bomb in the Moscow Metro with the result that women and children were killed. His 'humanism' isn't simply false. It is pathologically inhuman. 'The lot of the hapless Hess,' he laments, 'is nothing less than staggering. I write of Hess, knowing that he participated in creating the criminal Nazi system.'

Sakharov acclaimed reaction wherever it reared its head. He was delighted when the blood-stained Pinochet clique grabbed power in Chile. Nor did he conceal his fury over

the victories of democratic peace forces. When the people of Vietnam won the long, incredibly hard war against U.S. imperialism, Sakharov showered bitter reproaches on Washington. 'I think,' he wrote, 'that this tragic development of events could have been averted if the United States had acted more resolutely in the military and, especially, the political fields. Political pressure on the U.S.S.R. to make it stop sending arms to North Vietnam, quick shipment of expeditionary forces, including UN forces, more effective economic aid, and involvement of other countries of Asia and Europe—all that could have influenced the course of events.' It wasn't enough for him that the United States had engaged up to 600,000 men in the war against the Vietnamese, that they had killed many hundreds of thousands of civilians, that they had ravaged a fine and beautiful country. What hatred for socialism must Sakharov have if he does not falter in writing these man-hating lines.

A spiritual outcast, provocateur Sakharov has long since put himself in the position of a traitor of his people and country.

All the things Sakharov has done against his country, abusing the patience of the Soviet people, are a grave crime by the law of any modern state. Take the United States Code. Paragraph 2385 of the Title 18 reads: 'Whoever knowingly or willfully advocates, abets, advises or teaches the duty, necessity, desirability or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the government of the United States or the government of any state ... or ... with intent to cause the overthrow or destruction of any such governments, prints, publishes, edits, issues, circulates, sells, distributes, or publicly displays any written or printed matter, advocating, advising or teaching the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying any government in the United States by force or violence, or attempts to do so ... shall be fined not more than \$ 20 000 or imprisoned not more than 20 years or both ...'

If Sakharov were a citizen of the U.S.A. and engaged in the same activities, he would doubtless have landed behind bars.

Sakharov wanted to be a Caesar, but took a criminal road.

The administrative action taken against him is designed

to stop his subversive activities. The action has been approved by the Soviet public. It may benefit Sakharov, too, provided he makes a critical reassessment of his downfall.

Western propaganda is trying to concoct a 'Sakharov problem'. But there is no such problem. In any case, there is no such problem for the Soviet people. And the concerns of those who guided Sakharov's hand from abroad are concerns of a questionable, shady nature.

That is the note on which Efimov and Petrov ended their article. Gross slander? No, every word in it is true.

THE RESULTS?

The United States spends enormous sums on subversion abroad—exactly how much it is impossible to say, for it is a state secret. It may be safely assumed, however, that it turns into thousands of millions of dollars yearly, with the lion's share going to the CIA for operations against the U.S.S.R.*

But there is nothing to show for it. The Soviet Union is building its own life, and winning well-earned respect all over the world. The CIA is powerless to halt the march to communism. A new society, the most just in history, is emerging to take the place of capitalism.

Capitalism does not want to yield ground. It is doing its utmost to defeat the forces of the new. In this sense the CIA is the concentrated expression of Big Business determination to achieve its ends at any cost. All the more

* The figures mentioned by Philip Agee, a competent researcher, give a fairly rough idea of the total U.S. intelligence budget: 'The House of Representatives committee under Congressman Otis Pike found that the total intelligence budget is "more than \$10 billion", which is "3 to 4 times more costly than the Congress has been told" and possibly five times more.

'We got a hint, however, of the overall intelligence cost in the Senate committee's report. In each place where the amounts spent on intelligence, and their percentage as a part of the federal budget, were mentioned, the figures are deleted. Except once where, apparently by clerical oversight, the overall national (strategic) intelligence cost is said to represent about 3% of the total federal budget for FY 1976. In dollars this would amount to about \$11.2 billion and would include the total approved budgets of the CIA, DIA, NSA and National Reconnaissance Office. However according to the Senate committee, adding tactical intelligence and indirect support costs would double the amounts spent on intelligence to \$22.4 billion.'

Out of this sum, according to reliable sources, 64 cents of each dollar, were directed toward the Soviet Union and U.S. commitments to NATO.

so since that cost is basically shifted to the shoulders of the people. Philip Agee, a former agent of the CIA, appalled by its inside workings, broke his ties with it, and summed up his contribution in a major exposé: 'American capitalism, based as it is on exploitation of the poor, with its fundamental motivation in personal greed, simply cannot survive without force—without a secret police force. The argument is with capitalism and it is capitalism that must be opposed with its CIA, FBI and other security agencies understood as logical, necessary manifestations of a ruling class's determination to retain power and privilege.'²

A veteran of the American labour movement—by no means a Communist but a believer in democracy—Ernest De Maio, now permanent representative of the World Federation of Trade Unions in the United Nations, observed in 1978: 'If we are to understand the CIA, we must first take a look at the socio-economic system that spawned it. Our society is a system based on the exploitation of the many by a few who own and control the capital goods that produce the nation's wealth and the financial institutions that are its lifeblood. These powerful few, with their great economic resources, control the political life of the nation. They maintain a shadow government that makes the basic decisions that are relayed to the executive and legislative branches of the overt government through henchmen placed in strategic positions throughout the federal apparatus... When we go after the CIA, we are taking on the strong-arm agency of the power structure.'³

A flawless analysis. The CIA is an instrument of the class of monopoly capitalists organized as the state. Still, in the United States the activities of the CIA and other arms of political surveillance and repression are criticized from the right. Some say that CIA & Co. is not effective enough. This view is shared also by Big Business. For instance, the millionaires and multimillionaires who hold the reins in the United States apparently feel that the state agencies which guard their class rule, do not provide enough individual protection. In the mid-seventies they employed 250,000 personal security guards, which, coupled with the latest electronic 'watchdog' systems and the like, cost \$5 billion each year. Besides, the U.S. has 4,200 private detective agencies employing 32,000 licensed opera-

tives. Spying for private individuals has assumed gigantic dimensions; according to rough estimates, for each eavesdropping device installed by government agencies 300 are planted by private detective firms.⁴

When the personal security of the ruling class is so massively ensured, some loosening of tongues about the CIA is perfectly safe. For it is further evidence of 'democracy' in the United States. Why not allow some margin to critics from the right if the end goal is a further strengthening of the CIA?

In September 1978 the U.S. journal *Commentary* carried an article entitled 'What the CIA Knows About Russia'. It deals with the abysmal ignorance of Soviet affairs in the United States: the mass media either don't know the facts or deliberately lie, while the academic world, judging by published studies, reveal total incomprehension of what is happening in the U.S.S.R. 'But if the media cannot be counted on and the academy cannot be counted on, whom can one count on?' the author of the article asks, and replies: 'At this point my American friends come up with their trump card: "You may rest assured that somewhere in the intelligence community—" The sentence breaks off, and the speaker wears an enigmatic smile, evoking hidden recesses where the analytic geniuses of the Western world—backed up by the most sophisticated computers ever devised—sit poring over field reports from the depths of the Soviet infrastructure.'

Among the many absurdities about the U.S.S.R. emanating from the CIA, the author cites this one:

'It is not surprising to find the CIA in 1973 attempting to ascertain the scientific ability of the "Russians" as though these "Russians" ... were some newly discovered remote tribe whose scientific ability had to be determined by an intelligence agency. In this connection, the CIA cites the names of four Russian men of science, as familiar to every Russian schoolboy as the names Benjamin Franklin or Thomas Edison are to every American, and manages to get two of them wrong. The world-famous chemist Mendeleev (who is listed in Webster's Dictionary as the discoverer of the periodic table) becomes Mendeleevich, and the 18th-century Enlightenment figure, Lomonosov, becomes Lomonosovskiy. One wonders what an American would think of intelligence experts on the United States who

would discover the scientific ability of Americans in 1973 by calling attention to Franklins and Edison.

'Much of this ignorance is spontaneous, rooted in a long-standing unwillingness to understand that Russia is not some exotic primitive tribe but a vast, mortally dangerous, highly complex civilization, more sophisticated, advanced and rational in some ways than the United States.'

If the CIA can produce an assessment such as that cited above, the *Commentary* article goes on, it is understandable why people should think that 'the CIA which makes public appearances before Congress and the like is not actually the real CIA at all but a clever fake designed to mislead the Soviet regime and the American people. Somewhere, totally concealed, there must be a real CIA, it is thought, for who could believe on the basis of such goings-on that this CIA is the real thing?'⁵

In the heat of argument, however, the journal overlooked the CIA's main occupation. It should be borne in mind that intelligence gathering is only a minor aspect of its functions. Its main concern is subversion. That is its true *métier*. As we noted earlier, covert action accounts for some 90 per cent of all CIA activity. American journalist David Wise wrote: 'The House intelligence committee (the Otis G. Pike committee—N. Y.) report also provided the first analysis of types of covert operations undertaken by the CIA. From 1965 to 1975, of projects approved by the Forty Committee, 32 percent were to influence foreign elections (the United States poured \$65 million into Italy over twenty years, for example), 29 percent were media and propaganda projects, and 23 percent were to finance secret armies, or to transfer arms, ammunition, or military equipment.'⁶

These findings refer to operations requiring the sanction of higher echelons than the CIA leadership. In addition, it is routine for the Agency to finance a multiplicity of foreign secular, religious, professional and labour organisations. Espionage proper, whose lamentable results are an object of endless controversy, accounts for only 16 per cent of CIA operations.

The details of the covert subversive activity are, for obvious reasons, far more difficult to ascertain. The report of the Senate Select Committee headed by Frank Church contained this significant passage: 'Covert action is defined

as clandestine activity designed to influence foreign governments, events, organizations or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such a way that the involvement of the U.S. government is not apparent.'

No wonder investigators are unable to dig down to the full truth. Even the financiers of all this activity, the two chambers of U.S. Congress, are just as hopelessly in the dark. The Church committee report puts it thus: 'There is no evidence that the full Congress . . . knew or understood the range of clandestine activities, including covert action.' What the committee made public in vague scraps of information had been censored by the CIA.

The overall guide in covert action was a National Security Council directive which empowered the CIA to

'—Create and exploit problems for International Communism;

'—Discredit International Communism, and reduce the strength of its parties and organization;

'—Reduce International Communist control over any areas of the world.'

To this end, the committee revealed, 'thousands of covert action projects have been undertaken', ranging from armed action (especially in Southeast Asia) to the recruiting and use of undercover agents of a stamp quite distinct from run-of-the-mill spies. The report said: 'The Agency developed a world-wide system of standby covert action "assets" ranging from media personnel to individuals said to influence the behaviour of governments.'

Presumably these agents are not idle, but the members of the Church committee threw up their hands, complaining that 'net judgements as to "success" or "failure" are difficult to draw'.

The uncertainty obviously derives from the fact that it just isn't done to publicize covert actions. More, after the report had already been passed by CIA censors, last-minute deletions were made in it. On the insistence of the CIA, two sections entitled 'Techniques of Covert Actions' and 'Covert Action Projects: Initiation, Review and Approval' were cut out.⁷ American researchers Alan W. Schaflin and Edward M. Opton, Jr., observed about the latter section in 1978 that 'the deleted section would have addressed the most vital question of all: who's running the country?'⁸

Reviewing the work accomplished by the Church committee, N. Stone observed that 'American history can be read as a continuous struggle between democracy and property, and in that perspective there is no doubt where the secret police stand. Their true role as the janissaries of property is only implicit, of course, in these carefully manicured Church reports'.⁹

The endless public discussion of the CIA has attuned Americans to the idea that there's ethically nothing out of the ordinary about its activity. If it's spoken about in the open, there couldn't be anything morally wrong. Yet we've already had a sampling of its morality. The talk about permanent changes in the CIA has itself become permanent. Henry Kissinger, we learn, spoke of reorganizing the intelligence community to bring it in line with the changing world. What he and Nixon really had in mind was to ensure the success of the Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy, with the intelligence community helping to carry it into effect. What is that if not a revival of OSS methods.

Nowadays, the CIA is treated as one of the more respectable agencies of the U.S. administration. Those who asseverate the impropriety of that, are invariably defeated. The average American has been taught to think that CIA business is good, clean business. A revealing example is how Nixon and Kissinger succeeded in legalizing subversive radio stations that had been secretly financed by the CIA in the previous twenty years.

On January 25, 1971, Republican Senator Clifford P. Case, member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, made a startling declaration to his colleagues, to the effect that in the past twenty years several hundred million dollars were spent out of the United States budget on the maintenance of Free Europe and Liberty. In the past fiscal year alone, the CIA spent 30 million dollars for this. And all that time Congress was kept in the dark.

This mode of procedure, Case added, was at loggerheads with the solemn promises of the administration. When in 1967 the world learned of the CIA financing the National Students Association, a special presidential committee, including CIA Director Richard Helms, ruled that no government agencies would directly or indirectly render any financial support to any national educational or

other voluntary organisation. President Johnson extended this rule to all government institutions of the U.S.A.

In effect, Senator Case and Ogden R. Reid, who backed him in the House of Representatives, were irated by just the legal aspect of the matter. The political side did not disturb them at all. Yet that was the side which created the many oddities in the government's relation to the radio stations or, more bluntly, to CIA activity in the field of psychological warfare against the socialist countries, first of all the Soviet Union.

One administration after another, whether Democratic or Republican (Senator William Fulbright, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, would say some time later), allocated funds to the two radio stations, and this secret funding went hand in hand with political control. If the allocated amounts (he will add) are an indication of their significance to the government, then they are obviously a crucial U.S. operation in relation to the socialist countries.

The White House ordered the 40 Committee, with Helms again among its members, to examine Senator Case's proposals. Months went by. The investigation dragged out. And it is hard to tell whether it would ever have come to an end if Polish intelligence officer Andrzej Czechowics hadn't told foreign correspondents in a Warsaw press-conference on March 10, 1971, of the impressions he brought away after working at Radio Free Europe for a number of years. A scandal erupted in the West.

Two days after the press-conference, the Department of State was notified that hearings on the financing of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe would resume on April 28. The State Department asked for a postponement—the longer the better. The ensuing tussle between the two sides culminated in a compromise: the postponement would run to May 24.

When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations gathered on that day, and the witnesses arrived, Senator Case, who had cooked up the whole thing, was seen to be troubled by just one thing: the secrecy shrouding previously the channels that financed the two stations had prevented Congress from approving the size of the allocations. He suggested a sum of \$30 million for FY 1972, with the reservation that if more money were needed, the sum could

be increased. Congressman Reid, too, said nothing of the CIA's mode of operations. 'I am here today,' he said, 'to support this bill, and to enhance thereby, we hope, the credibility of RFE and RL, which I consider to be useful and informational broadcasters.'¹⁰ Most of the committee members, and all the invited witnesses, spoke in the same vein.

Committee Chairman Senator Fulbright attempted to examine the matter more closely. He came to grips with Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, who was a witness, for saying that 'perhaps this is something, the past history here, which could best be most fully discussed in an executive session... I am not at liberty myself today to talk about the past history of these radio stations in an open session... If you are interested in going into the history of how it was developed, I would be very happy to do that as I said, in an executive session, where we can be as frank as you wish.'¹¹

Not until Senator Fulbright had broken down his reserve, did Hillenbrand admit that the CIA may have rendered some 'insignificant financial assistance' to the radio stations, but this only to help in the fine cause of 'enlightenment and education', and certainly without in any way influencing the nature of their broadcasts.

Fulbright, who was calling for realism in international affairs, wanted the radio stations to take their due place among the discards of the cold war. He did not stick at angry sarcasm. 'The CIA,' he said, 'is authorized by special act. I think it grows out of the National Security Act of 1947. I do not recall there is any authority for an intelligence-gathering agency to undertake an additional program such as the cultural program which is authorized. I do not believe Congress, in authorizing the CIA, expected it to undertake the responsibility of educating other people on the facts of life in the educational, cultural, or artistic fields—do you? I do not think that was contemplated nor involved in the basic organization for the CIA... Certainly, no one could doubt that the CIA is paying [for the RFE and RL]... that they supervise what it does. Neither the CIA nor any other agency is going to put out the money like this and allow some unknown or private individual to determine a policy.'¹²

The debate collapsed after Congress granted RFE and RL 36 million dollars in FY 1972. In early 1972, Fulbright tried again to raise the question of the CIA's ties with the radio stations, which were being obfuscated by a discussion of the technical aspects of financing them. For years, he wrote to President Nixon, people were made to believe that the radio stations were run on students' collections. It turned out, however, that the hundreds of millions of allegedly collected dollars came from CIA coffers. This was part of a ruse to impress on the American people and the people of Eastern Europe that the stations were private organisations run exclusively on private charitable contributions. This sort of thing, Fulbright said, had the same perverse and morbid imagination behind it, the same prejudices and the same thinking divorced from reality, that has already given rise to such ugly things as the flights of U-2 spy planes, the Bay of Pigs landing, and the Tonkin Bay incident.

Three months later, the President set up a special study commission to look into RL and RFE financing. The CIA's role was not mentioned. Nixon again recommended Congress to endorse his new 'temporary' bill for FY 1973. Congress obliged. It earmarked 38.5 million dollars, a still greater sum this time, to run Free Europe and Liberty.

The special presidential commission to study ways of financing 'private' radio stations, known as the Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting, began functioning in August 1972. Its members displayed zeal and energy. We see from the report submitted to the President half a year later, that they 'went to Munich, Germany, site of the studios, where we went as deeply and thoroughly as we could into the research, news gathering, monitoring, broadcasting.' They also interviewed 'recent emigres from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.' ¹³

We take it that what they saw and heard in Munich left a good impression. Still, one tends to wonder why the honorable members of the commission found none among the defectors and top-ranking personnel of the two stations to suspect of associations with the CIA, for there were and still are many of its proved agents there. All the commission was concerned with was to devise a method of granting the radio stations financial support 'in such a way as not to impair their professional independence, credibili-

ty, and effectiveness, while retaining assurance that the broadcasts will not jeopardise the objectives of United States foreign policy.' ¹⁴

An organisation was formed in 1974, named the Board for International Broadcasting, with headquarters in Washington. From this Board radio stations Liberty and Free Europe, housed in Munich under one roof, received \$50 million in 1974, as much in 1975. By the eighties this financial support was running into nearly an annual hundred or so million dollars.

The summer 1973 hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee may well be likened to a last ditch stand that Senator Fulbright put up with not the faintest hope—as friends and foes saw—of even partial victory. RFE chief of the Polish department, Jan Nowak, writing of the situation in a private letter that came to public notice, said 'as you surely know, Fulbright suffered a bad defeat in his own Committee. There is nothing now to threaten the continuation of our Radio during the next fiscal year.' ¹⁵

Little wonder, therefore, that Fulbright's pronouncement became restrained and laconic, though again he found it necessary to stress that 'for two decades ... both radios were believed by the American people to be operating on budgets financed wholly by charitable contributions. The reality, as we now know, was that the radios were financed almost entirely by funds secretly supplied by the Central Intelligence Agency ... During that period, ... the two radios received nearly \$800 million of the taxpayers' money.' ¹⁶

No one bothered to come to grips with him. Fulbright was ignored. The other members of the committee and the witnesses summoned to its hearings seemed to have agreed among themselves to extol the great cause of 'liberty' in which the two radios and the CIA were engaged. There were also new overtones. Priorly, it was the custom to speak of winning the whole Soviet people for 'freedom'. Now the accent shifted on support and moral aid to the 'small but influential elite that was boldly defending its convictions'—the dissidents.

Most enlightening on this score was the statement of one-time Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Ball. He said to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 'I would say that perhaps the most important function that Radio Liberty perhaps has performed is to serve as a

kind of ancillary to this effort to assure the circulation or the availability to a very much wider audience of this samizdat material because the Radio Liberty station has the greatest collection of samizdat in the world. ... And it gives currency to this within the Soviet Union by beaming it back. The result is that there is a kind of multiplier factor. What could be achieved through circulation from person to person of type scripts is multiplied enormously by the availability of this samizdat material through the activities of Radio Liberty... We would be doing them a very cruel disservice if the service of these stations were to be discontinued.' ¹⁷

Try and visualise this consensus, and imagine the shock at the hearing when Fulbright gave the floor to a relatively obscure witness he had invited on his own, one Dewey F. Bartlett, whom the chairman introduced as an 'independent', that is, officially unconnected with any governmental agency or private company, a specialist in the field of communications.

Bartlett said: 'It has long been my view that RFE and Liberty, in their present form, should be closed down and their facilities put to better use ...

'As one who has spent nearly 30 years in broadcast communications of all types I strongly believe in an exchange of information among the peoples of the world. But exchanging information among nations is not the role of RFE and Liberty... The special and primary mission of RFE and Liberty is to give people in the eastern zones ... what the State Department wants said by some entity it can then officially disavow ...

'There are hundreds of letters ... but I have seen no hard evidence to convince me that the Soviet or other east bloc masses are reached ...

'Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were conceived in the State Department born to the CIA, and fed from the public treasury ...

'I believe the time has come ... to strip RFE and Liberty of their false facades once and for all... They should become legally what they are in fact—corporations in which the U.S. Government owns all the stock.' ¹⁸

But Bartlett's deposition altered nothing in the general trend and tenor. None of the speakers who followed him 'stooped' to any direct denials of what he had said.

At a sitting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the end of May 1974, also devoted to the funding of RFE and RL, speakers kept mentioning Solzhenitsyn. Those present were given the monthly programs of Radio Liberty with a detailed scenario of Solzhenitsyn's slanderous lampoons. Again and again, speakers recited Solzhenitsyn's various pronouncements.*

During this last hearing (the last, because after it the financing of RFE and RL was put on a permanent basis by an act of Congress) it was made clear to one and all that the services of, say, Radio Liberty were so highly special that, say, the Voice of America could never fill the gap. It is down in the minutes of the committee that 'by contrast with the VOA and other Western official stations... RFE and RL are unofficial stations broadcasting only to the peoples of East Europe and the U.S.S.R.; as such they provide a comprehensive picture of what is going on in the listener's own country.' ²⁰

True, there were those who couldn't grasp why information, if it was true to the facts, could not be broadcast by the Voice of America. Wouldn't that save a lot of money? To convince them, the Program Policy Manual of Radio Liberty was brought to light, with the following passage in it: 'In contrast to other outside broadcasters, who project their own "national" point of view, Radio Liberty offers in each language programming as closely equivalent as possible to that which an objective, uncensored domestic radio station would provide.' ²¹

The above necessarily concize description of that relatively small area of CIA subversive activity against the U.S.S.R. shows that the United States is willfully breaching the juridical norms of U.S. relations with other countries. Washington knows that perfectly well.

* Extreme reactionaries in the United States find them useful in backing the big lie about a Soviet military threat. Senator Jesse Helms, for example, had this to say to his countrymen: "'World War III is over, and the West has lost it," Mr. Solzhenitsyn announced, and day by day the headlines bore him out... Our forebears had the sense to heed the words of Paul Revere: "The British are coming!" Unless we heed the words of his counterparts today, of Schlesinger and Solzhenitsyn and a host of lesser prophets, we are going to be invaded: "The Russians are coming!" The possibility we refused to admit will come to pass, and we will be powerless to respond to it.' ¹⁹

In September 1974 the House of Representatives defeated an amendment which would have forbidden the Central Intelligence Agency to fund operations 'for the purpose of undermining or destabilizing the government of any foreign country'. A month later in the Senate the same fate befell an amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which would have forbidden any agency of the United States Government to carry out 'any activity within any foreign country which violates or is intended to encourage the violation of, the laws of the United States or of such countries, except for activities "necessary" to the security of the United States and intended "solely" to gather intelligence.'²²

The defeat of these amendments revealed that the majority on Capitol Hill considered CIA covert action part of official U.S. policy, and blocked those who wanted normal practice to prevail in inter-state relations.

Upon the establishment in 1933 of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, both sides, on U.S. initiative, undertook not only to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs but also to restrain all individuals and organizations under their direct or indirect control, including organizations receiving state financial aid, from overt and covert action which may be detrimental to public tranquillity and welfare, law and order, and security of the other side. Direct mention was made here of 'agitation and propaganda'. These undertakings, formalized in an exchange of letters between Maxim Litvinov and Franklin D. Roosevelt, are still in force.

When in 1951 U.S. Congress officially allocated funds for the activation and maintenance of armed units made up of traitors to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries to be used against the U.S.S.R., the Soviet government pointed out in a note handed to the U.S. charge d'affaires on November 21, 1951: 'The enactment by the United States of this law is an act unprecedented in relations between states and represents an instance of gross interference by the United States in the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time it is an outrageous violation in international law.'

Washington ignored the protest.

The Basic Principles of Relations Between the Soviet Union and the United States of America, signed on May

29, 1972, says that the sides 'will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence'.

This was the first official Soviet-American document in which the United States officially recognized the principle of peaceful coexistence.

And there is no room in the peaceful coexistence doctrine, officially recognized by the United States, for any psychological warfare. The CIA, which is continuing its subversive activity against the Soviet Union, is prejudicing the very basis of Soviet-American relations.

AFTERWORD

In 1979 the University of Chicago Press published *Russia and the United States. US-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of View*. A mass market edition appeared in 1980. The authors were Professor Nikolai Sivachev of Moscow State University and myself. The book had a long history: the publisher had requested us to write a book back in 1971, eight years before it was finally published. The delay was considerable, due in part to technical difficulties—the translation, the shuttling of the manuscript and proofs between Chicago and Moscow, work schedules at Moscow University Publishing House—but largely, I must confess, to my conviction that there was nothing urgent about the task.

It took Professor Sivachev, a frequent visitor to the United States, considerable time and effort to make me realize that a Soviet view of the problem in English was really a matter of some urgency. I refused to hurry in the mistaken belief that at least among American historians there were enough people who knew Russian and thus had no need of crutches—works of Soviet historians translated into English. Since in the Soviet Union it goes without saying that anyone majoring in history must have a working knowledge of two (better three) foreign languages, I thought that was also true of the United States. But my extrapolation was wrong. As the U.S. historian John Lewis Gaddis said about the book, 'American readers rarely get opportunities' to get acquainted with books by Soviet authors because 'Soviet scholarly writings do not often appear in translation and Americans do not often learn Russian.'¹ Anyway, the 300-page book was finally published in the United States.

From the outset, Professor Sivachev and myself decided we would write the book exactly as we would have for a Soviet publisher, presenting the average Soviet approach

to the issue. As Nikolai Sivachev remarked in his interview to *The New York Times*, 'we did not set out to please the American reader, nor did the University of Chicago Press asked us to. On the contrary, they recommended that we should feel free to present our own views. I think it would be unfair to the reader in the United States for me to write one way for Soviet publications and another for an American publisher.'²

To be quite frank, I did not set much store by that book. It was a general survey, and many of approximately 20 titles I had published in the Soviet Union were much more thorough than my part of the book in question. I was therefore amazed at the veritable deluge of reviews that appeared in the West from the spring of 1979 to the summer of 1980: scores of them, and offering different assessments. I believe it would be pertinent to discuss them here, because they have a direct bearing on the book *CIA Target—U.S.S.R.*, offered in English by Progress Publishers.

We concluded our book *Russia and the United States. US-Soviet Relations from the Soviet Point of View* (Professor Sivachev dealt with the period from the late 18th century to September 1, 1939, and myself, with that from the start of World War II to this day) by saying:

'We have looked back on the past, it is for the basic reason that history teaches us at least what we must not do, what we must avoid. We must avoid an arms race, first of all, and instead of accusations and counteraccusations learn more positive language. May the possibilities which in the recent past have been lost in the wind not be permitted to slip by during our time... It has been the obvious truth that our two great nations share too much responsibility in international relations, in preserving world peace, to allow unscrupulous, irresponsible, and vested interest groups to distract them from fulfilling truly historical tasks.'³

The book presented our conclusions made on the strength of facts, not of moralizing or rhetoric. Let us now turn to the response it generated.

* * *

First, about those who spared neither effort nor paper to serve ends that had little in common with a dispassionate and scholarly examination. The trick they all used

was giving a biased and crude interpretation of the book and pointing at those 'Messrs. Sivachev and Yakovlev' who 'paint an unrelieved picture of a monstrous America bent on annihilating that bastion of Stalinist-Leninist-Marxist righteousness and human behavior, the U.S.S.R.'⁴ The *Virginia Quarterly Review* did not use much space to present that conclusion, but the *Strategic Review* castigated us in an article almost as long as the Afterword you are reading now. The review was written by Mose L. Harvey, Director of the Advanced International Studies Institute. I quote:

'This is an extraordinarily revealing book. It is also a chilling book. It was written by two Soviet academicians at the invitation of the University of Chicago Press as part of what it calls "a novel venture for both scholarship and publishing" involving "turning to a non-American scholar of distinction for a discussion of his country's relations with America".'

'The authors in their preface assert that "the decisive factor" that led up to their acceptance of the invitation to write the book "was the desire to take what part we could in overcoming the negative heritage of the cold war".'

'Yet the book is itself an unmitigated exercise in cold war. There is no pretense of objectivity, no admission of any Soviet error, no concession of any American goodwill. And this is by representatives of a presumably new breed of Soviet intellectuals on whom so many Americans have staked such great faith as progenitors of a new order of enlightenment and reason in the U.S.S.R. . . .

'Presumably written to further detente, the book leaves no doubt that the detente that is at stake is one of strictly Soviet design. Over and over again the message is that good relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R. can be steeped only in U.S. acceptance of Soviet view-points, and only if and as the United States recognizes and bows to the "objective realities" of Soviet power.'⁵

After reading this and many other similar reviews, Sivachev and myself felt flattered: it is not every day that ordinary professors are elevated to the rank of 'politicians' able to dictate the United States to 'bow'. Then the London *Survey*, a weighty anticommunist quarterly, told us we had written the book on the instructions of some higher authority, because one simply did not speak one's mind in the Soviet Union.

The *Survey* made wisecracks about why it had taken so long to prepare the book: it was all because the supervisors found it difficult to draw up the formulas the authors were to insert in the book.

It was all much simpler than the wits from the *Survey* made it look. I only make this point because the majority of the reviewers labored under the same misconception. As the *Roanoke Times and World News* put it, 'it is inconceivable that they (the authors—N. Y.) could have published a book of this sort without official Soviet government approval, and so one safely assumes that the opinions and interpretations contained in it have been very carefully screened by the Soviet Foreign Ministry.'⁶ The British *International Affairs* went even further: 'In the Soviet Union they (historians) face even more overt pressure to distort history: to avoid the wrath of GLAVLIT—Soviet censorship' and therefore the book presented 'a fairly orthodox Soviet view'.⁷ The *American Historical Review*, the leading journal of U.S. historians, said: 'This book by two Soviet historians conveys what the Soviet government would like Americans to think the Russians think of those relations . . . Moreover, the new Soviet venture in diplomatic history also differs from most previous ones by serving unabashedly the cause of detente as Moscow understands it. Laudable as that cause may be, it does not necessarily provide the correct inspiration for good history. To be sure, compared with the thesis-infested and cantankerous Soviet historiography of the past, Nikolai B. Sivachev & Nikolai N. Yakovlev's opus is almost a model of restrained factual analysis. But still, the thesis comes first, and the facts are harnessed to fit into it.'⁸ The *National Review* thought the Soviet Foreign Ministry was not good enough and believed the book was 'supposedly the first account written of Russo-American relations to carry the imprimatur of the Kremlin'.⁹

These quotations point to the Western belief, shared even in academic circles, that Soviet scholars are merely puppets whose strings are pulled by some mysterious higher authorities. Nothing could be further from the truth. There are no strings. As to the ominous censors, they could not possibly find anything to censor in any book like ours: Glavlit's mission is to see that no state or military secrets appear in print. A book on diplomatic history written to

interpret materials that are open to any historian could hardly contain anything secret.

Thomas Conway wrote his review for the *Boston Sunday Globe*, and his article was in keeping with the newspaper's prestige. Of course, we could not agree with him on many points. For example, we did not recognize ourselves in his description of us as people who lack 'generosity for those who do not share the authors' world view, who do not see things in as clear a light. While claiming that "condescension is inappropriate", this unfortunate intellectual vice permeates and mars the entire work. When discussing American motives, leaders, or scholars they are consistently arrogant ... belligerent and snide. While they emphasize the need to "trust each other on the basis of equality and mutual respect", the authors persistently evince a complete intolerance for opposing views.' And so on and so forth in the same vein.

Still, Mr. Conway has learned his lessons from studying at Columbia University Russian Institute and going on several study-tours of the Soviet Union. He rejects out of hand the notion that Soviet scholars have no faces of their own: 'An American reader should not prejudge this book as simply another dreary contribution to the rhetoric of Soviet propaganda. It is more than this. The book is an expression of a view of the world that is truly and strikingly different from an American one and it is important to understand that it is a theory of reality that is shared by most, if not all, Soviet intellectuals who study America and its foreign policy ... One must go further and understand that such a view of reality is sincerely and deeply held and that it is part of a larger belief system that gives the authors' scholarly work coherence and meaning ...

'In their minds the Soviet Union has always had noble purposes, it has always been consistently benevolent in its foreign policy and it has been innocent of causing any tensions or hostilities with the U.S. Aside from peace, all it has desired is to be treated "equally" in a businesslike and sober manner. Above all, the Soviet Union is a first-rate power, it will remain so, and it must be treated as such.

'While the authors portray the Soviets as justified and exemplary in all their actions, they see nothing but naked ambition in similar actions of the U.S. America has been responsible for all the tensions between the two nations.

It has been an aggressive and hostile power ... It is clear that whatever detente might mean to American scholars, to the authors it does not mean the dulling of the struggle of ideas.' ¹⁰

We accept this evaluation, discounting several turns of phrase and often groundless emotion. That was what we wanted our book to say. Thomas Conway the scholar grasped our views, our convictions at which we arrived after studying the United States and not at the behest of some higher-ups. Incidentally, those in the West who picture us as puppets also recognize that we have written a professional book. Elementary logic upsets their claim: no one can become a professional in historiography on orders from above.

* * *

Our book reflected not only the overall Soviet view of U.S. policy but also that of a group of perceptive American historians, usually called 'revisionists', who stepped into the limelight at the juncture of the 1960s and 1970s. Although they proceeded from different precepts and arrived at different conclusions, they proved that all the responsibility for the cold war rested with the United States. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., one of the intellectual pillars of the American establishment, seized on our book as another chance to get even with the 'revisionists', whom he had been fighting for almost 15 years. Professor Schlesinger wrote a lengthy and fulminating article. Placing us squarely among the 'revisionists', he called our book 'egregious' and appealed to law-abiding Americans to make their own conclusions about the way 'Sivachev and Yakovlev give the American revisionists a benign pat on the head ... But the revisionists do not go far enough to satisfy Sivachev and Yakovlev, who present a benevolent and infallible Soviet Union, incapable of offense, miscalculation, or error, patently seeking peace against all manner of Western provocation.' ¹¹ The professor's foray does not tie in with the claim that the U.S. academic community lives in a realm of pure reason and does not stoop to low politics.

We believe—and we said as much in our book—(and naturally, Mr. Schlesinger is incensed by it) that the 'revisionists' have made a major contribution to the analysis of U.S. foreign policy motives. We have closely followed

and welcomed their work. The *Sunday Oregonian*, of course, went too far when it said that 'students of American foreign policy will find the text an echo of our own Cold War revisionists who fault the United States for the pernicious relations between the two countries'.¹² It would be more accurate to say that their books and ours share the same realistic approach to U.S. foreign policy. We wrote that 'the "revisionists", somewhat tardily, have agreed with the Soviet historians regarding who bears the responsibility for cold war and who is to blame that reasonable possibilities in American-Soviet relations were not realized'.¹³

Let us not argue about who echoed whom. Let us return to Arthur Schlesinger. He needs no introduction. From time to time he worked for the government—for example, under President Kennedy. But his early years in the Office of Strategic Services poisoned him for life. It appears that the haughty intellectual has great affection for the intelligence operators and considers himself one of them, even though he does not wear the cloak-and-dagger uniform.

It also appears that this passion of Schlesinger's explains the policeman's logic he demonstrated in his lengthy article and also the word 'egregious', widely used in the books extolling the American establishment and intelligence services.

The amazing thing is that John Lewis Gaddis, a capable historian, said in reviewing our book that 'it provides evidence, simultaneously, of increasing sophistication in American studies inside the Soviet Union, and of the egregious shortcomings that still remain'. Another amazing thing is that Mr. Gaddis analyzes what the authors 'choose to emphasize or ignore' because 'the most striking aspect of the book, though, is what it reveals about the preoccupations and anxieties of the current Kremlin leadership, which presumably passed on the "correctness" of the arguments advanced therein'. The Kremlin, of course, has nothing better to do than reading and endorsing what Sivachev and Yakovlev wrote.

But Gaddis is a gifted scholar, and his works stand out in the American historiography of the 1970s. And yet he says this: 'Sivachev and Yakovlev seem oddly unaware that American revisionism on the origins of the Cold War of which they predictably approve, has not been much heard from in recent years. No serious American scholar still be-

lieves, as they do, that Truman dropped atomic bombs on Japan primarily to frighten the Russians.'¹⁴ If that were so, why then did Arthur Schlesinger tear himself away from the assembly line of commercial books to castigate us. How can one explain the remark made by M. Harvey: 'The discourse they (Sivachev and Yakovlev—N. Y.) have produced will doubtless be hailed by such revisionists, since it both honors their views and offers new vistas for "that intellectual masochism" which Harvard historian Adam Ulam sees as the hallmark of the American revisionist cult.'¹⁵ That is a well-known viewpoint. Henry Kissinger made free with that expression in his memoirs and used it to describe anyone critical of Washington's official course.

Soviet historians are perfectly aware of what happened to some of the revisionists. We wondered at the remarkable way erstwhile critics were incorporated into the prevailing doctrine of American historiography, while some of their theses were used and not credited to their authors. That process, reminiscent of the one used to hammer together the 'consensus' of the 1950s, will be analyzed in the forthcoming book by the Soviet historian O. Stepanova.

Mr. Gaddis' remarks are, of course, understandable. So are all the forays against our book that linked us to the revisionists: the *enfants terribles* appeared tame, the 'consensus' looked so touching, and then it turns out that their views are appreciated in the Soviet Union, and this is said in a book which, no matter how one berates it, has been described as sensible by American publishers. According to the *Publishers Weekly*, 'historians and scholars will find the book most valuable'¹⁶; the *Library Journal* said 'this book will be especially valuable for students of American diplomatic history and foreign policy'.¹⁷

Or, according to Norma C. Noonan's article in the respectable *Perspective*, 'Although works by Soviet authors on history and other social sciences are available in Russian and sometimes also in translation in the U.S., they are generally not widely read except by specialists. This book, published by a major American press, will no doubt have broader circulation and publicity than comparable works published in the U.S.S.R. . . . Clearly, this work belongs in every college library, because it is a sophisticated treatise and a major source on American foreign policy from a Soviet perspective. Students and scholars of U.S. history and

politics, as well as people who do business with the U.S.S.R., are the most likely audience for the book.' ¹⁸

Professor William Appleton Williams, president-elect of the Organization of American Historians and author of 'revisionist' classics, singled out what he considered the main thrust of the book. Having proved in passing that 'revisionism' was not at all dead, he aptly drew America's attention to the way the book exposed the U.S. approach to the Soviet Union as unjust: 'Sivachev and Yakovlev raise significant issues. The question here involves the inherent contradiction—or double standard—exhibited by American leaders (and most intellectuals) in the following ways...

'It is permissible for us to criticize, or apply pressure to change internal policy in the U.S.S.R., but it is unacceptable for them to do the same in the U.S.A. We can push Christianity, or to try to remove a foreign minister (Bullitt vs. Litvinov), but they must behave as perfect isolationists and virginal non-interventionists.

'It is perfectly within the rules for us to renege on economic commitments by playing word games: a credit is not a loan.

'It is wise for us to devise a sophisticated strategic plan, but fiendish for them to look out for their own interests.

'All of these matters clearly informed and affected Soviet perceptions of American policy. The authors develop their remark, "ideology was subordinated to real national interests", as rather sophisticated dialectical argument: Western capitalism (led by Roosevelt) wanted to defeat the Axis at the least possible cost to itself. This produces, in the course of the remainder of the book, a subtle criticism of Roosevelt, Churchill and others. The West successfully avoided great losses only to emerge victorious with the Soviets claiming territory and influence in payment for death and devastation. Here we have a certain revision of the revisionists.

'And so we come to the consequences of letting the Russians defeat the Germans. *It is eerie*. We chose fewer casualties, *and butter at home*, only to awake from the dream of preserving the 19th century to the reality of capitalism on the defensive.

'So naturally we turned to the capital intensive solution: the atom bomb. The authors do an impressive bit of

work with Clark Clifford's memo to Truman in September 1946, almost a year before the publication of Kennan's "X" article: "Therefore, in order to maintain our strength at a level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet Union, the U.S. must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare."

Professor Williams has a distinct and remarkable style. He assumes that the reader is aware of the facts he cites. It is rarely that way, but the expert grasps it all right away. Professor Williams has somewhat sharpened our arguments and shifted their emphasis, but without losing sight of the crux of the matter. Today's developments are rooted in the Second World War, and our book stressed that. To fail to see this means to understand nothing.

The most heartening thing is that Professor Williams brought it home to those in the United States who are willing to see a class approach in our evaluation of Washington's most recent moves against the U.S.S.R.:

'Make no mistake about it: Sivachev and Yakovlev are good. Of course, we learn to "bleep" the nonsense out of Russian rhetoric, just as we do with our own American spokespeople. But they do confront the issue of human rights in a way that keeps you up very late at night. It is not so much matter of food, shelter, and clothing against one-man-one-vote, as it is something they quote from Jack Green on the American revolution: "Every man was to have an equal opportunity to become more unequal."

'Yes, it is deadly.

'Either we do better than the American Revolution *and* the Bolshevik Revolution or we will be preaching about human rights as we commit genocide.' ¹⁹

Professor Williams is right. That is precisely what we meant: the 'human rights' campaign coming from the United States is an outrageous exercise in hypocrisy on the part of the propertied powers-that-be. Here is the quotation from our book he referred to among other things: 'We Soviet people are constantly told by various means—for example, by various radio "Voices"—that "dissidents" represent true aspirations of our country! We witness ever new "operations" by the Western mass media—"Solzhenitsyn", "the issue of human rights", etc. We are constantly taught to try to see a certain beacon of freedom that is to light the way—for the whole world, especially for us, allegedly

steeped in vice and delusions. One needs, indeed, a strong sense of humor to tolerate this massive campaign.

'The greatest pundit, we are told, of course is Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In late 1976, the Novosti Press Publishing House published an essay by Nikolai Yakovlev, *Living in Lie*. It should be quoted at some length because this essay has direct bearing on the problems of our book. Having analyzed Solzhenitsyn's major works, I, Professor Yakovlev, concluded... (See the last chapter of this book for the main points made in *Living in Lie*—N. Y.)

'Here we come to the last point—"freedom", the meaning of "human rights", all that is now being hotly debated in the West; and we, the Russians, are invited to draw salutary lessons from torrents of words. Recent celebrations of the United States bicentennial helped us all to realize the precise meaning of this high-sounding discussion. We never concealed the fact that our countries represent opposite socio-economic systems. The major difference is private property.'²⁰ This was followed by Professor Green's quotation about the American Revolution referred to in part by Professor Williams.

We have always considered Professor Williams a man of boundless intellectual courage. This time he has also displayed considerable civic courage by pointing to the class aspect of our work. Our book was attacked in the United States often enough, but its critics were united not only in their outrage but also in their silence regarding our interpretation of the 'human rights' campaign. The longest remarks on that issue were like this: *The New York Times* lengthy summary-review merely said that the authors 'call President Carter's human rights program abrasive'²¹. We never used that word. That would have been putting it too mildly. The reviewers, quite verbose on other issues, were surprisingly close-mouthed about our assessment of that campaign. Only very few, very brief reviews noted in passing that we discussed that problem. For example, 'this unique study of Soviet-U.S. relations...concedes nothing to our campaign for human rights'²². Or, 'in their discussion of human rights, the authors charge the U.S. with interfering in Soviet internal affairs and thus jeopardizing peaceful coexistence and detente'.²³

It is perfectly clear why the issue was hushed up. Those in the United States who support the 'dissidents' are on

shaky ground and besides, the latter are hardly capable of winning widespread approval in the West. *The New World Review*, a progressive American publication, offered a competent analysis of the book and began it by going back to the October Revolution of 1917: 'Those groups, who are now, as then, incessantly preaching their warped version of "human rights" to the world while continuing to conduct their old policies of covert intervention, political doubletalk, and economic and military blackmail, and with the unspoken assumption—accepted, fortunately, by fewer and fewer foreigners and U.S. citizens—that the United States has a God-given right to set others straight, because the latter are not—allegedly—competent enough to do the job for themselves.

'The propaganda continues to din forth, but as Sivachev and Yakovlev remind us, the same patterns of response were evident sixty-two years ago. The vaunted "human rights" campaign with its saccharine solicitude for emigres and "dissidents", no matter who and no matter how benighted and manipulated, was already in full swing at that time.

'Ignored then, as later, was the momentous, central reality of our era: that the real emigres and dissidents are the multiplying millions intent on leaving the capitalist system forever, whether their individually customized biographies are ever published or not; the true "dissidents" are not the vastly overpublicized minority of fortune-seekers, drop-outs and asserted celebrities, whose ready-made confessions of personal grievance and failure clutter the remainder shelves of the discount bookstores.'²⁴

Alan Wolfe, a member of the *Nation's* editorial board, is a fascinated traveler in the capitalist jungle. A perceptive and shrewd scholar, he views American realities with sadness. A seeker after the truth and a political thinker, Dr. Wolfe is blessed with an insatiable curiosity, and our book has not escaped his attention. His colleagues should be grateful to him for most of his competent criticism and pertinent conclusions.

'The fact is that *Russia and the United States* comes closer to the truth in its perceptions of American-Soviet relations than any comparable "official" history in the United States could. The reason for this is simple: hostility between the United States and the Soviet Union has, from

the beginning, been more the responsibility of America than Russia. As a skeptic who views state power with inherent suspicion, I would like to be able to blame both countries equally for the frequent deterioration in their relationship... Yet the historical record is overwhelming. While Russia has from time to time acted foolishly (and once or twice in adventurous fashion), the United States has been obstinate, hypocritical, aggressive, sanctimonious, untrustworthy and needlessly belligerent. The new-found "friendship" with China is just one more chapter in a long history of hostility toward the Soviet Union.

'In treating the sorry record of performance of the United States in these matters, Sivachev and Yakovlev try hard to find the right tone. Critical of the United States, they make an effort to restrain their indignation. Possessed of a fuller sense of the complexity of American politics than many Soviet specialists on America, they understand that alternatives were possible... Conversant with the work of revisionist historians in the United States, they engage frequently in debates of considerable importance. Moreover, they have avoided being ponderous, and even, from time to time strike a humorous note... Their book is entertaining to read, instructive and, in many respects, fascinating. They took on a most difficult assignment and performed it extremely well.'²⁵

* * *

The discussion in the United States of the Soviet survey of Soviet-American diplomatic relations, necessarily described here in detail, is far from reflecting all U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. The polemic touched on the traditional and respectable form of intergovernment relations, one that is studied by professional historians. Soviet historians have always stayed within the confines of that field.

But the trends that emerged in the United States back in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt times have now grown so much that diplomatic historiography can no longer highlight all the aspects of relations between our two countries. U.S. foreign policy is increasingly resorting to psychological warfare and subversion—the techniques born in Washington during the war against the Axis powers. They have now been officially adopted as routine methods used

by the United States in its relations with the Soviet Union. This is even reflected in the structure of U.S. foreign policy leadership, comprising the State Department and the President's Special Assistant for National Security, the man in charge of the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence community.

The dichotomy of methods—official diplomacy with its pious declarations and subversion aimed at overthrowing governments Washington dislikes—often gives rise to conflicts between those in charge of those two top government agencies. Such conflicts—for example, those that happened under Presidents Nixon and Carter—were not so much rooted in the personal qualities of the Secretary of State or the Special Assistant for National Security (despite speculation to that effect in the mass media) as in the controversy over priorities, over whether the desired result at a given moment should be achieved by diplomacy or subversion or a combination of the two, and if so, what should the ratio be, etc.

Another question was whether the issue discussed was a 'crisis situation'; the positions of the competing colleagues depended on the answer to that question because, according to American mythology, the State Department takes care of maintaining traditional diplomatic relations, while the President's Special Assistant for National Security steps to the fore in case of 'crisis'. Henry Kissinger's memoirs are interesting in this regard because they supplied the students of U.S. foreign policy with certain authoritative—although strictly limited—information about the way the entire mechanism operated. Dr. Kissinger was, of course, in a position to do so because he had held both these posts and had been an employee or a willing associate of military intelligence (G-2), the CIA and the FBI. His diplomatic pragmatism is rooted in the considerable personal experience he accumulated while working for the intelligence services and in his 'theoretical' penchant for rationalizing the unthinkable.

Henry Kissinger's symbiosis of diplomacy, and covert operations shows how greatly today's U.S. foreign policy differs from, say, the pastoral 1950s. In those days, the U.S. journalist W. Bowart recalls, 'in the chill of the Cold War, few Americans remembered that John Foster Dulles had been pro-Nazi before Hitler invaded Poland. No one

thought, either, to question the fact that while John Foster Dulles was running the State Department, and therefore dealing with friendly governments, his brother Allen was running the CIA, which he once described as a State Department for dealing with unfriendly governments'.²⁸

That means both the State Department and the CIA are organic components of U.S. foreign policy, and so both American diplomacy and subversive activities should be examined accordingly, as an integral whole. Previously, Soviet historians avoided such an approach for the simple reason that Washington rarely admitted that the CIA was an official tool of U.S. foreign policy. Another reason was the understandable reluctance to probe into the unsavory dealings of U.S. cloak-and-dagger types. The book Professor Sivachev and myself wrote is a case in point: it deliberately avoided touching on that issue. Perhaps this was an example of the 'restraint' Alan Wolfe referred to. But we can no longer continue in that vein in view of the recent developments in U.S. foreign policy that clearly spell interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

That was why I wrote *CIA Target—U.S.S.R.*, published in the Soviet Union in 1979. I believe it should be viewed in conjunction with the survey of U.S.-Soviet diplomatic relations Professor Sivachev and myself wrote for the American audience. The two books, I trust, will offer a balanced view of how Soviet historians assess Washington's policy toward the Soviet Union.

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